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Abstract 
 
Legal provisions in the US have extended the idea of the border to the inside of 
US territory. Border Patrol Agents confront people in different spaces to inquire 
about their status. I examine border policing along the northern border of the 
United States through textual and discourse analysis. This thesis asks: How do 
border agents exercise power and control the movement of people within 100 
miles of the border? In whose interest is the border, the “nation,” secured? The 
spaces in which these mobile borders are practiced become the sites where 
“citizens” and “aliens” are produced, reproduced and contested. These border 
policing practices create the illusion of a “nation” that is secured for “our” 
interests. However, the interests of these vulnerable groups are not reflected in the 
immigration policy and along the “border. Therefore the very existence of 
immigrants and their basic right to be in the US is undermined. 
Keywords: Political geography; US-Canada Border; border patrol; “aliens;” 
border policing  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
 In 2004, a private high-speed ferry service was initiated between Toronto, ON and 
Rochester, NY, and this service created the need for Border Patrol and Border Patrol 
Agents (BPAs) in Rochester, NY. The purpose of the BPAs was to act as a border control 
for ferry service passengers. Previous to the establishment of BPAs, the border in Lake 
Ontario had existed on maps and in minds, but had not appeared physically or materially 
to the people in Rochester. The imagined borderline in Lake Ontario between the US and 
Canada was, thus, materialized as a result of the ferry service, through which the border 
and border agents entered into everyday life on the northern border. Within a couple of 
months, the ferry service went bankrupt and was discontinued. Interestingly, the number 
of Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) at the station has, nevertheless increased. This increase 
occurred despite the ferry service’s discontinuation. The BPAs in Rochester patrol(ed) 
borders between points of entry and 100 miles inside of the international border.1 This 
border policing represents an internal extension of the idea of border and border control; 
some of the rules and regulations at existing ports of entry now are applied within 100 
miles of the borderline. This legal shift also provides authority for low-level immigration 
officials to detain and force out those believed to be unauthorized to be in the US. In 
other words, the right of individuals to apply for juridical review has been eliminated for 
those “aliens.”   
 With no port of entry or material or imagined border to protect, the Rochester 
BPAs have shifted their attention to non-traditional locations. BPAs have entered Amtrak 
                                                
1 While I was conducting my research, on October 27 2011, Border Patrol Headquarters 
had issued a memo that halted border agent’s internal “checks” on the northern border 
(NBPC 2011).  
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trains and Greyhound buses and they even moved into “parks, downtown, shopping malls 
and other public spaces” to challenge people to declare their citizenship status (Jensen 
2009: 2). In other words, these practices have slowly expanded along the northern United 
States. In spite of the BPAs involvement in the everyday public and private spaces, these 
questionable practices have not attracted much attention in public life, media or thus far 
in academia (see Coleman 2007). My preliminary observations, having lived and 
participated in the everyday life of Syracuse, NY between 2003 and 2009, suggest that 
these border policing practices have gone unnoticed and unremarked considering the 
increased visibility and the number of border patrol agents in unconventional places.  
 During the Cold War, borders, both in theory and practice were understood as 
concrete and immobile port-of-entry locations and rigid lines that separated nation-states 
(and the people residing there). However, in the late 1990s, scholars argued that borders 
were not simply fixed lines; they questioned the static lines produced in previous 
scholarship, and argued that borders are “the sum of social, cultural and political [and 
economic] processes” (Johnson and Jones 2011:61). According to Johnson and Jones, 
Etienne Balibar’s notion that “borders are everywhere” (Balibar 1998, quoted in Johnson 
and Jones 2011:61) suggests that  “the traditional sovereign state’s loci of the borders and 
bordering practices can no longer be isolated to the lines of a political map of states.”  In 
relation I confer that borders are (and were) everywhere but add that for some people 
they are more concrete and material. These theoretical changes in academic circles have 
been paralleled by changes at physical borders around the world. The concrete and 
permanent lines of national boundaries—borders—are now mobile. In the United States, 
the expanding legal provisions reify borders and declare anywhere within 100 miles of 
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the border as a port of entry. As Mountz asserts, “the border increasingly crops up in 
unlikely places—the laundromat, the grocery store, the bus station—places not 
traditionally conceived of as the border, but where the US Border Patrol operates 
nonetheless” (Mountz 2011: 65). These border policing practices aim to “secure” the 
nation, borders and the “citizens” by detaining and removing those who are recognized as 
non-citizens, “illegal aliens” (and “terrorists”). Hence, my research focuses on the history 
of those recognized as “aliens” in the US.  
 During the semester of fall 2009 at Syracuse University, in one of my classes we 
discussed “illegal” immigration and border security. My colleagues immediately began to 
talk about threats from the southern border. There was no attention given to the northern 
border. The negative image of the southern border is the result of the historical (and 
social) construction of the US-Mexico boundary as the source of unauthorized 
immigrants (Nevins 2010; Sánchez 1993). In contrast to the south, the US-Canada border 
historically has not attracted much attention. The previous and more positive (and 
friendly) perceptions of the US-Canada border do not seem to match current practices of 
the BPAs. Yet, the “aliens” and the alienation of those recognized as non-citizens 
continue to be the norm within 100 miles of US-Canada border. Although “‘illegal’ 
flows, including the smuggling of drugs, cigarettes, migrants [i.e. “aliens”], and arms” 
persist at the US-Canada border, unlike the southern border, they have been 
overshadowed by increasing legal commercial flows in the post NAFTA era (Andreas 
2005: 451). Similar legal flows also occurred at the US-Mexico border in the post 
NAFTA era (Nevins 2010: 8-9); however, the parallel increase in legal economic 
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activities at the southern border did not change the US government perspective on the 
US-Mexico border as the place where most of the “illegal” activity takes place.  
 Stephen Flynn (2004, also quoted in Andreas 2005) explains that before the 
September 11th attacks, half of the northern border’s ports of entry (that is 126) were left 
unguarded, or orange cones were put to work to protect the nation’s borders. For the 
potential border crosser, the orange cones meant that the crossing was closed. By contrast 
to the northern border, even by the late 1990s, the number of border patrol agents in 
Brownsville, TX alone was more than the number for the entire US-Canada border. To 
show the disparity between the southern and northern border, Andreas points out that 
“[b]y 2001, there were only 334 US agents assigned to police the 4,000 mile-long 
northern border compared to 9,000 agents on the 2,000-mile-long US-Mexico border” 
(2005:452). Despite similar legal and illegal socio-economic activities on both sides of 
the US border, the “positive” image of the northern border and the differences in the 
number of agents suggest that the racial imperative of gatekeeping has kept focus on the 
south and that might be one of the reasons why students in our class discussion on 
“illegal” migrants primarily focused on the (darker) US-Mexico border. Although border 
security and build-up had begun (such as Operation Wetback, Gatekeeper) long before 
September 11th (Nevins 2010), the attacks provided further justification and a rhetorical 
cover for “securing the nation’s borders.” After the attacks, it became clear that the US-
Canada border would be viewed, at least for a while, as no “different” from the south—
suggesting that the racial imperative of gatekeeping has expanded to include other 
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interests.2 In addition, with the expansion of border policing operations, one also 
observes a strong relationship between these policies and job security for border patrol 
agents. The low number of unauthorized entries at the US-Canada border could explain 
the lack of attention to the north, but then, why has the US government increased border 
enforcement along the northern border? Furthermore, in light of those increases, why 
have these border enforcements attracted little public and media attention? There are 
numerical differences between the US-Canada and US-Mexico borders in terms of 
unauthorized entries. These numerical differences might be useful for statistics; however, 
the reasoning that is based on numbers alone will be reductive and says nothing about the 
historical, social and economic relationships. In effect, it ignores the history of making 
“illegal aliens” in the US. 
 The histories and geographies of borders cannot be separated from the histories 
and geographies of those who are made into “aliens.” The US State and its institutions, 
the media, non-governmental organizations (and people) produce and reproduce citizen, 
and non-citizen (“alien”). When compared to the south of the border, the northern US 
border, given these increased security measures and the presence of Border Patrol Agents 
in unlikely places remains largely invisible over much of its distance. In this thesis I 
explore this state space with critical geographical thought. Second and related, I 
contribute to the growth of geographical knowledge on the northern border. Finally, 
through this research I make these border policing practices more visible. To be able to 
accomplish these objectives, I investigate social and spatial changes in immigration and 
border policing practices by examining the history of the US immigration and border 
                                                
2 At least until October 27 2011, when Border Patrol Headquarters halted border agents 
“checks” on the northern border (NBPC 2011). 
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enforcement. I ask and explore the following questions: How do the BPAs exercise 
power, distinguish citizen from non-citizen, and secure the “nation?” Over which spaces 
do BPAs exercise power? What is the role of “race,” class, (and/or whiteness) in the 
exercise of power? And, in whose interest is the nation secured? To sum up, in this thesis, 
I will examine how BPAs exercise power, control spaces, and manage the movement of 
people—citizen, non-citizen and “alien”—within 100 miles of the international border. 
 This research is framed by political geography where social, spatial, economic 
and political power dynamics shape, and are shaped by people and spaces (cf. Delaney 
2009). As a political and geographic project, my thesis is also shaped by these power 
dynamics. In chapter two, I discuss my methodology, and my methodological challenges. 
In other words, I describe my research methods, challenges and experiences, and my 
positionality in an attempt to situate this thesis and myself. In chapter three, I focus on 
key geographical concepts such as border and territory, territoriality, citizenship and the 
state, and security and surveillance. The study of these concepts provides me with critical 
lenses that are useful for the examination of the border policing practices. On the next 
chapter, I explore the historical production of “aliens” in relation to “race” (racialization) 
and whiteness in the US. I closely examine the history of “aliens,” and those who are 
alienated in order to argue that these constructs shaped both past and present immigration 
policy and border control in the US. One of the border enforcement programs put to work 
by US State was Operation Gatekeeper. This was not only a government policy or 
boundary build-up, but, as Nevins puts it (2010), it was also a manifestation of decades of 
economic, social and political relations and struggles that made and remade individuals 
and the border. In Chapter five, I briefly examine the border patrol as an institution and 
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narrow my focus to the border policing on the northern border by closely exploring 
Rochester, NY and Olympic Peninsula, WA. I explore and provide detailed discussion of 
these fluid (and unnoticed) border-policing practices that aim to protect and secure 
“nation’s” borders and its citizens from non-citizen or “aliens.”   
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Chapter 2 -- Methodology: 
2.1 Introduction: 
 
 Qualitative research has played a crucial role in geographical thinking and 
practice; Cope (2010) and Crang and Cook (2007) attest to the notion that an increasing 
number of human geographers have used and are using qualitative methods. Cope (2010: 
25 original emphasis) asserts, “[i]n fact, qualitative research cannot be separated from the 
history of geography at any point: as long as there have been attempts to ‘write the world’ 
(geo-graphy), there have been qualitative methods of observation, synthesis, analysis and 
representation.” Hence, this chapter focuses on the qualitative methods that, as a 
geographer, I have employed or chosen not to employ in this thesis. The principal aim of 
this research is to investigate contemporary bordering practices inside the territory of the 
United States—particularly on the northern border. In order to do achieve this goal, I 
engaged in qualitative research methods that include textual and discourse analysis and 
participant observation.  This research is the product of my theoretical and political 
commitments, which themselves are the product of social relations that have been 
negotiated and shaped by many factors including (but not limited to) my committee 
members, texts, documents and the institutions I encountered.  
 To be able to demonstrate this negotiation process, I first discuss how 
bureaucracy in academia, Brock’s Research Ethics Board (REB), has limited and shaped 
this research. My aim here is to reflect on my experiences and some of the difficulties 
that I have encountered undertaking this thesis. Although my intention is to share my 
experiences and difficulties with other students and faculty, I make no recommendation, 
since I have decided not to seek ethics clearance. After commenting on my REB 
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experience, I move on to a discussion of the qualitative methods that I employed for this 
research. These qualitative methods are also helpful for providing me with perspectives 
that are useful for the examination of contemporary border practices in the US. The 
discussion of qualitative methods is accompanied by my own positionality and 
subjectivity. The Dictionary of Human Geography explains, methodology includes “the 
principles and assumptions underlying the choice of techniques for constructing and 
analyzing data” (Gregory et al. 2009: 457). Thus, the discussion and the triangulation of 
my research experience, qualitative methods and my positionality are crucial for 
understanding the methodology behind this thesis.  
2.2 Ethics: Qualitative Research Failed? 
 
 Since the 1990s an increasing number of human geographers have been training in 
qualitative research methods and have applied qualitative methods in research that 
involves human participants. This increase in the application of qualitative methods has 
also increased the interchange between researchers and Research Ethics Boards (REB) or 
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) (Butz 2008).3 In terms of research that involves 
human subjects, there is a long history of abuse and neglect (Evans-Pritchard [1940] 
1969, Pratt 1986, Rosaldo 1986, Clifford 1988, Price 2012a).4 While scholars have been 
searching for ways to address problems with research that includes human subjects, 
academic institutions, such as REBs, exist to aid researchers and provide some protection 
                                                
3 IRB is used in the US, and REB is used in Canada. 
4 For example, the term “research” has a close historical relationship to European 
colonialism and imperialism in that “The word [research] itself is probably one of the 
dirtiest words in the indigenous world’s vocabulary…it is implicated in the worst 
excesses of colonialism, with the ways in which, knowledge about the indigenous peoples 
was collected, classified and then represented back to the West” (Linda Tuhiwai Smith 
1999: 1, quoted in Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 1, emphasis by Denzin and Lincoln).  
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for both the participants and the researcher. However, the interchange between researcher 
and REB is not always a pleasant encounter. There have been ongoing problems between 
REBs and researchers and scholars have made an effort to identify some of these 
problems. Some geographers stress the inadequacy of the official frame on which REBs 
rely such as Canada’s Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research 
Involving Humans, or in the US 45 CFR 46 (Butz 2008, Shea 2000, Martin and Inwood 
2012, Price 2012a, 2012b, Trudeau 2012).  Some geographers share their experiences 
more frankly (Cohen 2007, Epstein 2007, also see Shea 2000) and others avoid research 
with human subjects due to “fear [of] the powers of their IRBs to limit future research 
trajectories, or to make the tenure process difficult” (Martin and Inwood 2012: 14 fn:1). 
In my case, I share both my experiences and my fears—a timely completion of my thesis 
and my program—to stimulate the discussion around the qualitative research and REB. 
 Originally, I intended my research to focus on individuals, or more specifically, 
students or residents in Rochester and Syracuse, NY who experienced contemporary 
bordering practices and/or border policing with Border Agents in Rochester, NY. My 
preliminary investigation and exchange of ideas with some of my faculty members 
showed that access to these groups might be difficult due to issues around accessibility, 
privacy and security for those who will take part in my research. Despite these concerns, 
through communicating with some of my friends in Rochester and Syracuse, NY, I 
learned that I could access and interview some of the people who had experienced border 
policing. Moreover, some Syracuse alumni who worked with border agents in Rochester 
provided me with contact information for border patrol agents as well. However, my 
excitement was short lived. Although, I had a chance to find and interview willing 
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participants (and perhaps BPAs)5, I encountered an institutional and bureaucratic setback 
with Brock University Research Ethics Board (REB).  
 I was new to REB process and some graduate students and faculty at Brock 
suggested that the Brock REB had a reputation for being arduous and demanding.6 Thus 
to prepare myself, I sought assistance from people who had experience with REBs, such 
as faculty and graduate students in my program along with graduate students at other 
universities. I gathered two approved applications from graduate students in my program 
and one from a Ph. D. student at York University in Canada whose research focus 
involved borders and border crossing between Canada and the US. After a couple of 
weeks of reading, writing and re-writing, I managed to come up with the first draft of my 
REB application. I forwarded this draft to my supervisor and one other person at the REB 
for feedback. Based on their feedback, I revised my application and then on May 6, 2011, 
I submitted my application for review. On May 9, 2011, I received an e-mail stating that 
my application had been submitted for “Expedited review.” However, the expediting did 
not happen. On June 1, 2011, I received an e-mail stating, “The reviewers have 
recommended that [my] proposal be submitted for a full review” and my “proposal will 
be reviewed by the entire Research Ethics Board at the next meeting on Monday June 20, 
2011.  
 
 
                                                
5 The interview with the border agents might not have been useful because there is 
always the possibility that during an interview, border agents might provide answers from 
their website or from their strategic plans. 
6 As Vice President of Internal Affairs for the Graduate Students’ Association at Brock 
University, some graduate students shared their stories with me during informal 
meetings.  
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May 6, 2011 Submitted our application to Brock REB 
May 9, 2011 Received acknowledgment e-mail for “expedited review” 
June 1, 2011 Received notice that my application was submitted for a full review and full 
board meeting scheduled on June 20, 2011 
June 13, 2011 Received an e-mail for clarification and notes for full board review 
June 20, 2011 Dr. Mackintosh and I attended a full board review 
June 21, 2011 Re-submitted revised version 
June 29, 2011 Received an e-mail for (similar) clarification and notes, and notice for second 
full board review scheduled on July 7, 2011 
July 6, 2011 Decided to withdraw my application for REB clearance. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline for my REB application 
  
 Consequently, on June 13, 2011, I received an e-mail stating that the REB “finds 
that [my] proposal requires clarification or revision.” The REB had several significant 
concerns regarding participants in my research—in terms of what would happen to 
participants and researchers during and after the research.7 Some of the clarification 
requested included whether I might need REB clearance from other Universities, whether 
I intended to recruit minors, and whether risks might be present for participating 
individuals and for border patrol agents8 and so on. I responded respectfully and 
professionally to the REB demands with the assumption that they were merely trying to 
improve and protect my research, the potential participants and me. 
 While such concerns are understandable, there were others that made little or no 
sense. In fact, one member at the REB seems to have been unhappy with the content of 
my critique that aimed to question Rochester BPAs bordering practices. I had pointed out 
that when the ferry service went bankrupt and left Rochester with no port of entry or 
material and imagined border to protect, BPAs shifted their attention to non-traditional 
locations. One of the reviewers expressed his/her concern by questioning how I could 
                                                
7 See Brock REB’s website for their concerns with research involving humans 
http://www.brocku.ca/research/ethics-and-research-reviews/human-ethics. 
8 For example, what if BPAs get fired for something they say. 
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make this claim “since the international border is directly north of Rochester, through 
Lake Ontario!” While this point may be arguable, I question its relevance to 
consideration of ethics. Another peculiar suggestion was about one of my potential (and 
important) participants, Mr. Jensen. My application for REB included information about 
Mr. Jensen who had publicly made statements on the issue of border patrol agents and 
their policing practices along with a link to his official statements which are available 
online for the public and for the members of the REB. Yet, one of the reviewers asked me 
to use a pseudonym for Mr. Jensen, and “as well to mitigate any potential risk involved in 
participating in [my] study.”  I should “[o]therwise provide a fuller description for him 
about the risks of being identified by name in the study.” Surely this could have been a 
legitimate concern for Mr. Jensen; however, as I stated before, he had already provided 
both a written account (that suggests these practices allow racial profiling of international 
students) to the US immigration court in NY,9 and he appeared in newspapers such as the 
Chronicle of Higher Education on January 9, 2011.  He expressed his concerns about 
foreign students being picked up by BPAs, and, he said “It feels a lot like East Germany 
did when I visited in 1980” (the chronicle.com).10 He had also publicly spoken against 
these bordering practices on a National Public Radio (NPR) show “All Things 
Considered” (npr.org).11 Jensen had actively sought public venues for his criticism of 
bordering practices, nevertheless, I was asked to use a pseudonym for Mr. Jensen.  
                                                
9 http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/flash/cityroom/CaryJensenDeclaration.pdf (Last 
accessed on February 15, 2012). 
10 http://chronicle.com/article/Far-From-Canada-Aggressive/125880/ (Last accessed on 
February 15, 2012). 
11 http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129888751 (Last accessed on 
February 15, 2012). 
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 I discussed the REB’s suggestions with my supervisor and other departmental 
faculty familiar with the REB process, and I attended the review meeting with one of my 
committee members, Dr. Mackintosh. The meeting followed up on suggestions that the 
REB had made on paper a week before—how to inform participants of the risks, how to 
protect their privacy and how to protect BPAs if they were to lose their jobs because of 
something they said during interviews. However, some follow up suggestions seemed not 
well thought and helpful for improving my application. For example, one REB member 
asked me what I would do if one of the participants was not comfortable using the 
English language during the interviews. While I was not sure how to respond, I replied, 
“if my participant cannot speak English or Turkish then I can not conduct the interview, 
as I do not have the resources to hire a translator.” At this point, seeing that I was getting 
frustrated with the situation (and with some other disconcerting questions as I discussed 
above),12 Dr. Mackintosh intervened and explained that since the researcher will provide 
both information and consent forms beforehand in English and the prospective participant 
(him/herself) would freely contact the researcher, the question raised seemed 
incongruous…if prospective participants could not read or speak English, then they most 
likely cannot communicate and would not contact the researcher and participate in the 
research.  
 I had already begun making changes before our meeting to address some of the 
issues. After the meeting, I again cooperated with the board by addressing some of their 
                                                
12 For example, the REB asked “How do I transfer data between the US and Canada? 
What if the BPAs confiscated my recorder, laptop, etc. The REB recommended I should 
employ online database space and upload information immediately. When I suggested 
online security concerns for a moment it appeared that they understood that there are 
always risks. The REB members seemed to like my other idea where I suggested that I 
would upload the data into a CD that reads Bob Dylan! 
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extended concerns, found ways to revise others, and I resubmitted my application. On 
June 29, 2011, I received an e-mail suggesting that my application required further 
revisions. The suggestions mainly repeated earlier concerns even though I had addressed 
those concerns during our meeting with the board and later in my resubmission. This time 
there were other additions. For example, they asked me if I could provide or refer Brock 
REB “to any published research in this area or any experts in this field who might be 
consulted.”  After two months of struggle during which my attempts to address the 
board’s questions failed to satisfy them, and rather, additional questions were added, my 
supervisor and I decided to pull my application back due to our concerns with a timely 
completion of my studies. While the REBs goal to provide feedback that aims to prevent 
past abuse and extend protections to participants is an invaluable one, the Brock REBs 
actions, at the same time, may be encouraging researches to avoid qualitative research 
designs or research that involves human subjects altogether. Fortunately, I took Crang 
and Cook’s (2007) advice, and from the beginning I planned back up research methods in 
case the others failed, and this back up kept me going in my research with minor 
adjustments. 
  “As a pragmatist at heart and IRB chair in practice” (2012b: 35) Price suggests 
that REBs/IRBs were nonentities that turned into “grim reapers.” In previous years 
scholars have shared their negative experiences with the REB or IRBs to demonstrate the 
problems of academic research that attempts to include human subjects in a highly 
corporatized university environment (Cohen 2007, Epstein 2007).  Price (2012b) 
acknowledges problems with RIBs, such the corporatization of universities and their risk 
management efforts that work to decrease possible law suits, as well as protecting human 
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research subjects and the researcher. Yet, she also takes a different perspective by 
arguing, “there is no such a thing as IRB per se” like other abstract entities, such as states.  
Price (2012b: 34) writes “for all their focus on human subjects, IRBs themselves are 
pervasively dehumanized in the discourse.”  While some of these points might be valid, 
they fail to recognize the uneven power relations between REB and the researcher. I do 
not want to make a generalization and suggest that all REBs are negative. However, like 
states, the actions and decisions taken by REBs: a) discourage students and researchers 
from designing research that includes people, and b) have material consequences that 
render them very much real and thus REBs turn themselves into “grim reapers.” These 
consequences define my interaction with an REB. Despite the fact that some of the REB 
requests were reasonable and helpful, they were also “real” and made it difficult if not 
impossible to co-operate in producing a substantive, ethical and efficacious qualitative 
research design that includes human subjects.  
 For example, Brock REB members were not shy about using their real 
institutional power to criticize my work, instead of focusing on ethical concerns with my 
research and possible subjects. As I pointed out, one REB member questioned my 
representation of the border between the US and Canada by insisting that it is “right 
directly north of Rochester, though lake Erie.” This point might be arguable, but not in 
the context of an REB. These positions change with theoretical and political 
commitments and/or social positions. However, when an ethics committee member 
presses his/her theoretical and political point of view on a graduate student’s ethics 
application as an issue in their ethics board clarification, there is an ethical problem—and 
a power game. REB members should not only focus on the power dynamics between the 
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researcher and the participants, but also be vigilant about the power dynamic between 
researchers and the REB. REB members should not try to pressure researcher’s 
theoretical and political commitments in ethics applications. Instead they can use their 
non-existing entity powers (Price 2012b) to minister ethics applications and help faculty 
and students improve their applications in a timely manner, so that qualitative research 
methodology is not a scary “thing” but an important and useful tool.  
 In my case, in a five term program I could not possibly continue to seek approval, 
find experts that could be consulted, and answer the same odd questions of the Brock 
REB. After my interactions I became convinced that the Brock REB would not approve 
my project no matter how hard I tried to meet their requests. As much as I believe that 
ours is an ethical profession, it is difficult not to feel unjust play in my instance.13 The 
examples of these unjust and unproductive processes have serious ethical and material 
consequences that might results in timely research not being conducted as a result of REB 
review. That is why, after two months of struggle, we decided to withdraw my 
application and continue with alternative methods in which no human subject would be 
necessary. It is not the researcher that creates fictional characters for the REB. On the 
contrary, the REB and the REB members’ actions help produce these negative images by 
blocking qualitative research projects through bureaucracy. But more importantly, these 
unproductive (and arguably unjust) practices severely damage both the use and the 
application of qualitative research that can be helpful for expanding and sharing scholarly 
knowledge. 
                                                
13 Or, they were afraid of any complications that might occur between the US 
government and Brock University.  As much as participants’ interest, Brock REB also 
needs to protect the interests of the university. 
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2.3 Locating researcher and research: 
 
 As I demonstrate in the next chapter, the topics of borders, territory, citizenship, 
security and surveillance are not only contested in everyday life but also in political 
geography. Mountz suggests that for political geographers “there is [a] work to be done 
to understand with precision where and how borders are moving, and how this movement 
can be conceived of as political” (2011: 5). Following Mountz suggestion, the focus of 
this thesis is on the contemporary bordering practices on the northern border of the US. 
The questions that this thesis asks include the following: How and where do BPAs 
exercise power and police borders? Whom do BPAs target? In whose interest is the 
border secured? This research will provide not only original data for the field of political 
geography, but it will also make these contemporary bordering practices visible and so 
contribute to the theorization of these contested concepts.   
 In order to search for possible answers to these questions, discourse and textual 
analysis is the main method employed in this thesis. BPAs activities are discursive 
practices, hence my methodological approach include a) examination of raw materials 
(border policing practices), and b) careful delineation of the discursive practices enacted 
by the BPAs. For the first part, I examined government sources, media and news outlets, 
and several non-governmental organizations and their reports and memos that are 
connected to my research theme. I searched government websites, documents and reports 
for border control, immigration, and national security. Some of these government sources 
include, but are not limited to, the Department of Homeland Security, the US Customs 
and Border Control, the Library of Congress, and US Congressional Research Services’ 
Reports. In addition to government sources, I researched some of the main online news 
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and media outlets (along with local ones), including but not limited to the New York 
Times, National Public Radio, CNN, Fox News, and local Rochester and Buffalo 
newspapers, with a focus on contemporary bordering practices and the border patrol. The 
newspapers I used were not chosen for their particular ideological position per se, instead 
my attention was on particular themes such as border patrol, mobile borders and related 
key words in the main-stream media. My aim was to look at how the state and media 
produce images for, and of, the state, citizens and borders. In addition to the above 
resources, I also identified and examined non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such 
as the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU), Pew Research Center (PRC), Families For Freedom (FFF) and Applied 
Research Center (ARC) for reports and memos related to my research—and I updated my 
data until the final moments of this project. 
 Wilson (2009) explains that texts help us build and understand social and material 
realities. In this light, each of the sources that I examine has its own ideas to put forward 
and communicate so that each one promotes and creates particular social and material 
realities. Therefore, the policies and positions that are produced by these sources from 
government, media, NGOs and academia, are not neutral. They actively (but unevenly) 
shape, and are shaped by the social and the spatial (Wilson 2009). The main purpose of 
bringing different sources into play (such as government, media and NGOs) is to be able 
to study whose social and material realities are promoted and created and for whom. The 
systematic investigation of related government websites, documents and newspaper 
articles helps me understand not only current discourses around the border, but it also 
allows me, as a researcher, to critically investigate and question how “knowledge is 
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formulated and validated by society as truth” (Dittmer 2010:275). Discourse analysis 
helps me identify inconsistencies and contradictions in current border practices by 
questioning some of these truth claims (Berg 2009). 
 Consequently, I examine relevant academic literature on border, citizenship, 
territory, state, and security and surveillance. In addition, I explore historical texts that 
discuss and offer critical perspectives on “race,” whiteness, class. I contrast different 
historical accounts and experiences to understand how one becomes “aliens” or alienated 
from social, political and economic life. For example, I draw on black and Irish 
experiences, Malcom X’s and MacDonald’s, to demonstrate the complex relationship 
between “race” and class. The contrasting “race” and class helps me scratch the surface 
of the idea of whiteness. My aim is demonstrate and emphasize the relationship between 
historical and the contemporary. The examination of some of the scholarly literature 
assists me with the examination of the data collected above. One of the challenges for my 
research in regards to academic texts has been that, as I mentioned before, most of the 
focus in academia (or in media) is on the US-Mexico border (Andreas 2005, Nevins 
2002, 2010). Therefore my reading background includes border literature that is not 
limited to the US-Canada border. This broad focus assisted me in determining how other 
scholars have approached and examined borders and bordering practices, as well as 
refining my understanding of legal and prevalent geographic perceptions of the border. 
Accordingly, chapter three critically examines relevant literature both in and outside the 
field of geography. Since all of these concepts overlap, the examination of these concepts 
allows me to better explicate discursive practices around the US-Canada border, and it 
helps me find possible answers to the questions of where and how borders and bordering 
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practices are moving, in whose interest are these contemporary bordering practices 
implemented, and from whom is the border secured? I address these questions in chapters 
four and five.  
 Finally, my last method involves participant observation. I lived in Syracuse, NY 
between 2003 and 2010. During the Fall Semester of 2010, I travelled between St. 
Catharines, ON, and Syracuse, NY on a weekly basis (approximately sixteen weeks)—
almost exclusively by car and three times by train.14 After the Fall of 2010, I took up 
residence in Canada, and I regularly crossed the border, most often by car and train, 
between Canada and the US for research and personal reasons. Since I initiated my 
research, I have traveled by car between St. Catharines and Syracuse three times, St. 
Catharines and Buffalo four times, St. Catharines, ON and Rochester, NY two times. I 
also traveled between Buffalo and Syracuse, and Buffalo and New York City by train.15 
These visits involved daily trips and sometimes long-term stays, and I continued my 
observations all the way to early March 2012. My aim in using participant observation is 
to be able to witness how BPAs exert power. As Watson and Till (2010: 122, emphasis 
added) explain,  
“[a]lthough ethnographies draw upon myriad of source materials, including 
formal interviews, material culture, performances, images, and texts, we focus on 
observation, reflection and learning—including recording, analyzing and 
representing qualitative data—because participant-observation is perhaps the 
defining method that distinguishes ethnography from other qualitative research 
designs.” 
                                                
14 One of these trips took place in 2010 but before my research project started. 
15 The route includes Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, Rome, Utica, Amsterdam,…New 
York, NY (Empire Service 2011). 
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While traveling back and forth, I participated, observed, and gathered information about 
the US State and its border patrol agents. While I was travelling, I took notes, took 
pictures and made videos of the spaces that I have been to so that I would be able to 
describe and reflect on my observations and experiences later on. In addition, my 
participation in the everyday geographies of the border helped me to catch a glimpse of 
how BPAs exercise power in these spaces. The triangulation of academic investigation, 
government and media resources, and participant observation provides a strong 
background for this thesis.  
 While I attempt to highlight overlooked histories, policies and practices, I must 
also situate myself in this research. This self-reflexive account will help readers to be 
able to understand how I, as a researcher, have a partial understanding of the world 
around me. Following Harraway (1988), geographers have pointed out the importance of 
self-reflexivity in geographical research (Katz 1992, Rose 1997, Crang and Cook 2007, 
Kobayashi 2009, DeLyser et al. 2010).  Some of my experiences position me as an 
insider while others place me outside of my research area. My interest in the border, the 
state, space, and power has not been solely theoretical; I have an embodied relationship to 
human geography. A key example will illustrate what I mean here: On July 29, 2003 my 
partner and I were flying from Istanbul to New York. My partner held a U.S. passport, 
and I had a Turkish passport along with my new status as a permanent resident alien—A# 
200-155-214. On our journey to the U.S., we had a six-hour long stopover in Frankfurt, 
Germany. My partner and I naively planned to leave the airport and go to a café or 
restaurant close by. When we got to border control, my “American” partner found that 
she could easily cross into the “territory” of Germany, while I, of course, could not; we 
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had failed to understand the very complex relationship between borders, territoriality and 
national identities in Germany. I was marked as an unwanted stranger or foreigner, 
because I was recognized as Turkish in Germany in the context of a historical relationship 
between Germany and Turkey that developed after the initiation of the “gastarbieter” 
program of the 1960s through which the existence of Turks became similar to that of 
African Americans in the US or Kurds in Turkey. These historical relationships ensured 
that my Turkishness at the airport in Germany would be viewed officially as a threat to 
the nation-state. This experience gave birth to a curiosity that led me to explore the 
geopolitics of borders and migrants.  
  Although most of my subsequent experiences in the US were unremarkable, I 
have also had a number of difficult experiences during which I was subject (most often 
verbally and a few times physically) to harassment, seemingly due to not being perceived 
as part of the social imaginary of the US state. These experiences ranged from not being 
recognized as a reliable person due to my accent to being recognized as the responsible 
person for otherwise unexplainable federal violations at the Syracuse airport. These 
experiences also included jokes from co-workers and others about how I ever managed to 
pass the FBI background check (to my knowledge I passed it at least three times), and 
they included several instances of being called a “terrorist” due to my (so-called) lack of 
patriotism in not supporting wars around the globe.  These experiences have heightened 
my sensitivity to the pressures that those perceived as outsiders of the US state may 
experience in daily life.  
 Since my US naturalization ceremony in 2007, I carry additional papers that have 
again redefined my geopolitical status, as I became a U.S. citizen and so, ostensibly, a 
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North American insider. One would assume that most of the above problems would 
disappear, and at least on paper (and as long as I do not speak) I am no longer likely to be 
perceived as a stranger. With my US passport in hand, the imaginary borders of nation-
states have become less concerned with my movements across “their” territories. 
Consequently, my previous permanent resident alien status (“legal alien”) and my 
subsequent naturalization, my “white” skin, and my male gender, have all provided me 
with certain privileges and the ability to pass unnoticed, and these factors situate me as an 
insider as well. In other words, while I have experienced some forms of othering, I have 
not shared the negative experiences of people who have a darker skin colour or who do 
not otherwise look “white.”  
2.4 Conclusion:  
 
 The points that I make in this thesis are political and as the above self-reflection 
suggests, personal. Hence, this paper is not objective, and has no intention or claim to 
being objective. This thesis is made by the histories that I have experienced and read, and 
bordering practices that I examined. But, it has also been influenced by my own political 
beliefs, my experiences and by other individuals. I am not motivated by the desire or 
intention to save others or “aliens,” to romanticize them, or fix the socio-economic 
problems in the US. In other words, I am not speaking for subjugated people; rather, 
following Spivak, I attempt to speak with them (Spivak 1988). Thus, this research is a 
part of an ongoing resistance against past and current discursive practices that make 
people “illegal.” If the US can continue to celebrate the history and the “discovery” of 
America despite the annihilation of Native Americans (and their homeland) by 
Columbus, if the US can call itself a “nation of laws” but fails to recognize its own legal 
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documents and treaties with Native Americans and, further, justifies the assassination of a 
US citizen or non-citizen as legal, if the US through the legal and social construction of 
race has enslaved people and defined who could be a citizen or non-citizen based on skin 
colour or by their skull size up until the 1950s (Haney-López 2006, Mitchell 2000), if, in 
the name of “securing borders” and “national security” thousands of migrant deaths can 
be ignored (Jimenez 2009, CSR 2010: 25), while the assassinations of others are 
celebrated (Coskan-Johnson 2012, unpublished manuscript), and if the US border agents 
viciously search buses, train stations, highways, ferry terminals, parks, and downtowns 
for possible “illegal aliens,” then this thesis resists current law and order and national 
security discourses that the US State has been employing for a long time. My aim is to 
highlight neglected histories and unremarked policies and practices at the thresholds of 
the US borders and/or inside the US territory to make what appears to be invisible and 
unheard, visible and heard.  
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Chapter 3 -- Literature Review: 
 
3.1 Citizenship and the State  
 
 In reviewing the geographical literature on citizenship and the state, I focus on 
some of the central themes that are most relevant to my research. I start with a brief 
overview of the literature, and then in the remaining part of this section, I gradually move 
into a detailed discussion of these concepts. In the following section, I review the 
complex and contested idea of citizenship. Here my objective is to better understand how 
the US State and some mainstream media reify citizen and non-citizen, and then, in 
contrast, I examine the ways that scholars characterize citizenship. For some of the 
geographers that I examine below, citizenship is a complex and contested idea. 
Consequently, any configuration of citizenship requires a critical approach that examines 
not only the formality of, but also the practices of citizenship—not only genealogy, but 
also experiences, historical relations and the people-subjects (Staeheli 2010). This 
literature review will contribute both to political geography and to the examination of the 
(US) state and the citizenship practices that are occurring inside US territory. Each 
section will start with a brief review of the terms, and then I will examine the different 
forms of the state and the practices of citizenship that conflict when put to work both in 
theory and practice. 
3.1.1 Citizenship: Is it a status or a practice?  
 
 Citizenship, then, can be described as a form of membership in a particular 
territory or nation-state. The condition of this membership can be based on place of birth 
(jus solis) or on parental status (jus sanguini), which is used to determine membership, or 
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on religious background. The immigrant who is not a full member can become a full 
member of the state, a citizen, through the naturalization process (Mountz 2009: 288)16. 
These are some of the ways that citizenship status can be achieved.  
 Chouinard (2009: 107) explains that geographers’ interest in citizenship dates 
back to Strabo and Ptolemy. However, until the 1970s political geographers’ interests 
were limited to national borders, and their spatial analysis was engaged with voting 
patterns and voting districts (Low 2008: 353). Following the 1970s, radical, feminist and 
critical geographers began to emphasize the complex nature of the concept. The general 
argument was that citizenship not only must be examined inside and outside the state, but 
also that a significant focus must be on how different groups of people or individuals 
experience the socially and geographically uneven exclusionary practices of citizenship 
(Chouinard 2009: 107) and rights (Kofman 2005). Feminist geographers like Hyndman 
(2004), Staeheli (2008, 2010) , Cowen and Gilbert (2008), for example, have intervened 
and challenged a vision of citizenship that is based on a universal contract; they argued 
that the female body (along with other socially, economically and politically subjugated 
groups/bodies) had been absent in these previously established patriarchal analyses 
(Chouinard 2009: 108).  
 These conceptual changes provided different perspectives from which political 
geographers could critically examine the characteristics of citizenship, such as “identity, 
belonging, status, rights, and responsibilities” (Cowen and Gilbert 2008:10). While 
                                                
16 Naturalization requirements differ from state to state. However, one is not “Semel civis 
semper civis,” once a citizen always a citizen (Black 1995: 1069). People can also be 
denaturalized. (See Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA act), Title 3, chapter 3, act: 
349 loss of nationality by native-born or naturalized citizen 
(http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-29.html#0-0-0-154 
accessed on 11/11/2011). 
	   28	  
citizenship comes with social, political and economic rights (the right to vote or the right 
to assemble against the government), duties and responsibilities, the definition of 
citizenship and the production of citizens become contradictory when they are put into 
practice. These definitions change in time and space with the interest of the dominant 
groups.17 However, it is not only the state and its apparatuses that produce citizens. The 
media, businesses, and the people also contribute to the construction and constitution of 
citizens and the production of citizenship.18   
 One of the significant contributors to the constitution and construction of 
citizenship is the mainstream media. Noam Chomsky (2001: 24) explains how 
mainstream media work to construct submissive people through the “manufacture of 
consent.” He explains that the manufacture of consent creates the necessary conditions 
for spectators so that people make “right” decisions—as free citizens who have a right to 
                                                
17 Here, my intention is not to undermine those social groups who are struggling for basic 
rights. Instead, I am suggesting that those rights often coincide with the interests of those 
who hold (or those who want to hold on to) social and economic power. The long 
struggle of the Gay and Lesbian communities in the US (for basic rights) significantly 
shaped and contributed to the repeal of US military policy of “don’t ask, don’t tell.” But 
the repeal also comes at a time when US government is trying to administer two wars at 
the same time—where soldiers are deployed multiple times. The US government cannot 
afford to say no or dismiss people who are serving or want to serve the US government. 
This is the point Vice President Biden made right before signing the bill that ended the 
“don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. He said that “[t]his fulfills an important campaign promise 
the President and I made, and many here on this stage made, and many of you have 
fought for, for a long time, in repealing a policy that actually weakens our national 
security, diminished our ability to have military readiness, and violates the fundamental 
American principle of fairness and equality —that exact same set of principles that brave 
gay men and women will now be able to openly defend around the world.” And later 
President Obama concluded that “[t]hat is why I say to all Americans, gay or straight, 
who want nothing more than to defend this country in uniform: Your country needs you, 
your country wants you, and we will be honored to welcome you into the ranks of the 
finest military the world has ever known.” (http://queerrhetoric.com/tag/dont-ask-dont-
tell/, accessed on October 28, 2012). 
18 These other contributors are also closely associated with the state apparatuses. 
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vote. Thus “we [elites] make sure that their choices and attitudes will be structured in 
such a way that they will do what we tell them, even if they have a formal way to 
participate. So we’ll have a real democracy” (2001:24). The question is, then, in whose 
interest are these images and meanings made and remade by the mainstream media? For 
Guy Debord (1994 [1967]: 19) the mass media as understood in the limited sense, is not a 
neutral and simple apparatus.  In fact, he explains, “it answers precisely to the needs of 
the spectacle’s internal dynamics.” Debord writes that spectacle’s function is the 
“concrete manufacture of alienation” (1994: 23) and if the communication between 
people and the administration is mediated by mass media, which manufactures consent so 
that people make “right” decisions, then this “communication is essentially one-way 
(1994: 19, original emphasis). Debord continues “the concentration of the media thus 
amounts to the monopolization by the administrators of the existing system of the means 
to pursue their particular form of administration” (ibid). Chomsky captures this one-way 
relationship in the past: people become “spectators” not participants (2001:22). For 
example the US President Woodrow Wilson campaigned for presidency and used the 
slogan “peace without victory.” He was elected for his position against the US’ 
involvement in the World War I. However, when President Wilson decided to participate 
in the war, he needed the consent of his spectators. This is where propaganda or 
“manufacture of consent” was used to form people’s choices and attitudes so that they 
would make right decisions. Within several months a real democracy worked and the US 
State was in the war (Chomsky 2001: 23).19 Thus, it is difficult to ignore the mass media 
                                                
19 Chomsky discussed two other examples; one being how Hitler saw similar opportunity 
after the World War I. Second, how businesses discovered the power of the manufacture 
of consent by successfully persuading women to smoke. 
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and its role in the construction of citizen and non-citizen in the past because knowing the 
past will help us better understand present. 
  Example from present could be Lou Dobbs, formerly of CNN or Glen Beck, 
formerly of Fox News, (as I will discuss in later chapters). They have defined and 
constructed citizen and non-citizens (as “illegal aliens”) for people in the US. 20 They 
assist and push particular ideologies so that people, as spectators, make the right choices, 
and create new ways of thinking that normalize these ideologies. 21 With the assistance of 
some mass media, the state, its institutions and agents put forward their particular 
positions and policies that work to define citizen and non-citizen. For example, border 
patrol agents’ “primary mission is to detect and prevent the entry of terrorists, weapons of 
mass destruction, and illegal aliens into the country, and to interdict drug smugglers and 
other criminals along the border” (CRS Report 2010). Therefore, the ways in which these 
images of “terrorists,” “illegal aliens” along with “citizens” are produced by the state and 
assisted by media become an integral part of citizenship practices. One witnesses this 
process in the course of the US Border Patrol Agents’ day-to-day operations that aim to 
track down and detain non-citizens.  
 Chouinard suggests that “[c]itizenship refers to particular ways of being situated 
within and responding to relations of power through which a community is governed or 
ruled” (2009:107). These power relations represent contradictions between formal (i.e. 
status) and substantive citizenship (practice). Membership in a particular state comes with 
                                                
20 To be able to listen or read Dobbs or Beck’s take on “illegal aliens”, one only has to 
type “illegal alien” and Loub Dobbs or Glen Beck in the popular search engines.  
21 In the beginning of History of Sexuality, Foucault explains how new discourses are 
created and normalized. Foucault demonstrates how small re-action to a “normal” 
repeated sexual favor in the past leads to the creation of various other legal and social 
discourses work to ban the old “normal” (1990 [1978]: 17-35).  
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rights, legal and moral criminalize duties, and responsibilities. In the US, these qualities 
are for the most part constructed and shaped through both repressive and ideological state 
apparatuses (Althusser 1972). These apparatuses often reflect and serve the interest of 
dominant groups such as wealthy, Christian, heterosexual “White” males. State 
apparatuses which include institutions such as the border patrol, mass media, religious 
and educational institutions, etc. most often reflect the interests of these groups. Thus, I 
argue that when BPAs confront people to determine their citizenship status, those people 
obey the laws and policies that are constituted by these dominant groups. While formal 
citizenship stresses citizens’ rights and responsibilities to the nation-state, the actual 
practice of citizenship raises the question of how these rights and responsibilities are 
practiced in a way that excludes some people and their rights in certain spaces and places 
(see Sibley 1995). In other words, citizenship contains rights, duties, and responsibilities, 
while at the same time, it is also a tool for defining and excluding those who do not have 
or share these qualities (Isin 2002a, b; Painter and Philo 1995; Purcell 2003, 2008; 
Staeheli 2010). Clearly, the space in which citizenship is defined and contested is a 
continuous concern for geographers.  
 More recently, Staeheli (2010) has re-examined the citizenship concept in 
political geography and argued that citizenship is not easy to capture and locate.22 She 
points out that citizenship is a contested term both in theory and practice and that there 
are different and contradictory approaches and definitions that attempt to explain the 
concept. As a result of these diverse approaches, multiple meanings surface: “citizenship 
is multifaceted; it is embedded in the relationships that construct places to broader 
                                                
22 Yet, border agents seem to have no problem capturing the difference and distinguishing 
citizen from non-citizen. 
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networks; it takes on different context; and it seems to be defined as much by what it is 
not as by what it is” (Staeheli 2010: 1, original emphasis). Staeheli’s re-examination of 
citizenship is useful to inform, expand, and systematize my understanding of the 
citizenship literature. 
 Staeheli suggests that given the differences found in debates around the concept 
of citizenship, there is recognition that “actually existing citizenship” cannot be detached 
from the broader currents and processes shaping societies (2010: 2). Therefore, 
citizenship is both a status and a practice, or as Staeheli puts it “a set of relationships by 
which membership is constructed through physical and metaphorical boundaries and in 
the sites and practice that give it a meaning” (Ibid). In other words, citizenship is 
materialized when individuals encounter the nation-state at particular sites such as public 
and private spaces (inside sovereign territory), spaces above the national (offshore), and 
sites beyond the Global North (Mountz 2010: 150, 2011: 76; Staeheli 2010: 2-3). If we 
recall the discussion of Chomsky and Debord’s mass media analysis above, it becomes 
clear that these metaphorical sites, physical borders, or in my case anywhere within 100 
miles of the border (mobile borders), constitute some of the places where citizenship is 
made, remade, and contested everyday. For example, mobile border policing enables the 
US State and its institutions—with laws and policies and discourses of fear and 
security—to justify its exclusionary practices as if border policing is necessary for the 
protection of US democracy and citizens from potentially dangerous non-citizens, “illegal 
immigrants,” “aliens,” “terrorists” or whoever looks like a non-citizen (Staeheli 2010:2, 
Nevins 2010: 114-15, for geopolitics of fear see Pain 2009, 2010, Staeheli and Nagel 
2008).  
	   33	  
 These contestations between who is or is not a citizen are not always seen, and 
when they can be seen, they are communicated one-way so that the material existence of 
non-citizens in these spaces becomes transgression, rather than resistance of the 
boundaries of citizenship practices. This tension is partly due to differing views on how 
to conceptualize citizenship, which further complicates the question of which part of 
citizenship, formal versus practice, one must focus. Staeheli acknowledges the points 
made in Isin and Nielsen’s analysis (2008: 2, quoted in Staeheli 2010: 7) that emphasis 
should be given to the historical construction (patterns and relationships) of citizenship. 
In other words, it is important to “understand the formation of citizenship, its genealogy, 
and its disruptions” (Ibid). However, Staeheli goes on to say that it “feels uncomfortable 
to seem to ignore the citizen-subject, to decenter experience and subjectivity” (ibid). 
Sharing Staeheli’s discomfort at ignoring the citizen-subject but also recognizing the 
importance of citizenship as a historical construction, my analysis in later chapters 
utilizes the historical construction of citizenship, and citizens and non-citizens of the past 
and present. As a political geographer, I make use of the past to understand and 
investigate how are citizen(s) and non-citizens produced and reproduced presently inside 
the US territory. 
3.1.2 Conclusion: 
 
 Based on the discussion above, it is difficult to univocally define or conceptualize 
citizenship. As I have argued, citizenship is made, remade and contested. The practices of 
citizenship occur not only at border crossings but also in train/bus stations, downtowns, 
public parks, universities or the private spaces of malls. But so does the contestation of 
these practices. In relation to citizenship and the state, Purcell (2003: 570) suggests that 
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the economy and the state have been de- and reterritorialized at different scales. While 
the economy might be reconfigured by the “spatial reorganization of policy 
coordination,” the de- and reterritorialization of citizenship and the state challenge the 
idea of the nation and the state. These changes at various scales might give the 
impression that the nation and the state have been undermined. However, in spite of this 
direct challenge, one still observes that in the formation of the EU and NAFTA, nation-
states (at least dominant ones such as the UK in the EU and the US in NAFTA), continue 
to make decisions in their national interest rather than in response to regional or other 
states’ concerns. In terms of citizenship, these states continue to define and practice 
citizenship23 on different but connected scales. Neil Smith uses the term “jumping scales” 
to show the connection among various scales (Smith 1993: 66). Smith explains “[i]t is 
geographical scale that defines the boundaries and bounds the identities around which 
control is exerted and contested” (Ibid). Here, the scale is not cartographic or 
methodological, but rather it is geographical. Geographical scale is a social process, 
which contains both social activity and the site where this activity takes place. While de- 
and rescaling occurs in citizenship, the state, and the economy, this does not mean that 
the traditional state is destabilized or undermined. As Brenner (1999: 53, emphasis 
added) explains:  
 “Crucially, this re-scaling of territoriality does not entail the state's erosion but 
rather its reterritorialization onto both sub- and supra-national scales. States 
continue to operate as essential sites of territorialization for social, political, and 
economic relations, even if the political geography of this territorialization 
process no longer converges predominantly or exclusively upon any single, self-
enclosed geographical scale.” 
                                                
23 This does not mean that there is no resistance to these unequal and unjust practices. 
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This view of scale describes the case in my thesis. The US state continues to work to 
shape social, political and economic relations. These new forms—the EU, NAFTA, 
ASEAN, etc—like the idea of citizenship, are still subject to institutions that are the 
products of the state. In other words, the state fights back; it continues to define and 
redefine who is and can be recognized as citizen with these changes. This is not to 
suggest that the state is the sole determinant in citizenship; however, it is a sign of its 
power that the state and its apparatuses (imagined or materialized) continue to define 
citizenship and exclude some people as “undesirable,” “illegal,” “terrorist.”  
3.2 The State: 
 
 This section will focus on the concept of the state, principally the US State 
(borrowing the term US State from Alexander and Mohanty 1999, Mohanty 2006). After 
providing brief definitions for the concept of state in general, I critically examine state 
and state apparatuses in order to understand how these apparatuses work to shape 
people’s lives. Then I move my discussion to an examination of the US State that can be 
understood as a set of political, economic and socio-spatial apparatuses that create spaces 
of inclusion and exclusion. The main point that I want to emphasize here is that the state 
is—whether as an “imagined community” (Anderson 1983) or as a combination of 
concrete “Repressive and Ideological apparatuses” (Althusser 1972)—both powerful and 
imperfect; it works to influence and shape social, political and economic life to be able to 
serve particular interests.24 Hence, these particular assertions have material consequences 
                                                
24 Some of these particular interests include, but are not limited to: the needs of capitalist 
production (accumulation of wealth and continuation of capitalist relations); the needs of 
the those who are in position of power (the need to establish political legitimacy in order 
to normalize social, political, economic relations); needs of the state institutions (survival 
of the state institutions and jobs), and the needs of the people (basic rights such as right to 
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for those who do not benefit from particular interests. Therefore, my aim is to explore the 
idea of the state, but not to decide which conceptualization of the state works better. 
Instead, I give my attention to how the state (or different versions of the state) create 
conditions—laws, policies, definitions (and discourses if you like)—that have significant 
material consequences for those who are recognized as non-citizens. While I focus on the 
concept of the state and citizenship in this section, the following chapters provide a 
comprehensive discussion on how people were/are affected by the US State both from a 
historical and geographical perspective.  
3.2.1 Characteristics of the state and the US State:  
 
 The idea of sovereignty grants the sovereign with an absolute authority over a 
political community and territory, as well as control over the people (Gregory et al 2009: 
705-6, Coleman 2009). Through the formation of the state system, sovereignty has 
shifted from kings and queens to the state or “people” (Taylor 1994: 155). The sovereign 
states have the power to organize and administer (and desire to expand) their territory and 
control the movement of people and commodities inside their territory. The foundation 
and integration of this sovereign and territorial system of states was put in place by the 
treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (Taylor 1994, Jessop 2009, Jones 2009, Paasi 2003: 114).25 
The centralization of sovereignty and territoriality enabled states to make use of 
“despotic” and “infrastructural powers” to gain access to and manage people’s lives 
(Mann 1984), and thus, made it possible to imagine the state as a nation—a group of 
people who supposedly share a common identity and/or characteristics (Anderson 1983). 
                                                                                                                                            
education, healthcare, right to move, etc. (For a more comprehensive discussion please 
refer to Purcell and Nevins 2005). 
25 For a critique of the Westphalian sovereign and territorial state, see Elden (2005). 
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The sovereign and territorial state system recognizes nation-states as the only actors in 
world politics, which is “made up of an anarchic, unregulated space of the international 
and the ordered [domestic] space of sovereign states” (Sharp 2009: 359).  
 The concept of state can be understood as a historical and contingent social 
construct made up of apparatuses that can be repressive (military, police) or ideological 
(school, media) (Althusser 1972: 142-8).26 These apparatuses (along with other 
dispositifs) can work as a set of governing strategies (i.e. governmentality, Foucault 
2007), which aim to construct the population in particular ways such that the people are 
trained to govern themselves in particular ways. In addition to the above, other alleged 
characteristics of the state include, but are not limited to, imperialist, capitalist, 
neoliberal, neoconservative, masculine and heterosexual, etc. (Harvey 1985, 2005, 
Mohanty 2006, Brown 2006, 2010). To add insult to injury, twentieth century 
decolonization increased the number of “anarchic” states (Gilmartin 2009) and according 
to the United Nations there are over 190 states (www.un.org), which more or less 
embody at least some of the aforementioned characteristics.  
 The consideration of all these factors complicates, if not making it impossible to 
provide a definition for the state. What emerges here is that like other concepts reviewed 
in this chapter, no one theory can provide a definitive explanation of the state. With these 
theoretical obscurities and practical difficulties on my mind, I argue that the state is 
always partial, unraveling and contradictory, and as a powerful instrument, the state 
                                                
26 Althusser reminds us that repression can take non-physical forms, for example 
administrative repression (1972: 143). For Althusser the Repressive State Apparatuses 
(RSAs) are the military and the police whereby the state can use force. On the other hand, 
the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) such as schools, media and religious institutions 
works ideologically. For a more recent, comprehensive critique of Althusser see Ahmed 
(2000: 23-4). 
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attempts to act as a buffer. In other words, the state, while protecting economic interests, 
it also aims to “protect” its citizens. For those who are recognized as citizens, the state 
facilitates quality of life by providing the physical and social infrastructure for education, 
healthcare, etc. At the same time, those who are not part of the “imaginary” are left out. 
The state is a useful tool for achieving social, political and economic hegemony where 
relations can be controlled in support of dominant groups. Therefore, most often, if not 
always, the state serves dominant groups.27 For example, securing the “nation’s borders” 
and conducting border policing are both done supposedly in the interest of the 
“citizens.”28  
 Through a variety of institutions (apparatuses), the state works to control social, 
political, and economic relations among the people who live inside its territory (Gilmartin 
2009: 19; Mountz 2006: 460). Gilmartin (2009) describes the state as a legal, political 
and geographical “entity” that is marked by national borders. The term state is also used 
in reference to the nation-state. Although the two concepts are connected to each other, 
there is a difference between the state and the nation-state. The nation-state refers to a 
group of people who live within the national borders of the state. Therefore people are 
taught to believe that they share a common language, religion, history or other cultural 
practices. The invention of false commonalities is supposed to overcome the differences 
(of class, gender, or religion) that may otherwise divide people from one another within 
the nation-state (Mitchell 2000: 269). However, the idea of a large group of people who 
share the above commonalities can never be achieved because not all people share the 
                                                
27 The most recent US government response towards Occupy Wall Street demonstrators 
does testify to my points above. 
28 Chapter four and five will closely examine these points. 
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same language, religion or history (Ibid). Therefore one might suggest that there is no 
such thing as nation. However, if and when people are made to believe in such a thing (or 
a process, community or fantasy), the state becomes a spatial container. Hence, socio-
spatial exclusion (legal, political, economic) becomes a tool in two ways: by 1) alienating 
the people who are not socially acceptable inside the nation-state’s territory and 2) by 
reaffirming and bringing the idea of the nation-state as a container into reality. I 
investigate relations and tensions between those who are considered part of the US and 
those who are considered “alien” in the following chapter where I focus on the history of 
whiteness and minorities in the US. 
  Agnew (1994) provides a critique for the state-centric geopolitical order, which 
imagines the state as a container and boundaries as solid lines.  He calls this reduction the 
“territorial trap,”29 which is based on three different but related assumptions. First, 
sovereign states require clearly bounded or fixed sovereign spaces; second, they require a 
distinction between domestic and foreign (national/international) relations; and third, they 
assume the territorial state as a geographic container (Agnew 1994: 59, see also Paasi 
2003: 117). These concepts and assumptions suggest how Cold War geopolitics firmly 
classified “good” and “bad” without much difficulty. From a North American perspective 
(and wherever consent is manufactured), the Soviet Union was associated with 
communism, Iran with fundamentalism and the US with freedom and democracy (Sharp 
2009: 361). Agnew’s main focus was on these rigid arrangements and stable borders. 
When these state-centric assumptions are brought to life, the world suddenly becomes a 
                                                
29 For further discussion of Agnew’s territorial trap see also Paasi 2009, 2011, Reuber 
2009. 
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space that is neatly marked to exclude individuals and separate states into easily 
identifiable containers. 
 State-centric approaches suggest that the spatial and political relationships among 
containers—economy, territoriality, sovereignty, and citizenship—must be dealt with at 
the state level, without reference to the people who experience the state and its politics on 
the ground. Taylor (1994) critically examines this idea of the state as a container in 
relation to territoriality. He discusses the four basic tasks of the territorial state: wage 
war; manage the economy; give national identity; and provide social services. He 
presents four different containers and provides a critique of them. As power containers, 
states tend to maintain their existing boundaries; as wealth containers, states tend to 
expand their territories; as cultural and social containers, states focus on creating 
large/small scale “imagined communities.” As mentioned above, states have to convince 
their citizens to believe that they share a common language, history and even a race or 
religion. Taylor concludes that the process of nation building ignores the fact that states 
consist of mixed cultures and minorities; hence, in practice the idea of the nation-state 
should be nothing but a myth (Taylor 1994). But in fact, as I demonstrate in the next 
chapter, the state serves some constituencies quite well by reifying their position through 
self serving laws and policy, making the idea not false, per se, but exclusive and 
exclusionary. 
 The contemporary state continues to exercise sovereignty, assert territoriality, and 
work to construct the “nation.” I now focus my attention on an examination of the US 
State. A critical examination of the US State will assist me in my empirical chapters 
where I investigate the people who have struggled to find a social, political and economic 
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space inside the US State. Chandra Talpade Mohanty and Jacqui Alexander (1997, 
Mohanty 2006: 10) offer one useful view of how one can understand the US State. They 
refer to it “as an ‘advanced capitalist’ state with an explicit imperial project, engaged in 
practices of re-colonization, prompting the reconfiguration of economic, political and 
militarized relationships globally” (ibid). Mohanty and Alexander argue that the US State 
(and other advanced capitalist states) shares specific features: first, states own the means 
of violence which are organized in the name of “national security”; second, through 
militarization, postcolonial states re-masculinize the state apparatus; third, state practices 
consolidate patriarchy and colonize, through racializing and sexualizing their people, 
particularly women. Finally, heterosexual citizenship is promoted through “legal and 
other means” (ibid).30 The construction of (particular) “citizens” by the state includes 
some and excludes others. The state, particularly the US State, creates racialized, 
gendered and heterosexual images of the citizen as a patriot, and others as “the sexualized 
and de-masculinized external enemy and potential domestic terrorists” in the service of 
its imperial needs (Mohanty 2006: 14). Thus, it is not a surprise that undocumented 
immigrants are criminalized, racially profiled, detained and deported. 
 Mohanty’s analyses are important because one can observe the contradiction in 
state practices where capital and certain people can freely roam in the US and around the 
globe. The same right, if not completely denied, becomes close to impossible for others 
(see Mountz 2010, Hyndman 2001, 2004, Nevins 2010). As mentioned above, while 
                                                
30 Under the “Don’t ask Don’t tell,” Defense Marriage Act (Mohanty 2006: 10) which 
was recently overturned, same sex couples were denied visas and citizenship (see 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/30/same-sex-couples-denied-i_n_842646.html). 
State domination over people’s lives and the promotion of heterosexual citizenship 
should also be seen as part of other struggles. In other words, the struggles of LGBT 
should also be connected to the struggles of (authorized or unauthorized) immigrants. 
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goods and capital can flow with very little interruption (along with some privileged 
bodies), for others, their presence in public and private spaces is not only limited, but also 
they are subjected to imprisonment and deportation. The state can act as an instrument of 
power to control the movements of certain groups of people.  
 A number of important ideas strongly manifest themselves in my research and in 
the lives of the people who encounter the state on a day-to-day basis. The presence of the 
state, borders, modes of citizenship, state institutions, policies and agents have material 
consequences for the people on the ground. The “imagined state”, whatever the form and 
shape it takes, still acts as (if it is) the facilitator of social relations among people; 
sometimes by means of violence and at other times through social, political, cultural and 
economic processes that take part in shaping these social relations. Consequently, the 
state holds on to the means of violence, which allows the state to police its borders and 
work to control the movement of people (along with commodities). The state is not the 
only determinant in defining these practices; nevertheless, it is an important and powerful 
one. For instance when BPAs practice their routine checks in certain public spaces, 
permanent or mobile, borders become not only fixed lines that separate one sovereign 
state from another but also tools for the excluding of “others” inside state territory.  
3.2.2 Conclusion: 
 
 Based on the discussion above, I suggest that there are many possibilities for how 
the state can be described and examined. Mohanty’s examination of the US State clearly 
demonstrates this complexity. However, when viewed from the perspective of the US 
State, this complexity seems to fade away. Negative images such as “dangerous 
terrorists,” and/or “illegal aliens” have been manufactured and presented by the state and 
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most mainstream media. BPAs combine coercive powers of the state with different 
surveillance strategies to search, detect and remove these “dangerous” people from US 
territory. The BPAs’ border practices make it possible for state ideologies (such as you 
are either with us or with the terrorists) to make their way into everyday spaces such as 
parks, downtowns, bus terminals or highways. Bordering pratices are not the only way 
the state enters into the everyday. Although this paper focuses on BPAs within 100 mile 
of the border, other US State apparatuses currently work in various locations and further 
inside US territory (Coleman 2009, Coleman and Kocher 2011, Harrison and Lloyd 2011, 
Hiemstra 2010, Nevins 2010). Consequently, the modern state’s policing practices can be 
found at a variety of spaces and thus scales—federal, local, etc.  The jurisdiction of BPAs 
(and other immigration officers) extends inside of the US border.  For example, 287 (g) 
gives some of the immigration enforcement duties to local police so that they can enforce 
the border practically anywhere in the United States (Coleman 2009: 907-910, Coskan-
Johnson 2011: 4). Literally, the “imagined” US State can be encountered and experienced 
in its real form everywhere within its territory. 
3.3 Border and Territory:  
 
 In this section, I review the geographical literature on borders and territory. First, 
I focus on the conceptualization of border from Cold War geopolitics—rigid lines and 
neat territorial units, and then I move to the “borderless world” and ultimately to 
(im)mobile borders. Second, I look at different definitions of territory and examine how 
territory is used to re-create rigid lines that separate “us” from “them.” Literature on the 
border generally includes other related concepts such as territory, security and 
surveillance. While I continue to make reference to citizenship and the state, I also 
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tentatively make use of concepts such as territory, security and surveillance here. I offer a 
more detailed examination of these concepts later in this chapter. My examination of the 
border and territory literature contributes both to the investigation of internal bordering 
practices within US territory and to the development of political geography and 
geographical knowledge. 
3.3.1 Making borders 
 
 Like other related themes in this chapter, both the idea and the definition of 
border and territory are particular social constructs, and therefore they are complex and 
contested inside and outside academia. In terms of the theorization of borders, Newman 
explains that different academic disciplines have been trying to conceptualize borders. He 
writes “the meaning of what constitutes a border for one is not always compatible for 
another, with the disciplinary semantics and terminologies remaining a significant barrier 
to a full fusion of ideas” (2006: 144). Thus for some, borders are imagined as lines on a 
map which neatly divide the world into stable containers or state territories. But, what 
does one mean by imaginary?  
 Here, my aim is not to suggest that these lines and borders are not real. They are 
real. Material and/or symbolic, different definitions of borders and the applications of 
these definitions of the borders have significant consequences for those who are not 
recognized as “citizens.” For the US government these lines constitute the illusion of 
stability, despite the fact that borders (and territories) are not stable, and are not limited to 
lines on maps, because these lines make certain people’s lives extremely difficult. 
Mountz asserts “[f]or the undocumented, the displaced, and the stateless, for people of 
color with tenuous legal status, the border is everywhere” (2004:342). Borders are 
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physically constructed and policed (and thus, made real), not only at the edges of state 
territory but also inside and outside state territory (Mountz 2010, 2011). The border can 
materialize as a physical building at the port of entry point or as a wall or a fence that 
marks and separates one sovereign state territory from another (for fences and walls see 
Brown 2010). The states’ desire (and need) to control the movement of people is 
materialized in these spatial forms sometimes as walls and other times as fences and 
buildings. While these features are common on the southern border of the US, recently, 
the borders and policing of borders can also be witnessed within the northern parts of the 
US. These mobile and internalized borders and border policing appear in the form of US 
Border Patrol Agents in bus and train stations, shopping malls, parks and downtown 
Rochester, NY (Jensen 2009).31 Sometimes mobile borders appear in the form of US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agents raids in a slaughterhouse and 
meatpacking plant in Postville, IA (Harrison and Lloyd 2011), or “at highway 
checkpoints, at ferry terminals, in government buildings, on college campuses and 
preschools, at social and health services, on buses, at places of worship, at workplaces 
and in neighborhoods” in the Olympic Peninsula, WA (Border Patrol Free Zone, accessed 
8/29/2011).  The border seems to be acting like an invasive species; it enters into internal 
US state territory, seemingly distant from its “natural” habitat on the edges of the state. 
 The state, its institutions and agents confront people in certain spaces to determine 
their status or membership, whereas people encounter the state. In other words, state 
actions are calculated and planned (always imperfectly) as they target particular people 
and locations within 100 miles of the international border. However, people experience 
                                                
31 Also see “Caught in Transit: The Rochester Border Patrol Station,” 
http://vimeo.com/912940, accessed on 8/29/2011). 
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these border and bordering practices as unforeseen interruptions of everyday life and as 
the result of just being in these particular locations. Yet, borders—fixed, disappearing, or 
mobile—come to life when the particular idea of the border is put into practice. To 
examine this everyday interruption, the critical question should not be what is a border, 
but rather, who defines the border?  In other words, who reifies the border? How is it 
made and remade? Who benefits from these bordering practices and who does not?  
While later chapters make use of empirical examples to answer these questions, below I 
examine how recent historical and geopolitical events have made and remade borders. 
 Cold War geopolitical relations between the Soviet Union and the United States 
were based on a universal binary logic, or as Agnew (1994) would call it, a “territorial 
trap.” The world was divided between “us” and “them” (Dodds 2003: 206, Reuber 2009: 
447). The other less important “players”, states or people other than the US and Soviet 
Union, were characterized by their relation to the US or Soviet Union. These “less 
important” states and the individuals who lived in these bounded spaces were defined by 
one or the other category—“us” or “them,” depending on ones’ perspective. The 
importance was given to making borders as recognizable and as visible as possible. As 
Newman explains (2006: 145, emphasis added) the border “[n]ot only was tainted with 
the post-second world war geopolitics brush, but borders were also perceived as being 
physical and static outcomes of the political decision making process, to be described 
rather then analyzed.” Later on this image of fixed borders was called into question by 
the geopolitical changes that took place during the late 1980s.  
 The late 1980s were marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Berlin 
Wall. The borders that separated “them” from “us” fell down. Cold War geopolitics 
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represented how static borders had helped to create neat divisions among the many states. 
For example, the Soviet Union was associated with communism, the US with freedom 
and democracy, and Iran with fundamentalism (Sharp 2009: 361). However, these neat 
divisions began to tremble during the decade of the 1980s. From the perspective of the 
US State, the falling walls resulted in the disintegration and fragmentation of “them.” 
This transformation was also influenced by the increased role of international economic 
institutions, agreements and unions such as NAFTA, ASEAN and the European Union 
(Brenner 1999:53, Muller 2010: 77). When combined, these events gave the impression 
that the state and its borders were fading away; the borderless world was seen as the 
future (Andreas 2003: 83, Brenner 1999: 50-53, Fukuyama 1989, Johnson and Jones 
2011: 63, Newman 2006: 143, 2003: 133). However, neither the borderless world 
perspective (Ohmae 1989), nor the fixed borders of the Cold War (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 
2006 [1992]) questioned the modern state system that was based on a 17th Century 
Treaty.  
 Ó Tuathail and Agnew explain that geopolitical thought should not be accepted as 
an organic and objective part of political philosophy. In other words, geography and 
geopolitical analyses can never be objective and impartial. Ó Tuathail and Agnew assert 
“[t]he great irony of the geopolitical writing, however, is that it was always a highly 
ideological and deeply politicized form of analysis” (2006: 95). Within the context of the 
discipline of political geography, scholars such as Ó Tuathail and Agnew argue that 
geopolitics cannot be reduced to the “East-West” divides. The state-to-state relations tell 
us little about people.32 For example, during the Cold War there was little or no agency 
                                                
32 Yet, this reductive approach is and has been part of the US foreign policy. 
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for the people who were part of these neatly bordered territorial units. Geopolitical 
examinations are not limited to the foreign policy and international relations of the states 
(Cowen and Smith 2009). Yet, even during the post Cold War period when people are 
mentioned as part of the borderless world, the focus was on economically (and socially) 
privileged citizens (Ohmae 1989). In his article, in a section called “geography without 
borders”, Ohmae argued that we are living in a “borderless world,” and that states are 
becoming less visible and “global citizenship is no longer just a nice phrase in the lexicon 
of rosy futurologist” (Ohmae 1989: 153-4). Ohmae’s borderless world seems to be made 
up of only consumers who want cheaper products, which Ohmae portrays as the leading 
cause for the elimination of national borders and the production of “global citizens,”33 
and “transnational elites.” While the conditions and the need for cheaper products has 
been implemented by various free trade initiatives (i.e. NAFTA), these are not initiatives 
for freeing borders or eliminating fences and walls (Brown 2010).34 Hence, one wonders 
who these global citizens and transnational elites are that can travel and cross borders 
easily in Ohmae’s world.  
 These elites take part in the production of border crossing discourses. The regular 
movement of these people “has a particular geography; a very uneven geography that is 
                                                
33 These elites are most often identified as “expatriate” instead of immigrants. 
34 The EU’s Schengen area might give the impression of borderlessness; however, it is 
quite the contrary. The European Union’s (EU) foundation was to bring peace, stability 
and prosperity to Europe, and since then it has been pushing for diversity and (searching 
for) the identity of the “European” (McCormick 2005). On the one hand, the EU is 
constantly pushing for diversity, while on the other; the EU is using “cultural difference” 
as a tool for excluding non-Europeans. The “Schengen area” is created by a subset of the 
EU member states. The agreement opened the borders for those who are “EU nationals” 
while heavily restricting non-EU citizens. The Schengen area created a borderless Europe 
by creating a “fortress Europe” (Rodríguez-Pose 2002: 108).  
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reflective of uneven development processes at a global scale” (Olds 2009: 381). The term 
“transnational elite” here refers to those who have the ability and means to move without 
much state interference across national borders regularly—without much scrutiny at or 
inside the national borders (Olds 2009). This elite group includes executives of 
multinational and transnational corporations along with other global nomads (and/or 
expats), who have the social and economic means to travel and cross national borders to 
live in two or more countries (ibid). Global citizens and transnational elites possess socio-
economic capital that creates the conditions for them to be able to easily cross over 
fences, walls and borders. The people who are picked up by BPAs in the fields, bus 
stations, parks, or highways can also be viewed as nomads, or as transnational and global 
subjects. But the difference is that while crossing fences, walls and borders, nouns such 
as “transnational,” “citizen” or “elite” are dropped. The reified US border identifies these 
people with new adjectives: “illegal” immigrants and/or “aliens,” “economic” migrants 
which makes “imaginary” borders material—real.  Therefore, it is crucial to return to 
Mountz’s point above; for the undocumented, the displaced, the stateless, or people of 
color with tenuous legal status, the borders and consequently the state, is everywhere.  
 Hence, to complicate the claim of a borderless world, one can argue that neither 
the people nor the borders (nor the states, for that matter) are disappearing, because every 
deterritorialization is followed by reterritorialization (Mitchell 2000: 263). The tainted 
geographic and political products of the post Cold War imagine a borderless world that is 
perhaps only available to some privileged members of the world. There are also other 
people involved in these geopolitical relations that try to define the border. Therefore, the 
traditional sovereign territories of the states and their borders have to be examined as “the 
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sum of social, cultural and political [and economic] processes [and relations]” (Johnson 
and Jones 2011:61). These conceptual changes are useful since they reflect the fluidity of 
borders and thus contemporary border policing. In the United States, once could see and 
experience border policing anywhere within 100 miles of the international border 
(Mountz 2011: 65). If borders are everywhere, then the related subjects such as citizens 
and non-citizens are everywhere as well. For the BPAs and the people, anywhere within 
100 miles of the international borderline becomes a site for defining and reifying citizen 
and non-citizen. The extension of the legal jurisdiction of the border exacerbates the 
tension between the state and the citizens and non-citizens over who is or is not a citizen. 
As a result, the legal application of the border, which appears to be neutral, is in fact 
embedded in historical relationships that have attempted to exclude people based on their 
race, skin colour, sex, sexuality, health, religion.  
 Borders may be complicated and difficult to explain, however, when the idea of a 
fixed or mobile border is backed by laws and public policy that are exclusionary and 
applied on the ground, the resulting discursive practices allow BPAs to control and 
normalize the idea of both border and, citizen and non-citizen. The apparent aim is to 
secure the border (and the “nation”) from potentially dangerous non-citizens, “illegal 
immigrants,” “aliens,” “terrorists” or whoever looks like a non-citizen (Staeheli 2010:2, 
Nevins 2010: 114-15). In other words, through these border policing efforts, entry points 
as well as anywhere within 100 miles of the international border become places where 
border, citizen and non-citizen are made, remade, and contested every day. 
 The struggle to define what a border is and how it should define citizen and non-
citizen suggests that the idea of the border is fluid both in theory and practice. The 
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material and the symbolic borders of the state and its bordering practices are also 
changing and moving—becoming fluid. The increased availability of personal 
information in cyber space also assists authorities in determining whether a person is who 
they say they are by electronically scanning their passport at entry points. The data 
collected and stored in cyber space used to determine who can or cannot enter. Mountz 
(2011: 76) explains: 
“Borders are increasingly characterized by movement rather than a stasis. Borders 
are more diffuse and proliferating more rapidly than at any time, and they are 
reproduced as digital entities in cyber space where authorities share data, and as 
legal and bureaucratic entities where migrants and advocates struggle over policy 
to negotiate entry and exclusion.” 
The transformations of the states’ borders are, to a degree, due to the implementation of 
new laws and policies, and to the use of new technologies that enable security and 
surveillance of the people. In other words, borders and citizenship are practiced (at 
offshore locations or inside state territory) in such ways that exclusion becomes more 
visible in everyday life. Mountz (2011: 76) reminds us that  
“[g]iven recent changes to actual boundaries around the nation-states, however, it 
is imperative that political geographers in particular not lose sight of the physical 
manifestation, material realities, and everyday productions of borders that 
function to include and exclude a range of people  located somewhere along a 
spectrum between citizens and non-citizens.” 
 
Citizen  Non-citizen 
Figure 2: The spectrum of Citizen and Non-Citizen: The citizen, non-citizen, “alien,” “illegal,” 
“terrorist,” “wetback,” etc. are not separate from each other. They are part of the same continuum. 
However, the US State works to define citizen and non-citizen as two distinct points. 
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This idea of a spectrum is crucial, because the distinction between citizen and non-citizen 
on this spectrum appears to be an ambiguous line, like the borders that work to separate 
one state from another. However, for BPAs citizenship does not seem to be viewed as 
much of a spectrum, but rather as two distinct points, as I demonstrate in chapter five. 
3.3.2 Conclusion: 
 
 There are two important points in my analysis of the study of the transformation 
of borders. First, since borders reflect changes in government policies, the shifting spatial 
location of the border is crucial for the examination of border policing. Significantly, as I 
demonstrate in the following chapters, the BPAs confront people away from the 
traditional border entry points. They confront people in both public and private spaces to 
inquire about their citizenship status inside the US. Second and related, borders are not 
only spatial but also temporal. Therefore borders reflect ideologies that aim to create 
discourses that are divisive--discourses that promote and protect the particular interests of 
whiteness35 while appearing to be neutral. These discursive practices at the border 
attempt to freeze spatial, temporal and historical relationships to normalize and reify 
border, citizen and non-citizen. For this reason, US border policy fails to recognize 
people as occupying a spectrum. I recognize that the people and the state are not 
independent from one another, but still, state institutions and border agents unevenly 
produce border, citizen and non-citizen. They are able to recognize “wetbacks,” “aliens,” 
“illegals,” or “terrorists,” and then have the legal authority to incarcerate and remove 
these people. Although I examine this process of the exclusion of “others” based on 
whiteness in chapter four extensively, this pattern of making “others” is not new in North 
                                                
35 Helga Leitner’s (2012) examination of a rural small town in Minnesota is an example 
of how these (spatial, temporal and historical) complex divisions are at work. 
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American history (Berlin 1998, Haney-López 2006, Nevins 2010, Sanchez 1995, Zinn 
2003, 2007). It is the US State that had formerly identified Native Americans as “savages 
out to scalp white settlers,” and it has also identified Muslims as “bloodthirsty terrorists” 
that threaten the United States (Mohanty 2006: 12).  The ideology that developed the so-
called biologically different races in the US (see Mitchell 2000: 230-58 for 
comprehensive discussion) not only excluded the Chinese and put Japanese (but not 
Germans or Italians) into internment camps, but it also forced African slaves to carry 
travel (or freedom) papers (Berlin 1998: 68, 282). And in the present, the US State 
continues to produce similar categories and enforce similar constraints on people within 
100 miles of international borders.  
 In the next section, I shift my attention to the control of state space. I examine 
territory and territoriality in order to better understand how territoriality is exercised and 
employed in and outside the US. 
3.4 Terror, Territory and Territoriality:  
 
 As some scholars have repeatedly suggested, territory has been neglected in 
spatial analyses and such scholars make a case for rethinking territory and territoriality 
(Sack 1983, Agnew 1994, Vandergeest and Peluso 2001, Elden 2007, Painter 2010, 
Murphy 2012). An etymological investigation of the word territory suggests that the term 
(in the Western World) comes from the French territoire, which is originated from Latin 
territorium. Territorium is believed to be linked to terra (earth). However, scholars such 
as Elden (2007: 822) and Painter (2010: 1101) suggest it might also have some 
connection to Terrere, which means to frighten or “frighten away.” Hence, territorium 
means “a place from which people are warned” (ibid, also see Oxford English 
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Dictionary). In what follows, I evaluate the concepts of territory and territoriality to be 
able to demonstrate, in later chapters, that BPAs use these conceptualizations which help 
them to expand spatial control of everyday spaces.  
3.4.1 The struggle for territory and territoriality: 
 
 Everyday usage of the term territory generally refers to a demarcated area or a 
space that is occupied and controlled by a state, group or individual. In other words, 
territory is a geographical means of control. While a small neighborhood or a human 
body can be a territory (Delaney 2009: 196), the usage of the term is most often 
associated with the modern state system (Elden 2007, Painter 2010). A more detailed 
characterization of territory can be described as a spatially organized, administered and 
bounded area where institutions, groups and individuals control the movement of people, 
money and commodities.  
 Actions that aim to control movements in a defined territory are called 
territoriality. According to Sack, territoriality is “the attempt by an individual or group 
(x) to influence, affect or control objects, people and relationships (y) by delimiting and 
asserting control over a geographical area. This area is the territory” (Sack 1983: 56). 
Territorializing often takes place within the privileged position of state institutions and 
agents and is usually legitimized through the notion of state sovereignty (Delaney 2009: 
201). Hence, by shifting borders from lines on the threshold of state boundaries to 
anywhere within 100 miles of that edge, border agents assert their sovereign power and 
control the movement of people within US territory. This territorial sovereignty reifies 
political identities such as citizen “and forms the basis on which states claim authority 
over people and the resources within those boundaries” (Vandergeest and Peluson 2001: 
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177).  Therefore, as a state space, territory is defined, defended, contested, and claimed 
against the claims of others (Cowen and Gilbert 2008).  
 Painter (2010), following Timothy Mitchell’s critique of the state (1991), suggests 
that territory as an effect should be understood as the product of relational networks and 
he uses the term “socio-technical practices” (2010: 1096). He first traces the Francophone 
and Anglophone roots of the term territory. Painter follows French scholar Lussault’s 
conceptualization of the term territory and later on he provides an empirical study of parts 
of England as an example. Lussault describes territory as a space that is arranged by the 
foundational notions of “contiguity and continuity” which “depend less on material 
aspects of space than on the systems of ideas (systèmes idéels) that frame the space in 
question, as well as the related practices that take place there” (Lussault 2007:113, quoted 
in Painter 2010: 1102, emphasis added).  
 On a conceptual level, Painter’s discussion of territory seems useful; however, in 
following Timothy Mitchell’s (1991) argument, Painter seems to overlook the important 
part of the territory and territoriality in relation to the state. Mitchell argues that the state 
is not a structure or a thing apart from society. Thus Mitchell suggests that the state 
should not be understood as an actual structure but as a structural effect, that is “as the 
powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist” 
(1991: 94, Painter 2010:1095). Painter applies Mitchell’s view to rethink territory, and he 
concludes that territory is not an eternal and fixed geographical account of state power 
(2010: 1116, emphasis added), “but a porous, provisional, labour-intensive and ultimately 
perishable and non-material product of networked socio-technical practices.” Again, on a 
conceptual level Painter’s discussion of territory might make sense, and it might be useful 
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to think and theorize territory is not constituting an actual state space, “but as the 
powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such spaces appear to exist” (Painter 
2010:1116). However, on a more material level, I argue that, first, the US territory and 
the US state are not only appearances. In other words, Painter overlooks certain material 
conditions. The state space, territory, is also spatial (and temporal). The state creates 
policy and laws to maintain a particular idea of borders, territory and territorial 
sovereignty. The state makes laws and uses space to incarcerate and deport people; it 
treats people like (state) property. Perhaps for “transnational elites” or “global citizens” 
the US territory can be an abstract, non-material space that appears to exist. However, for 
transnational migrants (or “illegal aliens”) it is more than an abstraction. The US state is a 
material space and it has the power to detain and deport people with or without papers out 
of US territory. According to the Applied Research Center, within the first six months of 
2011, US officials deported approximately 46,000 parents of U.S.-citizen children 
(arc.org). It is correct to suggest that the US state is not a thing apart from the society, but 
it is also correct to assert that the US State materially shapes people's lives—46, 000 
deported parents and their children testify to this notion.  
 Second, it is not the mundane arrangements only that produce the state. Soja 
(1980) examines the socio-spatial dialectic and he argues that space, in this case territory, 
is not only an outcome (or product), but also an input in social and spatial relations. For 
example, the events of September 11, 2001 threatened the so-called territorial integrity of 
the US. Hence, not only the US state space, but also people who live in that space were 
transformed (and they transformed the space). The changes after the events continue to 
have social and spatial consequences for anyone who appears Middle Eastern, i.e. black 
or brown, in the US. The US territory and the practice of territoriality, creates “terror” for 
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those people who are socially and spatially excluded. For people who experience the US 
State, border and state, territory and territoriality are exists and, as I suggested above, for 
those who recognized as non-citizens the material consequences are immense. 
 Elden (2007) looks at the relationship between terror and territory from a material 
perspective. He analyses how different and conflicting assumptions about territory, terror 
and territorial sovereignty are used to justify the “war on terror.” In the first part of his 
argument, Elden investigates the connection between terrorist camps and sovereign 
territorial states. He explains that after the 2001 attacks, the US government struggled to 
locate and target non-territorial and non-sovereign (and networked) terrorists. One way to 
resolve this confusion was to make non-territorial target, a territorial one. President G.W. 
Bush, in a speech to Congress after the attacks, declared that the US would make no 
distinction between the terrorists who are responsible for the attacks and those nations 
who provide a safe place for terrorists (whitehouse.archives.gov36, for a similar Bush 
speech see Elden 2007: 823). The US shifted its attention away from non-territorial 
terrorists and instead linked them with territorial and sovereign states such as Afghanistan 
(and Iraq). Territorial units, Vice President Cheney explained at the time, are easier 
targets then non-territorial and networked terrorists (Elden 2007: 824). US territorial 
sovereignty was used as a tool to justify the “war on terror” in other sovereign territories. 
Arguably, the US pays little attention to the territorial integrity of other states—an effect 
of US exceptionalism.37 What is undermined here is the territorial integrity and 
                                                
36 http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html. 
37 Noam Chomsky demonstrates how US exceptionalism works when he contrasts the 
terrible events of 9/11/1973 in Chile with the 9/11/2001 in the US. The US government 
took an active role and provided military assistance for the military take over in Chile, 
which violently removed the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende and 
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sovereignty of Afghanistan (and Iraq). Thus, territoriality involves the exercise of power, 
which shapes spaces, people and the relationship between people in these spaces.  
 However, not all configurations of power are territorial (Elden 2007). Through 
networks and institutions power can be territorialized, and it is also clear that state power 
is not limited to the extent of its territory (Cowen and Smith 2009). A basic definition of 
power sees it as the ability to act or “impose one’s will against the will of others” 
(Delaney 2009: 200). Therefore, state hegemony can be established by imposing the 
state’s will (whatever it may be) over others. Here, the assumption is that the state has (or 
holds) a monopoly of the means of violence over people (e.g., by detaining—sometimes 
indefinitely—unauthorized immigrants or others who seem to be a threat to the US, both 
inside and outside of US territory).  While the ability to monopolize and use violence is 
one way to assert hegemony, it is not the only way. Subjugation can be achieved without 
the use of force.38 For example, one can look at how territory and territoriality played a 
role in the making of “war[s]on terror” after 2001. The US government did not employ 
violence towards “American” citizens to obtain their consent for the “war[s] on terror”—
at least not towards White Christian Americans. One can argue that consent was taken by 
re-constructing the Cold War geopolitics of us and them. At this moment in US history 
                                                                                                                                            
replaced it with dictator, General Pinochet, who prisoned, tortured and killed (terrorized) 
thousands of people. The United States “defends” its territorial integrity by reifying, 
invading, occupying, subjugating and supporting those who will serve the US’s interests 
the best.  
(http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175436/tomgram%3A_noam_chomsky,_the_imperial
_mentality_and_9_11/, accessed on November 2011.) 
38 See Gramsci’s discussion on hegemony (1971: 12-13). 
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Muslims were (and still are) “them.”39 Millions of people in the US (and around the 
world) took to the streets and demonstrated their disagreement with the US government 
over its desire to invade Iraq. Despite the fact that a large number of people refused to 
give their consent, the US had already laid out its doctrine, which created a simple 
definition for territorial boundaries. Bush declared, “[e]very nation, in every region, now 
has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” 
(whitehouse.gov). State apparatuses, such as the US military or BPAs, were put to work 
and practiced territoriality. For example BPAs asserted their institutional and legal 
influence (sovereignty and ownership or social and spatial powers) to detect and remove 
“illegal aliens” in and through the US territory. However, it should also be noted that the 
practice of territoriality is not limited to dominant groups.  
 As I suggested before, territoriality is not only an outcome of, but also an input in, 
social and spatial relations. Like the state institutions and agents, other people also use 
territory and territoriality to resist. The subjugated groups or individuals such as 
“[s]quatters, smugglers, intruders, fugitives, [“illegal aliens”] and asylum seekers 
participate in territoriality no less than do owners, customs officials, and prison guards” 
(Delaney 2009: 197). In March 2006, thousands of immigrants (documented and 
undocumented) took over the streets and protested an anti-immigrant bill proposed by the 
House of Representatives. The Sensenbrenner (HR 4437) bill attempted to declare 
undocumented immigrants and those who helped them as criminals, and to introduce 
possible penalties for employers who hire undocumented immigrants (Mitchell 2003, 
                                                
39 “Muslim” men were portrayed as “terrorists.” “Muslim” women were again portrayed 
as victims of “Muslim” men who needed to be saved by “White” men and women. 
(Mohanty 2003). 
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Staeheli and Mitchell 2008). Immigrants and other groups who supported them worked in 
concert, organized and re-appropriated the US state space by taking over and 
territorializing the streets of Chicago. 
3.4.2 Conclusion: 
 
 I have identified different conceptualizations of borders and territory. This 
investigation is important for my empirical chapter where I examine how borders are 
created and practiced by the state apparatuses. If territoriality involves the exercise of 
powers then attention must be given to who does the territorialization along with those 
who experience it. Material or imaginary, the problem is that neither the state territory 
nor the borders are disappearing. Rather, both the border and its practices are 
transforming social and spatial relations and scales. It is not only exclusion that defines 
border and territory. They are also defined by social and spatial struggles. Struggles for 
social and spatial inclusion can also produce the state, institutions, borders, territories and 
the people, and each shape and simultaneously is shaped by the others (Soja 1980). 
3.5 Security and Surveillance: 
 
 The state, as a contradictory apparatus, desires to control the movements of 
people and commodities inside its territory—and as mentioned before depending on the 
ideology in charge of the state, while securing economic interests, it can work to improve 
quality of life for its citizens, or diminish the quality of life for non-citizens. Thus the 
security of people and commodities are a central concern for the state, and the 
surveillance of “dangerous” people becomes a necessity for the state. These 
contemporary bordering practices aim to secure social and economic flows through 
different surveillance strategies that make these flows safer. Therefore, reviewing 
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security and surveillance discourses will help me to better understand contemporary 
border practices that seem to be invading the spaces of everyday life inside US territory. 
The US State and its apparatuses, such as the Border Patrol, continue to rely on 
traditional—linear—surveillance strategies such as border checkpoints or walls to 
“secure the nation.” However, these linear and permanent security and surveillance 
locations are complimented by current fluid, dynamic and temporary surveillance 
strategies. These fluid borders materialize in unlikely places inside US territory (Mountz 
2011).  These recent invasive border practices can be seen as part of the September 11th 
security and surveillance practices that also aim to find “dangerous” people on the move. 
These surveillance practices are justified in the name of a national security that relies on 
the spread of fear, which in return fosters the spread of surveillance in the everyday 
spaces of the state. 
3.5.1 Security and surveillance?: 
 
 In order to gain operational control of borders between entry points, the border 
patrol combines traditional surveillance methods with contemporary technological 
advancements. There are limited numbers of agents that can operate. Hence the Border 
Patrol uses advanced technological gadgets such as “sensors, light towers, mobile night 
vision scopes, remote video surveillance (RVS) systems, directional listening devices, 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and various database systems” (CSR 2008: 7) to gain 
operational control of the border between entry points. This combination gives the 
appearance of constant surveillance and hence security. In Discipline and Punish, 
Foucault particularly focused on his disciplinary model by examining Jeremy Bentham’s 
Panopticon (1977). Later, he reformulated some of his previous ideas in his lectures, 
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Security, Territory, Population (2007). In this section I use the works of Foucault and 
others in order to examine changes in security and surveillance strategies. Thus, below is 
a brief examination of these two works, both of which I found useful for the critique of 
contemporary security and surveillance practices in the US. After a critical evaluation of 
theoretical approaches to security and surveillance in social theory, I will narrow my 
focus to geographers to observe how certain places such as the city and the nation are 
used as spaces of security and surveillance.  
 Security can be described as “freedom from imagined or real danger in the 
present or future” (Gregory et al. 2009: 672, emphasis added). When the term security is 
applied to the Westphalian sovereign and territorial state system, it gives birth to the idea 
of the nation-state and national security. As the actor among other sovereigns, the state 
takes on the role of protecting and securing the nation’s territory and its solid and 
homogenous population. While security concerns help to construct the idea of the 
“nation,” at the same time they work to construct the “other,” whom the nation must be 
secured from. Thus, the question of “whose security” we are interested in reflects the 
contested nature of nation and national security rhetoric. The White House suggests, “The 
President’s highest priority is to keep the American people safe. He [Obama] is 
committed to ensuring the United States is true to our values and ideals while also 
protecting the American people.”40 A historical examination of the US complicates the 
notion of who is or who can be an “American.” In other words, the American imaginary 
is not as clear as the White House puts it, because it changes with geography, time and 
space. However, what is clear here is that concerns around security (and surveillance) 
                                                
40 http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/homeland-security, last accessed on November 13, 
2012. 
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seem to revolve around population. Of course, there is then always the question, what is 
the composition of the population? Since the population is composed of individuals made 
up of those who are included (“citizen”) and those who are excluded (“non-citizen”), 
constructing the idea of homogenous population is always problematic.41 The discursive 
practices of security and surveillance create inconspicuous geographies of exclusion and 
inequality for certain groups of people.42 Subjugation is possible via security apparatuses 
(dispositifs), because the securitization of space is accomplished for the “nation” and for 
national security, which requires surveillance of “dangerous” people. In other words, in 
order to secure and protect the spaces of the nation, much like recognizing the nation as a 
property,43 the people have to be disciplined, thus surveillance must become part of 
everyday life.  
 For Foucault the core of this disciplinary power was based on visibility and 
surveillance, “and involved minute regulation and ‘normalization’ of individual behavior 
through impartial observation and standardized, calculated punishment or correction of 
behavioral abnormalities” (Hannah 2000: 18, emphasis added). In order to illustrate this 
transformation, Foucault examines a sixteenth century town that was affected by the 
plague with the work of the panopticon. Because of the plague, the town was 
immediately locked down, the people were cut off from the outside, and officials 
monitored each street. The people were then locked inside their houses and one-by-one 
each house was “perfumed” (1977: 195-197). The people who were affected by the 
                                                
41 I use citizen and non-citizen to refer to inclusion and exclusion. As I tried to argue in a 
previous section, meaning(s) are contested spatio-temporally. Who is a citizen and is not 
changes with particular space and time. 
42 I will provide a brief historical review for the production of these subjugated groups 
(i.e. “aliens” in the US in my empirical chapter). 
43 If the state is a property then the question is: who owns the rights to this property? 
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disease had to be isolated from the rest of the population. The concern (and the 
contradiction) here was the need for a healthy population that could perform labour, 
create value, support the state, build geographies, produce goods. Hence, the isolation of 
those who could harm the healthy population was necessary. 
 The panoptic vision was designed as a prison to isolate those who were seen as 
socially unacceptable and dangerous. The panopticon allowed the threat of constant 
visibility through unidentified guards that coerced prisoners to behave normally by 
employing calculated punishments (Hannah 2000: 18). In this panoptic structure, the 
tower is at the center, and is surrounded by backlit cells where the prisoners are held. For 
the watchers, the tower provides easy and constant surveillance of the prisoners in the 
cells. However, the prisoners in the cells can see the tower, but not the watchers in the 
tower—in other words, the person in the cell can not verify if s/he is been watched at all 
times. Here, Foucault suggests that the application of this panoptic model into the 
everyday life of people will alter power relations. The spatial composition that allows 
permanent surveillance is crucial because “even if it [surveillance] is discontinuous in its 
actions,” it assures the automatic functioning of power" (1977: 201). Hence, visibility 
becomes a trap (1977: 200). The plagued town example provides a model that restricts 
movement and creates spatial exclusion for the whole. In contrast, the panoptic vision 
provides automatic functioning of power, and when it is applied to everyday life, it 
suggests “a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men [and 
women]” (1977: 205). Today, through a combination of human power and technology 
such as CCTV, unmanned drones, police, BPAs and so on, these uneven power relations 
and the automatic functioning of surveillance are at work in places such as parks, 
	   65	  
downtowns, bus and train stations, factories, and schools to secure and protect the 
interests of those who are citizens. The safety of citizens and the “nation” is defended and 
secured against those who are considered undesirable, “illegal” and dangerous to the 
safety of the “public” in the United States (Mitchell 2000, 2003, Nevins 2002, 2010, 
Staeheli and Mitchell 2008, Sibley 1995).  
  These struggles for inclusion/exclusion take place in spaces of the nation and the 
cities, towns, hospitals, factories, schools, streets and so on where people not only reside 
but also participate in other daily activities. The transformation of small historic towns 
that can be closed at night, into large cities is critical for these daily social, political and 
economic activities. Thus in order to increase commercial activities, the town or city 
must be able to increase the circulation of people, commodities and capital. On the one 
hand, increased circulation translates into increases in trade and therefore the 
accumulation of capital (Harvey 1982, 2005). On the other hand, the circulation also 
creates security and surveillance concerns (Foucault 2007: 18-9). It would be accurate to 
note that in the same way, better circulation of air prevents miasmas and better 
circulation of commodities increases the accumulation of capital and thus provides 
opportunities for “citizens.” But, the large and open spaces of these cities also enable 
both the influx of non-citizens—lepers, beggars, workers, the homeless, and “aliens,” and 
the influx of state apparatuses such as the police, military, and the BPAs to prevent the 
actions, behavior and most often the existence of these undesirables in these spaces. 
Then, to be able to control these threats, not only through security but also through the 
surveillance of these “new” spaces and groups of people becomes crucial. To be able to 
monitor and achieve tangible results requires the minute regulation of particular places 
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and spaces instead of individuals. Instead of surveying the entire US-Canada border, 
BPAs can go to those places, such as bus and train stations, highways, parks, or 
downtowns, where not only are “aliens” visible but also they are in spaces that are 
essential for their daily social, political and economic (commercial) activities.  
 Foucault and Marx are viewed in opposition to each other, but in fact, as I 
demonstrate, they can be complimentary (see Hannah 2000, 2011, Harvey 2010). This 
unorthodox combination allows me to examine not only how different forms of power 
operate in different spaces, but also what kind of collective actions can be effectively 
used to resist power. Foucault provides an extensive investigation of how different forms 
of power (i.e. coercive, bio-power, etc.) operate (1977, 1978, 2007). However, his 
analyses do leave the reader with the question of what can we do or how can we get out 
of these problematic power relations. Foucault was generalizing about how different 
forms of power operate, thus he would have argued that people—or individuals, if you 
like—have to figure what s/he could do by her/himself.  In spite of Foucault’s refusal 
(and sometime rejection) of Marx’s ideas, he can be seen as developing some of Marx’s 
notions (Harvey 2010: 149). For example, Marx ([1867] 1967: 263) lays the groundwork 
for how different forms of power operate (and talk to each other) and shape everyday 
social relations in places that are historically constructed for “free” persons, for both 
adults and children.44 These places were once envisioned as “ideal workhouses” where 
“the poor shall work 14 hours in a day, allowing proper time for meals, in such a manner 
that there shall remain 12 hours of neat labour” (ibid). Later, when this idea was put to 
                                                
44 During this period, as Marx makes it clear, children between the age ten and eighteen 
are transformed into docile “bodies” in the factories, not in schools, by working ten to 
twelve hours a day (1867: 259-263). 
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work, it transformed the ideal workhouse into the “factory” (or as Marx called it, the 
“House of Terror”). These spatial structures enabled surveillance of workers (their 
behaviors, actions and time) by watchers (i.e. supervisors or managers)—to be able to 
make production as efficient as possible. This process requires supervisors to observe and 
discipline workers in particular ways so that over time, workers’ behavior is expected to 
be normalized. This normalization process serves the owners of capital, not the workers 
of the factory—spatial surveillance and disciplining aim to increase the extraction of 
surplus value. The watchers (or supervisors), who are also part wage worker, are 
concerned with every moment, every tiny second of the workers’ time and behavior; the 
workers’ behavior and actions have to be controlled and observed at all time because if 
the workers are not working during their defined work hours, s/he steals from the owners 
(Marx 1967: 224).45 Recalling Hannah above, this phenomenon was actually the focal 
point for Foucault’s panopticon where visibility and surveillance involved close control 
“and ‘normalization’ of individual behavior through impartial observation and 
standardized, calculated punishment or correction of behavioral abnormalities” (Hannah 
2000: 18). Of course, the uneven power relations in these “houses of terror” are not 
bounded by the walls of the factory, because the effects of the surveillance and 
disciplining of workers (or prisoners) also “trickle down” into everyday life.  
                                                
45 Marx has a footnote here that says: “Si le manouvrier libre prend un instant de repos, 
l’économie sordide qui le suit des yeux avec inquiétude, prétend qu’il la vole.” [If the 
free labourer allows himself an instant of rest, the base and petty management, which 
follows him with wary eyes, claims he is stealing from it] N. Linguet, “Théorie des Lois 
Civiles. &c.” London, 1767, t. II., p. 466. Translated by 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch10.htm#5.This is also the goal of 
border patrol by giving the impression of constant surveillance anywhere between official 
entry points. 
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 As Foucault suggests, one can see similar practices in other institutions, such as 
schools. School is not only for disciplining children, but it also allows for the external 
supervision of their parents (Foucault 1977: 211). In other words, the application of the 
panoptic model creates a form of power that is also complimented by coercive powers, 
and to exercise this power “it had to be given the instrument of permanent, exhaustive, 
omnipresent surveillance, capable of making all visible, as long as it could itself remain 
invisible” (Foucault 1975: 214). The supervisor of the social, the police apparatus, then, 
becomes a handy tool where security and surveillance can be performed in everyday life.  
 However, security and surveillance cannot be achieved only through coercive 
powers. When applied to larger scales, disciplinary powers construct and facilitate social 
relations where not only police but also people are put to work as part of security and 
surveillance. To be able to include people in these discursive practices of security and 
surveillance, people had to govern themselves. Hannah explains that these power 
relations between people (as biological life) and the state apparatuses (as a political 
power) shifted towards bio-politics where concern was not only to the “right to take life 
or let live” but also to “foster life or disallow it to the point of death,” or “power over 
life” (Foucault 1978: 138, Hannah 2000: 19, 2011: 1036). Then, “bio-power” is the 
implementation of bio-politics over the population through various state apparatuses—
“dispositifs.” The implementation of security and surveillance requires not only 
disciplining but also an art of governing where people can be taught to govern themselves 
(Foucault 2007, Elden 2007, Douglas 2009, Hannah 2000, 2011). Foucault (2007) traces 
the historical relationship among sovereignty, discipline and the government, which 
continuously searches for effective ways to control and administer populations. Foucault 
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used the word governmentality to bring these ideas together. The concept of 
governmentality includes the state strategies and tactics that aim to control population not 
only through institutions but also through self-control.  
 Many geographers have used governmentality in their empirical research. Hannah 
(1993) examines how the U.S. government used spatial strategies and employed different 
ways to govern the “uncivilized” Lakota and to “teach” the Lakota how to govern and be 
“good” subjects. He provides strong evidence for how a system of control based on 
visibility can be used for spatial and governmental strategies that attempted to assimilate 
(if not exterminate) Lakota. He argues that “at the core of the disciplinary logic of social 
control lies a mechanism for the regulation of human activity composed of three 
‘moments’: observation, judgment and enforcement” (1993: 413 original emphasis). 
Hannah explains that these moments are important because during the 1870s even the 
well-integrated citizens in the US were subject to little observation; however, for the 
native population and for workers in the “houses of terror” these ideas were already being 
put to work.  
  Using a more recent example, Mustafa Dikec focuses on the French urban 
environment.  While acknowledging that the constitution of urban spaces certainly has a 
governmental dimension, Dikec argues, “there is no inherent politics to such 
constitutions” (Dikec 2007: 279). He claims that although governmental practices are an 
important component of urban policymaking, different urban policies shape ‘spaces’ and 
“how these spaces are conceived matters because urban policy conceives of its object 
spatially” (Dikec 2007: 280). He tracks how French urban policy has changed between 
the 1980s and the 1990s. Dikec’s argument is important because he recognizes the 
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significance of urban policy as a governmental practice, and he asserts that in the case of 
the French experience, each policy and the policy makers conceptualized space in 
particular ways that reflect each specific moment. In the 1980s, the language of urban 
policy placed immediate attention on self-management and the participation of 
inhabitants and in the following years, the attention slightly shifted towards the welfare 
state (2007: 277-283). In this period government policy was applied to areas with high 
unemployment rates and social housing neighborhoods (mostly immigrant 
neighborhoods) and in order to increase economic activity, government provided 
economic incentives and redevelopment projects (2007: 284). More recently, government 
policy shifted towards the penal state; the main idea was the implementation of the 
authoritarian state—where security and surveillance can be practiced in those 
neighborhoods that appear to constitute a threat to French identity. This shift required the 
strong presence of repressive state apparatuses, such as the police. The contemporary US 
State also employs similar strategies to control its undesired populations.  
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Figure 3: “If you see something say something”: These signs are displayed in all train, bus and 
subway stations that I have visited. The one on the right is displayed on top of the artwork that 
seems to celebrate the diversity in New York City. Ironically, the artwork shows diverse group of 
people in NYC subway system (white, black, brown, Muslim, Jew and Christian, etc.) yet US 
State is asking information from the very same people: “If you see something, say something.” 
Photographed by M. Coskan. 
 
The US State uses not only repressive state apparatuses such as BPAs, but also lay-
people—governmentality at work.  “Citizens” are asked to be part of these surveillance 
strategies that presumably assist the overall “national security.” The US State uses 
“smiley face tactics,” and urges people to “say something”, if they “see something” (Katz 
2007: 351). 
 As I mentioned above, surveillance is contested because it creates a tension 
between rights and national security. In terms of rights discourse, surveillance not only 
violates the freedoms and the privacy of people, but also virtually works to eliminate the 
material presence of some people in the contemporary US State by excluding certain 
people from public spaces, deporting them, indefinitely detaining them. And, of course, 
these spatio-temporal practices never go away without some form of resistance (Douglas 
2009, Jones at al. 2011, Mitchell 2000, 2003, Mitchell and Heynen 2009, Staeheli and 
Mitchell 2008, Pain 2009, 2010, Walsh 2010).  
3.5.2 Conclusion: 
 
 State apparatuses, in the name of security and the safety of people, are constantly 
monitoring the day-to-day life of people. As I stated before, particular ideas about border, 
citizenship, territory, and security push to create discourses that aim to freeze historical, 
spatial, temporal relationships in order to normalize everyday life.  In “national security” 
discourse, as President Obama (and the presidents before him) repeatedly remind “us,” 
surveillance is necessary for the safety of the “nation” and/or the “American” people. 
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However, as recent internal bordering practices suggest, there has been a change in the 
surveillance strategies of the US State. As I mentioned above, traditional linear and 
permanent border checks have currently been complimented by fluid, dynamic and 
temporary surveillance strategies that aim to secure the “nation”. The US State constructs 
and uses discourses of fear to create a need for surveillance of the everyday lives of 
people.  Thus, the US State rationalizes and justifies national security concerns for its 
citizens. The production of the fear of “terrorism and illegal immigration” requires the 
production of the “terrorist and aliens.” However, one must also consider the security of 
those individuals who experience fear due to the US State’s security and surveillance 
practices in and outside of its territory. In an apparent paradox, the expansion of borders 
has meant the expansion of fear. Pain (2009: 468-69, 2010: 226) explains that since 2001, 
academia has focused on “globalized fear” and certain geopolitical events that have 
produced fear, such as the war[s] on terror, “illegal” immigration, spread of diseases and 
so on. As a result the focus is on the US State and citizens who fear “others,” instead of 
those “others” who fear the US State and its citizens (i.e. minorities).  
 There are several ways that one can resist these (uneven) power relations. One 
way is to look at individual resistances similar to that of de Certeau (1984).  For de 
Certeau individual tactical movements can be seen as resistance, for example, a secretary 
writing love letters at work during his/her company time or a furniture maker 
“borrowing” his/her bosses equipment to make a furniture for his/her house (1984: 25) or 
simply walking on the streets (1984: 97).  Hence, while these individual actions are still 
critical, they are transgressions. Another way is pointed out by Mitchell, who asserts 
(2000: 153, original emphasis), “in order for a resistance movement to be effective it 
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must surely be social rather than individual.” While acknowledging the different 
configurations of power, social resistance is where people react as a collective. The 
struggles for inclusion and equality must continuously resist boundaries of exclusion as a 
collective. 
 Discourses of the US State’s security and surveillance practices generate fear of 
“others” and justify contemporary bordering practices, which one can encounter 
anywhere; they can be seen at physical checkpoints at the end of state border lines or at 
unlikely places inside the territory of the US. Thus, my examination of the making of 
these concepts such as border, citizenship, state, territory, and surveillance involves the 
history of the US and also of the “aliens.” It is correct but not sufficient to say that these 
are social constructs, because like border, citizenship, race (and class), border is a also a 
historical social construct; it is (and they are) the product(s) of history (Berlin 1998: 1). 
Therefore, in the next chapter, I scrutinize the historical construction of non-citizens, 
“illegal aliens” in order to better understand their contemporary predicament. 
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Chapter 4 – The Production of non-citizen “Aliens” and Whiteness 
 
 
“‘Whenever an Indian reservation has on it good land, or timber, or minerals’, the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs stated in his Annual Report for 1876, ‘the cupidity of the 
white man is excited, and a constant struggle is inaugurated to dispossess the Indian, in 
which the avarice and determination of the white men usually prevails’” (Deloria et al. 
1999:189).  
 
 “Throughout the seventeenth century, black and white ran away together, joined in petty 
conspiracies, and, upon occasion, stood shoulder-to-shoulder against the weighty 
champions of established authority” (Berlin 1998:45). 
 
“In the early period, the primary concern of immigration officials was the entry of 
Chinese who evaded 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act by entering from Mexico. There was 
little attention paid to Mexicans” (Sánchez 1993: 50). 
 
4.1 The past and the present 
 
 As I have suggested in previous chapters, the examination of the past helps us to 
better understand present relations, policies, practices and their material consequences. In 
this chapter I explore the link between extermination, annexation of land, and the 
expulsion of “aliens” in the past and their deportation, detention, and exclusion in 
contemporary US. A critical and geographical examination of this history of exclusion 
helps me scrutinize contemporary border policing and immigration policy in the US. I 
must also note that the history I examine here is selective and therefore it is not a 
comprehensive review of the highlighted concepts such as “race” and whiteness. My 
project is not historical geography; instead, I study history in order to make contemporary 
inconspicuous geographies of border policy and practices visible. That is, this historical 
incursion is not an end in itself; it is the means to an end. More importantly, this thesis 
examines the political geography of border policing. Current discursive practices have 
failed to recognize the importance of socially constructed categories that create exclusion 
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and inequality. As a result, this chapter is important for this thesis, because it provides a 
historically grounded answer to one of the key research questions that I ask: in whose 
interest is the border and the nation secured? The goal of contemporary border policing 
practices is to track down, arrest and remove those who are not part of US national (and 
juridical) identity and space. Hence, in this section I examine those who are not 
recognized as part of US identity and space. 
 According to a Congressional Service Report (CSR 2008, 2010), during the 1990s 
the United States Border Patrol (USBP) strategy was focused on “Prevention Through 
Deterrence.” The principal focus of the border patrol was to install border agents and 
other resources at specific border locations to prevent the entry of illegal aliens between 
official points of entry (CSR 2010: 4, see also Nevins 2010). However, after the events of 
September 11, the USBP modified its strategy. In this new “evolved” strategy there are 
five national objectives. These objectives focus mainly on preventing the illegal entry of 
terrorists, terrorist weapons (i.e. Weapons of Mass Destruction), illegal aliens and drugs 
into the United States (CSR 5-6), with the assistance of a variety of surveillance 
technology and human power. The linking of “aliens” with activities such as border 
crossing and “terrorism and terrorist weapons” exacerbates the insecurity of those who 
have suffered and continue to suffer from the ideologies of whiteness in the United 
States.  
 Kobayashi and Peake examine whiteness and racism in the US and their main 
concern is the process of “racialization.” They direct our attention to “the material 
processes and the ideological consequences of the construction of ‘race’ as a means of 
differentiating and valuing ‘white’ people above those of color” (2000:393). While 
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understanding this process is important, Kobayashi and Peake point out that as critical 
geographers, they work to resist constructions of whiteness. Like these two scholars, in 
this section I focus on the construction of “aliens” and the process of alienation. In other 
words, I examine the history of those who made “aliens,” and laws and policies that 
assisted these processes. I demonstrate that while “aliens” and alienation46 generate social 
and spatial exclusion, they serve the interests and the construction of whiteness. And like 
the geographers and activists mentioned in this thesis (Nevins, Mountz, Kobayashi and 
Peake, and other scholars), my aim is not only to better understand, but also to resist legal 
and social constructions of whiteness. The results of these legal and social processes can 
be observed in the BPAs practices inside the US national space. These practices work to 
create heavily controlled and surveyed spaces that are exclusionary. The spaces in which 
these mobile borders are policed become the sites where “good” and “bad,” “citizens” 
and non-citizens, and “aliens” are made, remade (and contested). I argue that attempting 
to provide ontological definitions for “aliens,” and “race” not only freezes these terms 
and people in time and space but also hides and deflects attention away from the 
ideologies that helped to produce them in the first place. Thus, an examination of 
contemporary bordering practices must engage with the histories and the accounts of 
those who were (and are) excluded and labeled as “aliens,” “illegals,” and non-citizens in 
the United States. 
 4.2. Brief explanation of the concept of “alien” and whiteness 
 
  An “alien” is not an individual of extraterrestrial origin. Nor does the word refer to 
specific groups of people and their qualities—despite the fact that it is most often 
                                                
46 I use “alienation” to both imply the alienation from the means of production and also 
from the social, political and economic life and benefits that “others” enjoy. 
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identified with specific groups of people and their qualities. The concept of the alien 
changes with social, political and economic conditions. Even from the perspective of the 
US government, “alien” has had different meanings at different times and spaces. For 
example, in 1790 “alien” was used to demonstrate who could be eligible for citizenship in 
the US.  The 1790 Naturalization Act states “[t]hat any alien, being a free white person 
who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States 
for a term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen thereof” (Harvard 
University Open Collections).47 However, in 1798, the US government “alien” was used 
to identify enemies;48 and similarly, since 2001 aliens have been linked with terrorism—
“they” come to “our land” and infect “our” geography. 
 Protecting the “nation’s border” and “our national interest” from outside threats, 
such as “aliens,” has been the policy of the U.S. government for centuries. The task 
involves the alienation of those who are recognized as “aliens.” For the US government, 
the idea of the “alien” and alienation has been used to identify and exclude Chinese 
immigrants, Mexicans (Sánchez 1993: 50, Nevins 2010: 34, for Chinese also see, See 
1995) and Native Americans (Richter 2003). Although Mexicans and Native Americans 
were incorrectly recognized as “illegal” and immigrants, there is ample evidence that 
suggests they were made into such on their own land (Sánchez 1993, Hannah 1993, 
                                                
47 (http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/immigration/, emphasis added, accessed December 1, 2011) 
48 The Alien and Sedition Act states “whenever there shall be a declared war between the 
United States and any foreign nation or government, or any invasion or predatory 
incursion shall be perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United 
States, by any foreign nation or government, and the President of the United States shall 
make public proclamation of the event, all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the 
hostile nation or government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who 
shall be within the United States, and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be 
apprehended, restrained, secured and removed, as alien enemies” 
(http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/alien.asp, accessed on November 25, 2011). 
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Deloria et. al. 1999, Richter 2003, Nevins 2010, Zinn 2003, 2007). Hence, following the 
same logic, one can argue that European settlers came and infected Mexican and Native 
American land and geography with their whiteness. In US history, racial difference (or 
racialization) has been used as a tool to create tension between different peoples, such as 
poor white servants and African American slaves (Berlin 1998). At other times, it created 
the conditions for the socio-spatial exclusion of African Americans (Malcolm X and 
Haley 1967). Racial difference has also made the poor Irish into “white niggers” in 
Boston (MacDonald 1999). Thus, to be able to find the relationship between poor white 
servants, poor Irish persons, African American slaves and “illegal” Mexicans, the 
question should not be about what an “alien” is or what are the “racial differences”49; 
instead, one should ask how and in whose interest these concepts are made and then 
attached to people. Who reifies and benefits from them and who does not? What are the 
consequences of the historical materialization of the idea of “alien” for the people who 
are recognized as such in the contemporary US? 
 “Alien,” as a social construction, transmits meanings, which are made in relation 
to other meanings that are also socially constructed—such as the idea of a superior white 
race and the imagined nation (Horsman 1981, Anderson 1983, Haney-López 2006). The 
legal and social construction of whiteness is an important part of US history (Haney-
López 2006, Zinn 1999, 2003). As the 1790 legislation cited above makes clear, only 
aliens who were free white persons and who met certain requirements were eligible for 
the rights that come with US citizenship—such as the right to own property and to vote, 
which are the rights that were granted to white people (Horseman 1981, Berlin 1998, 
                                                
49 For example, Livingstone (1991, 2002) offers a historical geography of how these 
racial differences were framed in relation to climate research. 
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Haney-López 2006, Richter 2003, Zinn 2003, 2007). Following earlier laws, in 1798 
similar legislation was passed but with tougher requirements—extending the residency 
requirement for becoming a US citizen. The goal of these tough new laws was—while 
reaffirming the US as a nation state—to make it difficult for those dangerous “aliens” (at 
that point, French and Irish) to become citizens and gave the president the power to 
“deport any alien he50 regarded as dangerous to public safety” (Zinn 2007: 250)—non-
whites did not have to worry about these laws since they already lacked the crucial 
ingredient in their skin colour.  
 If the United States as a “nation” is built on the idea of whiteness, then I argue 
that the “alien” is alien to whiteness. Whiteness in the United States can be seen as the 
result of the relationship between nation and “race,” a relationship which also produces 
“aliens.” Consequently, “race,” racialization and racial stereotypes are important in the 
examination of the “aliens.” Whiteness, however, is more than a skin colour. In other 
words, it is not necessarily the skin colour per se that determines who can or cannot be 
white (Peake 2009: 247, Gregory et al. 2009: 810). One can be a black, brown or white 
Muslim or an Italian, Irish or Mexican Catholic but still be treated as an “alien” or a non-
citizen depending on time and place. Whiteness can be experienced through religion, 
gender, sexual identity and class (Haney-López 2006),51 which make “aliens” an unstable 
group.52  
                                                
50 As of 2012, there is still no she. 
51 For an excellent discussion of the legal construction of race see Haney-López 2006. 
52 The US government estimates that 11.2 million unauthorized “aliens” reside in the US 
as of 2010 (CSR 2011). Considering these numbers alone, it would be difficult to say 
they are a stable group. Nevertheless, BPAs seem to know how to recognize them! 
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 In other words, these concepts are produced and re-produced spatio-temporally by 
the social relations that are most often shaped by a conflict of interest. These interests are 
reflected in and through different institutions. Therefore, the construction of both the 
“alien” and “race” involves governments, laws, mass media, and people. The history of 
the US is about uneven power dynamics that influence social relations among people. 
These social relations mask the historical “conflict of interest between conquerors and 
conquered, masters and slaves, capitalist and workers, dominators and dominated in race 
and sex” (Zinn 2003: 10). Zinn asserts that the history of the United States is most often a 
history that is told “from the point of view of governments, conquerors, diplomats, 
leaders” (2003: 9). Therefore, this chapter examines US history from the point of view of 
people who became “aliens” in their land or are alienated upon entrance into the US. This 
history is about a power relationship that involves domination and resistance. The 
dominant groups have violent means (a monopoly of the means of violence) and non-
violent means (the discursive construction of an inferior race) to attach meanings and 
persuasively (and legally) define what and who is “alien.” Nevertheless the relationship is 
not one-way; there is always resistance (Berlin 1998, Deloria et al. 1999, MacDonald 
1999, Malcom X 1999, Morgan 2003, Nevins 2010, Richter 2003, Sánchez 1993, See 
1995, Zinn 2003, 2007).53  
 As will become clear below, my analysis will not follow a chronological order, 
because “alien” and “race” are particular social constructs and their meanings change 
over time and space. For that reason, my analysis and examples move back and forth in 
different times and spaces in history, so that I can trace how “race” and racism have been 
                                                
53 Therefore this thesis should be seen as part of that resistance. 
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made in ways that are both similar and different in the United States. Terms such as alien 
and race are dynamic, partial and changing. They have been made, remade and contested 
in and through the geography of the US. As a result, my construction of these terms is 
particular; in other words, they can never be viewed as impartial and objective. 
Furthermore, an analysis of these terms requires the recognition of related themes such as 
class and racial stereotyping. I would argue that concepts such as race and alien are most 
often, if not always, used as tools to conceal certain social and economic inequalities in 
the US. In other words, it is a useful (but defective) tool that works to create divisions 
among classes of people. This is not to suggest that class is more important than “race” 
(or gender, etc.) or that their relationship is hierarchical. These concepts become tools for 
“alienation,” especially when institutionalized to serve the interests of whiteness. 
4.3. The making of “aliens,” and alienation through “race” 
 
 Meyers (2004) suggests that US immigration policy was open and welcoming 
(with some exceptions) prior to the 1840s (c.f. Nevins 2010:125-26). In fact, the role of 
the US Immigration Bureau—created by the 1864 Act to Encourage Immigration but 
later repealed—was “to increase immigration so that US industries would have a 
sufficient labour supply during the Civil War” (Nevins 2010: 124). After the 1840s, these 
welcoming policies started to fade away due to social and economic factors such as the 
racial and religious composition of arriving immigrants, the association of immigrants 
with external threats and xenophobia, and finally, the economic crisis that produced high 
unemployment and economic insecurity. Thus, along with other new arrivals, the 
numbers of Chinese immigrants increased and so did the anti-immigrant and anti-Chinese 
sentiments and legislations. On several occasions, members of the US Congress 
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attempted to restrict Chinese immigration. Various US presidents vetoed some of this anti 
Chinese legislation on the grounds that it violated the United State’s Treaty obligations 
and were not “good” foreign policy (Meyers 2004: 31-32). The main concern for the US 
government was keeping economic relationships open by employing “good foreign 
policy” with other countries, such as China. Nevertheless, partly due to nativist pressures 
and partly to alternative labour supplies, restrictions were put in place in 1882 for 
Chinese immigrants and others who might become public charges (Meyers 2004, Nevins 
2010). Between 1882 and 1924, other regulations were passed to limit, restrict, or make it 
unlawful to immigrate for certain groups of people.54 One of the limitations put in place 
was the literacy test. Meyer (2004: 33, emphasis added) writes that Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge claimed that these tests aimed to eliminate “races whose traditions and 
inheritances, whose thoughts and whose beliefs are wholly alien to ours.” According to 
Senator Lodge, tests should be applied heavily to Italians, Russians, Poles, Hungarians, 
Greeks, and Asians, and lightly on “English-speaking peoples, Germans, Scandinavians, 
and France” (Ibid). Senator Cabot, who was himself a prominent and wealthy immigrant 
from Boston,55 produced legislation that worked to construct “aliens” by describing 
“races” of immigrants for whom entry into the US should be made easier.   
 Similar to Chinese, Mexican Americans had do deal with similar exclusionary 
practices that worked to make them “aliens.” When Mexican Americans were faced with 
                                                
54 For example, Act of 1892-93 extends the Chinese Exclusion Act and prohibits 
immigration from countries with cholera and infectious diseases. While the 1903 
Immigration Act excluded “anarchists, saboteurs, epileptics, and professional beggars,” 
in 1907 economic problems led to the expansion of restrictions that included Japanese 
immigration.  
55 For information about Senator Henry Cabot please refer to: 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/People_Leaders_Lodge.ht
m. 
	   83	  
the political and social power of newly arrived Anglo Americans, they relied on networks 
of family members and other members of the Mexican community in the US (Sánchez 
1995: 10-12).56 Despite institutional exclusion and socio-political and economic 
inequalities, Sánchez shows that Mexicans, men and women, families and communities, 
made economic and social choices for themselves. However, racism and, therefore, 
assumed racial differences, enabled certain stereotypes that worked against them. Before 
examining the effects of these stereotypes, we must look at how these stereotypes were 
created inside US territory by different apparatuses, a process that will become important 
for the examination of the contemporary border policing later in this thesis. 
 Nevins (2010) examines historical “origins and struggles between competing 
social entities” in the border area between the US and Mexico. He describes current 
territorial states as the “burial sites of history and geography in that they help to mask the 
dynamic and typically contested making of space and time that they embody” (18). This 
history that Nevins studies covers notions such as Manifest Destiny, which led to the 
U.S.-Mexico war during 1846-48, the Chinese exclusion act of 1882, and continues up to 
recent history. Nevins argues that while both sides of the border shared similar patterns of 
economic and social development, mostly due to capital from the U.S., over time and 
through legislation and nationalistic practices, these similarities gradually served to create 
differences. In other words, the border was established as a geographical entity that not 
only protected the “nation” from the “aliens” but also served as a zone where the US 
government practiced its racist policies. For example, in 1917, the image of “dirty” 
                                                
56 Sánchez shatters the depiction of the stereotypical Mexican family structure such as the 
idea of a male dominated Mexican family.  He demonstrates that Mexican families are 
complicated; they are diverse and each had their own conflicts and/or consensus (1993: 
131). 
	   84	  
immigrants, in this case, dirty Mexican “aliens” was created at the border. The physical 
inspection of immigrants from Mexico involved not only the processes of sterilizing and 
fumigating their clothes, but also included scenes in which they waited in lines, naked, 
for the inspection of their hairy parts for lice (Romo 2005: 235, quoted in Nevins 2010: 
66). Such scenes illustrate the legal practices and immigration policies that have shaped 
and continue to shape the idea, image and role of the border and border patrol agents. As 
I mentioned in my review of literature on borders, these discursive practices have 
normalized not only the ideas of borders and citizens, but also non-citizens and “aliens,” 
and it has made them legal or “illegal.”   
 While the image of the “dirty” Mexican was at work at border crossings, 
Prohibition added insult to injury. During the Prohibition years (1919-1933), Mexican 
border towns became the main destination for many US citizens and as a result these 
towns were booming. This economic boom was mainly due to the tourists from the US 
who were looking for sex, drugs and alcohol (Nevins 2010). However, these activities at 
Mexican border towns had few positive effects for the Mexicans—such towns were not 
seen as spaces of freedom. Ironically and as we saw above, the focus of bordering 
practices was not on the American tourists who traveled over the border for sex, drugs 
and alcohol, but rather, it was on the Mexicans who arrived seeking work, and who 
nevertheless were pictured as immoral and dangerous. Although scholars such as Nevins 
and Sánchez do not point it out plainly, it goes without saying that the Anglo-American 
tourists were not subjected to the same fumigation, sterilization or physical inspections 
on the way back to their homeland. Such practices were reserved for those who were 
“aliens” to the white United States. These practices not only constructed Mexicans as 
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“illegal” on their ancestral land and at the borders (Nevins 2010: 68, Sánchez 1993:62), 
but also crystallized the stronger position of the Anglo owners.  The response to Anglo-
Americans and Mexicans was not based on their actions but rather on their “race” or 
ethnicity—the whites were doing “immoral” things such as evading US laws by crossing 
into Mexico, but they were left alone. The Mexicans were looking for work (or for their 
family) and were fumigated at the border.  On the US side, businesses and employers, 
despite their racist inclinations, ignored racial differences, because Mexican labourers 
offered them economic opportunity (Sánchez 1993: 96, 215). Again, the state acts like a 
buffer to resolve the contradiction that arises between economic interests and the 
“imagined nation.” As mentioned in the previous section, the state is always partial, 
unraveling and contradictory. While serving economic interests, it has (and seems to 
have) the responsibility of protecting its citizens. Hence, the state has to facilitate and 
resolve the conflict between immigration and economy (Nevins 2010: 31). The state has 
to fulfill the interests of capital, and at the same time, it has to facilitate the needs and the 
security of its “citizens”—sometimes through setting check points at the borders and 
using various surveillance methods, and sometimes through teaching “Americanism.”  
 After World War I, there were programs created to Americanize or to acculturate 
immigrants, and there were attempts to make them “100 Per Cent American” (Sánchez 
1993:94). In the beginning of these programs, the instructors’ focus was on Mexican 
men; however, soon instructors realized that their efforts to Americanize these men were 
undermined by the nature of the Mexican man’s status in the US. The instructors 
concluded that as seasonal labourers it was impractical, therefore impossible for these 
Mexican men to use the English language. The solution was to shift the attention from 
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Mexican men to women and children. These Americanization programs then targeted 
Mexican women since they believed that women carried the responsibility for creating 
and passing on values at home; some suggested that the slogan for Americanization 
should be “go after the women” (Sánchez 1993:96). The possibility of the assimilation of 
Mexican families (at the expense of eliminating language and “culture”) seemed to be 
necessary for the protection of “American” national space, identity and values. 
 In the State of California, the foundations of the Americanization of “aliens” were 
put to work around 1913 not only to produce aliens but also to distinguish between levels 
of alienation with troubling inconsistency. The Commission of Immigration and Housing 
(CIH) was created to investigate the working and living condition of immigrants to 
California. CIH played an important role in the Americanization and teaching of English 
to foreigners (Sánchez 1993: 94). Interestingly, the CIH believed that Mexicans did not 
threaten the American way of life and that the Americanization of Mexican immigrants 
was difficult compared to Jews and Italians, but still possible, unlike the “unassimilable” 
Chinese and Japanese immigrants. In the same year that the CIH was established, the 
1913 Alien Land Act restricted Japanese land ownership and further extended Asian 
exclusion (1995: 95). Although legal exclusion was aimed at Asians, some nativists and 
members of the white American political establishment, academics, media and so on 
continued to wage war against Mexican immigrants—made up of the “Indian” and the  
“Negro”— and immigration in general on the grounds of the danger they posed to the 
superior “white race” (Nevins 2010: 131-2). The legal construction of whiteness was also 
supported by other sources such as newspapers that created stereotypes for immigrants 
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(see Romero 2006). Sánchez cites one of these nativists voices in the Saturday Evening 
Post in 1928,57 
“the endless streets crowded with the shacks of illiterate, diseased, pauperized 
Mexicans, taking no interest whatever in the community, living constantly on the 
ragged edge of starvation, bringing countless numbers of American citizens into 
the world with the reckless prodigality of rabbits…” (1993: 96, emphasis added)  
 
Here, one observes that racist ideology mobilizes stereotypes such as “illiterate, diseased 
and pauperized Mexicans.” They are seen as poor; they multiply like rabbits, and their 
children will threaten “white Americans”—not to mention the ways that poverty is 
automatically associated with disease and danger. Another newspaper, the New York 
Times, published a piece in 1930 that asserts, “it is folly to pretend that the more recently 
arrived Mexicans, who are largely of Indian blood, can be absorbed and incorporated into 
the American race” (quoted in Nevins 2010: 131). Racism (or racialization) not only 
produces and stabilizes identities, but it also separates and excludes. Racism, on the one 
hand, constructs certain people as acceptable and valuable members of the imagined 
community, and on the other hand, it constructs other people as undesirable and 
dangerous “aliens.” These fictitious stereotypes are also used to recognize non-citizens 
today. As I demonstrate in the next chapter, BPAs employ these and other negative 
stereotypes of the past when they are searching for “illegal aliens” inside US territory 
today. 
 Like Mexican immigrants who were framed as nearly or completely 
“unassimilable,” and were refused basic rights and declared a threat to white Americans, 
                                                
57 The title of the article was “The Docile Mexican” (Sánchez 1993: 295, fn 27). 
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another group that faced similar exclusionary practices was Native Americans. What 
makes Mexican and Native American experiences paradoxical is that both became 
immigrants or “aliens” on their own land.58 Most often Native American histories have 
been told from the white European perspectives. Historian Daniel K. Richter (2003) 
breaks these traditions; he utilizes oral history, archeological evidence and so on to 
provide a different geographical perspective. He reverses American history eastward by 
providing history from the perspective of the Natives (2003:8). Richter shows how both 
newly arrived settlers and Native Americans had perceived, interacted and constructed 
each “other.” Richter emphasizes that Native American life was not entirely shaped by 
the Europeans; in fact, Natives had their own trade relations and routes, struggles, 
population movements, and wars not only before but also after Europeans’ arrival to the 
“old world” (2003: 39). In other words, the history of the Native Americans was as 
complicated as that of the Europeans.  
 Richter (2003: 14) notes that for Natives “the world was a morally neutral 
universe of potentially hostile or potentially friendly spiritual forces—some human, most 
other-than-human—with whom one had to deal. People, animals, and spirit forces were 
all, in a sense, persons with whom one dealt with in much the same way.” According to 
Richter, Native peoples were not sure what to make of the European visitors. Richter’s 
descriptions suggest that Natives described these visitors as “woodworkers” or 
“metalworkers” according to the gifts that they received from visitors during exchanges. 
The Native’s descriptions were not based on preconceived ideas such as “race” or 
religion; however, for the newly arrived Europeans this was not the case. The crucifix 
                                                
58 I am not suggesting that the Mexican and Native American experiences were the same.  
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and flags that were left behind by Cabot and his crew around 1497 may not have meant 
much to Natives, but for Cabot they were the holy symbols that claimed legal ownership 
of the land for Cabot’s God and his English sponsors (Richter 2003: 13). Here we see an 
early attempt to displace Natives and their belief systems as inferior to Europeans. 
 These “explorers” such as Columbus and Cabot (or de Soto or Verrazano) were 
on a godly mission to search for new resources for their respective empires. They brought 
not just goods, horses and men. They carried another powerful weapon hidden in their 
ships and their minds: the ideology of a superior “god” and “race.” If these white 
Christian visitors had perceived Natives as equals, then it would be difficult to understand 
their reports to royal sponsors in England claiming that they had not seen anyone after 
they had encountered the Natives. Neither could they have kidnapped a child from an 
elderly woman and brought it into France just because Verrazano had the “need to bring 
his sponsor, Francis I, living proof of his exploits and a potential interpreter to aid future 
travelers” (Sánchez 1993: 13). It is accurate to say that “race” was socially constructed 
during the encounters between Natives and Europeans; however, the fact is that 
Europeans brought their problematic (“superior”) constructs with them to establish 
hegemony, which shaped social relations, if not always, then most often violently. 
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Figure 4: Re-discovery of Old World:  The celebration of the (re)-discovery of the (old) new 
world at the Central Park in New York City. (See http://www.centralparknyc.org/visit/things-to-
see/south-end/christopher-columbus.html, for detailed information). Photographed by M. Coskan. 
 
 Historians suggest that 3-8 million Natives have been killed by disease or 
murdered by the late “owners” of the land (Zinn 2003).  Hegemony, thus, enabled the 
appearance of whiteness as the norm, and “aliens” became alien to whiteness. Native 
American uncertainty about the Europeans was not due to preconceived ideas about a 
superior “god” or “race,” as is often reported, but instead, they perceived Europeans as 
simply another group of people that they had encountered and had to deal with. It might 
be true to say that these white visitors were aliens to Natives but not aliens to non-
whiteness. Natives, while with uncertainty, entered into social relations with the visitors 
as equals (Richter 2003). If this were not the case then Mexicans and Native Americans 
would have been able to describe white settlers similarly to the words of nativists in the 
Saturday Evening Post in 1928 above: White settlers “taking no interest whatever in the 
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community, living constantly on the ragged edge of starvation, bringing countless 
numbers of American citizens into the world with the reckless prodigality of rabbits….” 
However, the historical relationship between Native Americans and the US State is 
violent and most often based on the alienation of the non-white. Social control was 
achieved not only by the physical use of force but also by other spatial strategies that 
aimed to place Native Americans (and others) under the legal control of whiteness 
(Hannah 1993). As Nevins puts it, the idea of bounded national territory, first, creates the 
conditions that deny basic rights for those who are recognized as non-citizens, “aliens,” 
or “illegals.” This secondly, “reinforces status quo” and serves the interest of the 
privileged. Third and related, such a position that reinforces the status quo and serves the 
interests of the privileged “makes the immigration debate one of costs versus benefits, 
which has the effect of reducing immigrants [and others who are made into such] to 
commodities or investments” (Nevins 2010: 202). In other words, once the idea of US 
territory was established legally, supported by policy and practiced by state apparatuses, 
(and the previous inhabitants were removed, displaced, and so “alienated,”) the US 
territory became a space where non-citizens, “aliens” or “illegals” could be searched, 
detained and/or deported as if they were property. 
  The production of “aliens” and racial stereotypes is manifested in power 
relations. In other words, social relations that are heavily influenced by power relations 
give meaning to these terms. Power can be relational, diffuse and has many points of 
contact (Castree 2002:122, quoted in Kirsh and Mitchell 2004: 691). However, this 
definition of power fails to recognize that few people have access to the state institutions 
where power is unevenly distributed. Thus, Kirsh and Mitchell (2004: 691) remind us 
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that as much as power is relational, diffuse, and has many points of contact, “it is also 
therefore “centered”—centered in institutions [the US Army, CHI, Department of 
Homeland Security, media, i.e. Saturday Evening Post in 1928], in individuals 
[Columbus, Cabot, BPAs], or in structured social relations.” Thus when these institutions 
and individuals are entrenched in whiteness, “aliens” become the people who do not 
conform to the norms that are created for the interests of whiteness. What is the 
relationship between “race” or “racialization” and class? The strong racial divisions and 
the shift towards strong racial divisions can be traced back to Bacon’s Rebellion (Berlin 
1998, see also Morgan [1975] 2003). For some historians, the outcome of this rebellion 
made the fear and the threat of united lower classes visible; hence it marked a turn from 
class-based slavery to race-based slavery (Ibid). This shift does not entail an end or a 
beginning; rather, it represents how “race” masked class relations and also became a tool 
for exclusion. 
 Zinn argues above that the history of the US is about a “conflict of interest 
between conquerors and conquered, masters and slaves, capitalist and workers, 
dominators and dominated in race and sex” (2003: 10). Berlin’s (1998) examination of 
the history of slavery in the US provides an example of this conflict of interest. 
Historically, the extraction of “free” labour and resources played a crucial role not only in 
the accumulation of wealth, but also for slaves’ lives (and other subordinated groups) in 
the US. Berlin points out that “race” and class are relational and neither can exist outside 
of time and space and he argues, “if slavery made race,” then, its larger aim was to make 
class” (1998: 5). In his examination of two centuries of slavery, Berlin makes the 
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distinction between societies with slaves and slave societies.59 In societies with slaves, the 
assumption was that slavery was a fuzzy term since the line between free and slave was 
not clear. Berlin demonstrates, during the charter generations in Chesapeake, black 
labourers were one type among many others; whites and blacks worked together so that 
“racial slavery remained only one labor system among many” (Berlin1998: 38). Similar 
to white labourers, blacks slaves were also subject to harsh treatment—white and black 
were alienated based on their class. On the other hand, in slave societies, slaves were 
essential to economic production. As a result African slavery was maintained as a social 
order in slave societies. The racial ideology of white supremacy normalized and 
rationalized the alienation of people of colour “not merely to the base of the life cycle as 
children, but to the base of civilization as savages” (Berlin 1998:99). The slaves’ 
experiences could not simply be equivalent to the other forms of exploitation, so slavery 
implied different meanings in different places and time.  According to Berlin, slavery was 
negotiated between master and slave (Berlin 1998: 33). The recognition of these uneven 
social relations based on “race” and class is useful for this thesis, because similar patterns 
are also present in contemporary border policing practices.  
  Up to this point my discussion has focused on the construction of the “alien” in 
the U.S. in the past, but it is necessary now to turn to much more recent history in order 
to suggest that there has been continuity in the alienation of different group of people 
across time and space. Similar violent, uneven and unjust negotiations around inclusion 
and exclusion are currently happening in the contemporary US. A discussion of examples 
                                                
59 To examine this process, Berlin identifies three different generations—the charter, the 
plantation, and the revolutionary generations—and four different locations—one in the 
North; one in the Chesapeake region; another in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida; 
and one in the lower Mississippi Valley. 
	   94	  
below that include an Irish Family in Boston and an African American family can help us 
better understand how the alienation of different groups is normalized in everyday spaces 
of the city and the nation. MacDonald’s (1999) story of his Irish family in southie (the 
South End of Boston) demonstrates how institutional discrimination in the interests of 
whiteness has worked to create racial division between the Irish and the Blacks. The 
experiment involved the US government’s attempt to mix white and black high school 
students in response to the civil rights movement. The Irish community was outraged by 
this decision. However, the outrage was not based on a completely racist foundation, 
although some racism was involved. According to MacDonald, there was a different 
reason for their anger. As he writes, 
“[w]hen I asked who was trying to send us, someone told me about Judge Garrity; 
that a bunch of rich people from the suburbs wanted to tell us where we had to 
send our kids to school; that they wanted us to mix with the blacks, but that their 
own kids wouldn’t have to mix with no one, because there were no blacks in the 
suburbs” (1999: 75). 
 
The paradox here is that the government tried to mix poor white schools with poor black 
schools as if this forced mixing would resolve the long history of racial tension between 
whites and blacks. Both the Irish and the blacks lived in projects that were geographically 
(and socio-economically) segregated from the wealthy suburbs that were not subject to 
same mixing. In this way, everyone had their own geography. However, the Irish 
residents’ anger was not entirely about skin colour or so much about segregation; their 
anger was about the decision by the “rich people,” which compelled underprivileged 
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groups to mix so that the children in the suburbs would not have to.60 How does this 
example relate to border policing? I would suggest that current legal provisions that have 
extended the idea of border and border policing into everyday spaces can be ideologically 
linked to the policies above. These laws and policies have been implemented by the 
government to secure the nation and protect citizens by focusing on groups of 
marginalized people—people who have been geographically and socio-economically 
segregated. 
 One important part of MacDonald’s family story is that it involves how spatially 
and racially the city and its neighborhoods are divided in Boston. Each time they settled 
into a new place or just crossed over the boundary of another neighborhood, MacDonald 
discusses how “race” and racial stereotypes—similar to those negotiated between masters 
and slaves—also moved around the contemporary urban space. For example, when 
MacDonald’s mother was excited about moving out of a mixed to an all-white housing 
project in South Boston, he demonstrates his confusion by saying that despite the 
frightening stories, “my own experience had been that we got along much better with the 
black kids in Jamaica Plain, who seemed to have more in common with us than the other 
kids with Irish parents” (MacDonald 1999: 51). The tensions between whites and blacks 
seemed to be hidden behind not only racial ideologies and stereotypes, but also 
segregated urban spaces (c.f. Wacquant 1996, 2006). Both Irish and blacks were living in 
separate and isolated spaces of the city but under similar, if not the same, conditions. The 
                                                
60 In the case of “social experiments” of busings in Boston, MA, the historical 
construction of race and racial differences resulted in violent fights and dead bodies of 
both Irish and Blacks (MacDonald 1999:77, see also Zinn 2003: 467). 
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terms that carried historical meaning, such as “nigger,”61 were used to create social and 
economic differences that alienated black from white or white from “white.” For 
example, MacDonald writes that the term “white nigger” was applied to the white people 
who ended up in the D street Projects—the poorest of the poor. Ironically, however, 
when he passed through the “good” part of town, MacDonald realized that he was also a 
“white nigger.” It is difficult to recognize the effects of these social constructs in our 
everyday life today; however, these past relationships do have a non-trivial influence on 
present relationships. Therefore, “like any other relationship, it is a fluency which evades 
analysis if we attempt to stop it dead at any given moment and anatomize its structure” 
(Thompson [1963] 1980: 8). Even though an investigation of these complex social 
relations in a housing project in Boston seems removed from the border, these 
experiences are important for the examination of border policing practices that aim to 
identify citizens and non-citizens—as if these categories exist without any connection to 
the past. In a manner startlingly similar to moves made after the Bacon Rebellion, the 
privileges that come with being “White” did not seem applicable to all, because racial 
differences were used as a tool to conceal the class struggle that in fact, arguably, one of 
the important causes for the visible segregation in US.  
4.5. Is it only about “race”? 
 
 This section focuses on recent African American and Irish experiences. I examine 
how the government plays a role in the daily lives of African Americans. The civil rights 
movement led by black leaders such as Martin Luther King, ended the legal segregation 
                                                
61 Although for some the term “nigger” historically and currently has been used as a 
racial slur, the deployment of the term by poor white kids here is also used to create racial 
stereotype. 
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that was based on skin colour. However, it failed to end the social and economic 
segregation of people with and without coloured skins (Wacquant 1996). In 1963, black 
civil rights movement leaders planned a massive protest in Washington. Immediately 
after, President Kennedy and other national leaders attached themselves to this protest 
and turned the march into a friendly meeting (Zinn 2003: 457). While Martin Luther 
King’s speech marked the event, the speech failed to explain the anger that some blacks 
felt. These suppressed feelings—going back several centuries—were exacerbated by the 
bombing of the black church in Birmingham that killed four girls who were attending a 
Sunday school (Ibid). It was not King but the black militant Malcolm X who made it 
clear what happened in his speech two months later. Malcolm’s response is quoted at 
length here, because his explanations are crucial for us to understand why and in whose 
interest the government needs to control those who do not conform to whiteness.  
“The Negroes were out there in the streets. They were talking about how they 
were going to march on Washington.... That they were going to march on 
Washington, march on the Senate, march on the White House, march on the 
Congress, and tie it up, bring it to a halt, not let the government proceed. They 
even said they were going out to the airport and lay down on the runway and not 
let any airplanes land. I'm telling you what they said. That was revolution. That 
was revolution. That was the black revolution. 
It was the grass roots out there in the street. It scared the white man to death, 
scared the white power structure in Washington, D.C. to death; I was there. When 
they found out that this black steamroller was going to come down on the capital, 
they called in ... these national Negro leaders that you respect and told them, ‘Call 
it off,’ Kennedy said. ‘Look you all are letting this thing go too far.’ And Old 
Tom [MLK] said, ‘Boss, I can’t stop it because I didn’t start it.’ I’m telling you 
what they said. They said, ‘I’m not even in it, much less at the head of it.’ They 
said, ‘These Negroes are doing things on their own. They're running ahead of us.’ 
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And that old shrewd fox, he said, ‘If you all aren’t in it, I’ll put you in it. I’ll put 
you at the head of it. I’ll endorse it. I’ll welcome it. I’ll help it. I’ll join it.’ 
This is what they did with the march on Washington. They joined it... became part 
of it, took it over. And as they took it over, it lost its militancy. It ceased to be 
angry, it ceased to be hot, it ceased to be uncompromising. Why, it even ceased to 
be a march. It became a picnic, a circus. Nothing but a circus, with clowns and 
all… 
No, it was a sellout. It was a takeover. ... They controlled it so tight, they told 
those Negroes what time to hit town, where to stop, what signs to carry, what 
song to sing, what speech they could make, and what speech they couldn't make, 
and then told them to get out of town by sundown....” (Zinn 2003: 457-58). 
 
The prescient points that Malcolm makes here carry implications that are not limited to 
the civil rights movement. He explains how protests are controlled and made friendlier in 
contemporary US “democracy.” Mitchell’s (2003) and Mitchell and Staeheli’s (2008) 
work testifies that dissent is made safe for [white] democracy by controlling the content 
(place, time and manner) of protests and increasing the use of the police force. Malcolm’s 
points about controlling protests or dissent can be extended to the idea of the control of 
the movement of “aliens.” Contemporary borders and border policing invade everyday 
spaces to control the contents of the everyday lives of people through legal as well as 
non-legal discourses and practices. BPAs search for “aliens” who are already part of the 
US national imaginary. The foundation of these practices goes back centuries in the 
history of North America. For the US as an apparatus, the ideological foundation for 
these practices goes back to the 1790s alien legislation where the president was given the 
power to deport any “aliens” deemed as dangerous to public safety. Centuries later, 
“national interest and national security” continues to trump a “public” interest, which 
would include citizen, non-citizen and “aliens.” Similar practices are implemented to 
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control dissent’s voices and make the variety of “public” and private spaces of the city 
“safer” for democracy but not for others such as “aliens.”   
 Zinn argues that Malcolm was correct and that Kennedy and others tried to pacify 
the black movement but that these attempts were not successful (Zinn 2003: 458). The 
voting rights did not erase or eliminate the whiteness (or slavery) embedded in the US 
and also did nothing about the economic alienation that blacks were facing. For example, 
in 1963 the unemployment rate for whites was around 4.8 percent whereas for non-whites 
it was 12.1 (Ibid). Since then not much progress has been made. According to the US 
Department of Labour statistics, as of November 2011 the unemployment rate for white 
males over the age twenty is 7.3 and for white women 6.9 percent. In contrast, for black 
men the rate is 16.5 and for black women 12.9 percent (USDL 2011).62  
 Black (and white) people revolted against these gross inequalities all over the US 
(Zinn 2003: 459-60), and the US government reports presented reverse racism as the 
cause of the problem. For example, a report by the National Advisory Committee on 
Urban Disorders explains that riots “involved Negroes acting against local symbols of 
white American society” (Zinn 2003: 460). However, as Zinn asserts, the revolts were 
against the “symbols of authority and property in the black neighborhoods” instead of 
entirely against white people—the Irish gave similar reactions to the busing and mixing 
of poor black and white students. These resistances are against institutions that are put in 
place in the economic interests of whiteness; they are not about the so-called racial 
differences between white and black. On the other hand, the differences built into social 
and economic institutions, therefore everyday life, give the impression that such conflicts 
                                                
62 (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t02.htm#cps_empsit_a02.f.1, accessed on 
December 7, 2011). 
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are about “race.” For that reason, one must attend to the juxtaposition of Malcolm’s and 
MacDonald’s personal stories which reveals that inequality and alienation are not only 
about so-called race, but are also about the class positions of subjugated people. 
 For the other alienated groups and for Malcolm, distrust of whiteness did not 
happen over night, and for him it seems that whiteness was always there and working 
particularly well against black people (Malcom X 1999: xxvii). Before Malcolm’s birth, 
his parents faced racism both from the Klu Klux Klan and from the US government. As 
Malcolm explains, the welfare agents periodically visited and questioned his mother to 
determine if she was eligible for support. Interestingly, one can observe the presence of 
the welfare people in MacDonald’s Irish family in Boston. The welfare people questioned 
how Malcolm’s mother, a single black mother with eight kids, could possibly raise a 
family (Malcolm X 1999: 12-4). Ironically, however, the assumptions of the welfare 
people were the same when they visited MacDonald’s Irish family (1999: 33). How could 
MacDonald’s Ma, a single Irish (white) woman with eight kids, possibly raise a family? 
Both Malcolm and MacDonald’s experiences raise questions about the relations between 
“race” and class. Here my goal is not to provide a comprehensive scholarly analysis of 
these concepts; instead, my goal is to make these inconspicuous tensions that are part of 
everyday social relations, visible.   
 For Malcolm, racial tension between white and black was always present, but 
arguably he transformed after his visit to Mecca—where he discovered that the problem 
was not only about “race.” He understood that the “white man meant specific attitudes 
and actions toward black man, and toward all other non-white men” (Malcolm X 1999: 
340, emphasis added). In other words, whiteness is not about skin colour; rather, as 
	   101	  
MacDonald’s family story also demonstrates, it is an ideology that hides behind other 
social relations to pursue particular interests. The goal is to be able continue social, 
political and economic hegemony. Hence, whiteness as an ideology creates “race” and 
racial differences and uses state apparatuses as a tool to normalize exclusionary relations. 
As I demonstrate later in this thesis, the state agents—including BPAs—are trained to 
represent and serve precisely this long-lived ideology. 
4.6. Contemporary “aliens”  
 
 The US State, politicians, government institutions and the media work to control 
(always imperfectly) social, political, and economic relations among people (Gilmartin 
2009: 19, Mountz 2006: 460). Hence the state (has to) acts as a buffer between different 
interests (Althusser 1972). The conflict between national/economic security and the 
“public” interest, however, is a source of contradiction that the US State has to reconcile. 
National and economic interests, most often in the name of “national” interests prevail. 
The state apparatuses (dispositifs) such as educational institutions, the mass media and 
state bureaucracies reflect these interests. Thus, one might be able to scrutinize the divide 
between citizen and non-citizen (i.e. “illegal aliens”) by looking at examples of these 
reflections to see whose interests are better served.   
 For nine-year-old potential “citizens” and non-citizens in Gwinnett County, GA, a 
multiple-choice question on their homework assignment called “What is an illegal alien?” 
by Brenda B. Covert (Rowson 2011) reflects some of these interests.63  These students 
learn about “illegal aliens” in the classroom and at home. The story line before the one of 
the multiple-choice questions prepare nine-year-old students to recognize the differences 
                                                
63 The test is created by edhelper.com. 
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between citizen and “illegal alien.” According to the assignment, Sam was playing with 
his pet in the back yard and Taylor called Sam and asked if he could come and play with 
Sam. After confirming with Sam, Taylor walked towards Sam in his backyard. Taylor 
“swung the gate open”, entered Sam’s back yard, and closed the gate behind him (Ibid). 
While they played, a third boy, who heard Sam and Taylor having fun, jumped over the 
fence into Sam’s backyard and shocked both Taylor and Sam. To make a long story 
short, Sam’s mother came and told the third boy to “go home” and sent him back through 
to the gate rather then letting him “scramble back over the fence.” The story is followed 
by a definition for “illegal alien” and then a series of multiple-choice questions. The 
definition states, “An alien is a person from another country. An illegal alien is a person 
who comes to another country without permission. It is also a person who was allowed to 
be in the country for a while but who didn’t leave once time was up”(Ibid).64 The first 
point is that if one were to accept this definition as it is then the US government and US 
citizens would have had to seek permission from Native Americans. As I demonstrated 
above, starting with Columbus and later with others, they did not seek permission to enter 
into the already discovered land.65   
                                                
64 There is also an illustration of a person sneaking behind the fence. 
65 There are some instances when the US government sought permission to enter and 
hence signed Treaties with Native governments. However, a nation proud of calling itself 
a “nation of laws” even today refuses to recognize its own treaties with sovereign Native 
governments. The Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1784) was one for which founding father 
George Washington, himself, sent a delegation to ask for peace between the two nations. 
The Treaty of Fort Stanwix affirmed that the Haudenosaunee and the United States are 
two separate nations and established a federal boundary to prevent further settlements. 
The Treaty of Fort Harmer (1789) re-affirmed that the Haudenosaunee and the United 
States are two separate sovereign nations. In addition, Federal boundary lines were re-
affirmed to prevent further loss of land, so that there would be peace and friendship 
between the two nations. The Canandaigua Treaty of 1794 re-affirmed that the 
Haudenosaunee and the United 
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 The second point I will make is directly related to the multiple-choice questions in 
the assignment. While all of these questions work to solidify the distinction between a 
privileged citizen and an underprivileged non-citizen, question number six requires 
particular attention. The question asks, 
What does the U.S. do with illegal aliens? 
 
A. The U.S. puts them to work in the army.  
B. The U.S. shoots them into outer space.  
C. The U.S. puts them to death.  
D. The U.S. sends them back where they came from.  
The correct answer appears to be “d” (Ibid). However, in reality, there are two correct 
answers here. The Congressional Research Service report (Haddal 2010: 25-7) admits 
that the implementation of “Prevention Through Deterrence,” which forced immigrants 
(“illegal aliens”) into “harsh conditions on the Arizona border,” has increased the number 
of immigrant deaths around the border. Jimenez (2009: 17) shows that between 1994 and 
2009 approximately 3800-5600 immigrants died (unremarked) while trying to cross the 
border. In addition to these deaths, eight people have been killed since 2010. Anastacio 
Hernadez-Rojas was one of those people who was beaten, tasered (instead of extensive 
heat and dehydration) and killed by dozen of border patrol agents with an electric stun 
gun according to eyewitness accounts and a video taken at the scene (Epstein 2012). 
Eyewitnesses stated that Hernandez-Rojas “offered little or no resistance” (Ibid). Based 
on this evidence, one could in fact select the option “c” that reads “the US puts them 
                                                                                                                                            
“Complaint for declaratory judgement” between the Onondaga Nation v. State of New 
York by Robert T. Coulter, Josephy J. Heat and Curtis J. Berkey, 
http://www.indianlaw.org/node/100). I also had the privilige of participating in a mock 
court case with the Onondaga Nation’s Lawyer Joseph R. Heat. He presented Onondaga 
Nation’s claims for students at Syracuse University. 
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[“illegal aliens”] to death.” But more importantly, the students and their parents (and the 
general public) are exposed and perhaps learn to recognize and exclude others.66  
 The mass media and businesses also work to normalize the idea of “illegal aliens” 
but they play a paradoxical role. Unauthorized immigrants are crucial for the 
reproduction and expansion of capital and the development of businesses.  The owners of 
capital (who are very close to the centralized powers, i.e. the US State) appear to support 
and promote strict border security and immigration control policies, while they push for 
open borders (Andreas 2009, Nevins 2010).  Most often, businesses find ways to recruit 
(in or outside the US), hire, and receive benefits from “illegal” immigrant’s labour. 
According to Isabelle MacDonald’s year-long investigative journalism in 2010, one of 
the popular media figures that has benefited from “illegal” immigrant labour is Lou 
Dobbs. Dobbs “has relied for years on undocumented labor for the upkeep of his 
multimillion-dollar estates and the horses he keeps for his 22-year-old daughter, Hillary, 
a champion show jumper” (MacDonald 2010: 1). Dobbs is the media icon that is best 
known for his rage and hateful comments against “illegal immigrants.” He is currently 
“the host of Fox Business News' Lou Dobbs Tonight” and Dobbs also provides business 
                                                
66 In another occasion, parents from Gwinnett County, GA complained about their 
children’s third grade math assignment. The math assignment was designed around the 
topic of slavery. Gwenett County School District spokesperson stated, “we understand 
that there are concerns about these questions, and we agree that these questions were not 
appropriate.” However, she added, “teachers were trying to do a cross-curriculum 
activity.” (Katrandijan 2012). Some of the questions in the assignment were: “Each tree 
has 56 oranges, if 8 slaves pick them equally, then how much would each slave pick?” Or 
“If Frederick got two beatings per day, how many beatings did he get in 1 week? two 
weeks?” (ibid). There are not historical references in this cross-curriculum assignment. 
There are no references about who did the enslavement, which groups of people were the 
slaves and who benefited from centuries of slavery in the US. Similar to the “illegal 
immigrant” assignment, students are instructed to learn particular knowledge; the 
knowledge that will benefit the interest of “whiteness” in the US.  
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reports for “nationally syndicated radio reports daily.”67 His rage in popular media 
reached over “800,000 viewers and helped him collect $6 million dollars a year,” while 
“illegal” immigrants were working twelve hours a day to keep up Dobbs’ estate and his 
horses. Yet, these images solidify the position of immigrant workers as illegal and thus 
deny basic human rights, since they lack citizenship. As I argued in chapter three, the line 
between citizen and non-citizen appears to be an ambiguous one. However, the popular 
media in the form of figures like Dobbs (and the educational institutions referred to 
above) eliminates this ambiguity by crystallizing the image of some immigrants as 
unlawful and illegal. Furthermore, they also contribute to the conditions under which 
immigrants are stripped off their humanity, or become less human when compared to 
“citizens” (see Nevins 2010: 202). Also, not to mention, one can call himself a “good” 
law abiding citizen while forcing immigrants to work twelve hours a day. Preaching 
exclusion and hatred towards non-citizens through mass media and portraying them as 
unlawful significantly influences social relations. More importantly, when these 
apparatuses come together such as government agents, schools, and media, they can 
become much more effective for creating categories and shaping social relations. Dobbs 
might not be a representative of the government. However, there are others in the US 
government, Rep. Sensenbrenner, who work to create anti-immigrant legislations and at 
the same time benefitted from immigrant labour. While creating anti-immigration 
legislation in the US, Rep. Sensenbrenner’s family business eliminated the organized 
work force and thus created the conditions for people to migrate into the US (Bacon 
2007).  
                                                
67 Dobbs also wrote a couple of books. For more on Dobbs, see his website 
www.loudobss.com.  
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 Rep. Sensenbrenner was the architect of the failed68 immigration bill HR 4437. In 
HR 4437, Rep. Sensenbrenner tried to criminalize immigrants and those who aid them 
(Staeheli and Mitchell 2008). According to Bacon, aside from working for government, 
Rep. Sensenbrenner is also a businessman and an important shareholder in Kimberly 
Clark—the company that his grandfather created, and today it is one of the largest paper 
companies in the world (Bacon 2007: 57). The company, which has a counterpart in 
Mexico, has a close association with mining giant Grupo Mexico, which during the 1990s 
crushed the unionized mining work force and eliminated approximately 3500 jobs. 
Workers were also blacklisted and as a result “left for the other side” (Bacon 2007: 58).69 
Bacon points out that every year recruiters from companies like Kimberley Clark recruit 
people from Mexico and Central America through the guest worker program. Instead of 
hiring local labour in the US (which costs more), the company can significantly reduce 
their labour cost (variable capital), and thus produce cheaper products. Surely, it is not 
Rep. Sensenbrenner or his family who created this social and economic system. The 
system eliminates organized work forces in other countries, then blacklists them, and 
leaves workers with few options but to migrate in order to survive. And when these 
workers choose to migrate, they die, or survive but get caught up in anti-immigrant 
legislation, institutions and troubling perceptions. Yet, both Kimberly Clark as a 
company and Rep. Sensenbrenner as a government official enjoy the benefits either way.  
                                                
68 Legally failed, but successful in two opposing ways. The failed bill certainly 
contributed to the expansion and the domination of anti-immigration discourse in the US. 
At the same time, the bill also helped to unify citizen/non-citizen immigrants (over 
500.000 thousand people) to protest this bill 
(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin_america/jan-june06/immigration_4-10.html). 
69 Bacon asks “where did he [Rep. Sensenbrenner] think they [3500 black listed workers] 
would go?” (Bacon 2007: 58-9). 
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  All of these narratives, from Columbus to African slaves, Chinese to Mexicans, 
Irish to African-Americans are important for the production of “aliens” and alienation, 
and consequently for this thesis since my aim is to research and examine the US State, 
territory and territoriality, and the state apparatus that recognizes “others” and practices 
border policing within 100 miles of the international border. The dialogue between these 
descriptive accounts points to certain similarities across time and space that work to 
create pseudo differences such as “race,” and to the apparatuses that work to normalize, 
exclude, segregate and alienate.  
4.7. Conclusion 
 
 In this section, I examined “aliens” and those alienated in relation to what they are 
alien to, namely, whiteness.  I demonstrated that whiteness is not a skin colour but an idea 
(racialization) that works to create images for “aliens” and at the same time images for 
the nation, which are always in flux and defined by the struggles and relations between 
people day in and day out. As a result of this fluidity, I suggest that ontological 
definitions of “race” are not possible and do not tell us much about the relations and 
struggles that produce it in the first place. Although my focus was on the production of 
“aliens” and the legal construction of “race,” tracing these terms was not possible without 
including related themes such as racism, racial stereotypes, class, and so on. Based on the 
discussion above, the making of “aliens,” race and racism, when institutionalized, does 
not serve the interest of underprivileged, regardless of their “race.” “Race” has been and 
continues to be used as a tool to hide other social and economic inequalities that people 
face—regardless of their skin colour. I started this chapter with the juxtaposition of three 
different quotes to demonstrate how a number of historical social constructs work to 
	   108	  
divide people and serve particular interests. Deloria shows how, by whom, and in whose 
interest the land, minerals and other resources have been taken away from people. In a 
related context, Sánchez points to the unraveling quality of the US State, and 
demonstrates that the very laws and policies that aim towards particular groups at one 
point in history, at a later date, can be useful for excluding others.70 Finally, Berlin writes 
that black and white work together against the established authority, yet the discussion 
above suggests that the idea of “race,” and the process of racialization and social and 
economic interests have created strong divisions that reified African Americans as slaves, 
and “elevated” the social and economic position of “whites.” As a result, the power of the 
collective has been weakened as social resistance against the established authority.  
  However, these complex relations do not mean that the discussion of class and 
“race” is not important or that skin colour does not matter. On the contrary, it matters. It 
matters on the border crossings, or in parks, downtown, campuses or churches.  These 
historical constructs influence the everyday and have material consequences for those 
people who are deemed “aliens” and recognized as not part of the US national space and 
imaginary. The examination of contemporary border and bordering practices is directly 
related to these social and legal constructions; therefore, a critical examination of 
invasive borders must keep these histories in mind when examining the contemporary. 
                                                
70 Another example would be, linking “illegal aliens” with “terrorists.” 
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Chapter 5 – Invasive borders and BPAs border policing practices on the northern 
border 
 
5.1 US Border Patrol and the Agency’s Survival Strategy 
  
 The previous chapter focused on a historical discussion of how the laws and 
policies of the US State constructed certain groups of people as non-citizens and “aliens” 
(or made them into non-citizens and aliens) in the US. As the historical examples above 
suggest, the idea of, and the line between, citizen and non-citizen (or “alien”) was not 
always clear. Therefore, I argued that “aliens” were alien to whiteness. Although still 
important, the main question is not about who is a citizen or non-citizen or “alien.” 
Instead, the main question is which group of people has the ability to influence and (can 
work to) control state apparatuses (dispositif), which have the means to normalize and 
establish who is a citizen or who is a non-citizen or “alien.” The normalization process 
involves putting ideology into practice and making it a discourse with the use of 
dispositifs, which can effectively influence the everyday lives of people. Consequently, 
government institutions such as the border patrol are crucial for not only putting 
particular interests and ideas to work and for enabling and distributing exceptionalism, 
expansionism and capitalism, but also for making these interests and ideas into the 
“normal” in everyday life. Similar to the normalization process of citizen and non-citizen, 
when invasive border policing is normalized in the eyes of the general public, it appears 
that only then the nation and “our” geography can be secure. Once these institutions and 
policies create exclusion and once they are put to work, it is easier to deny basic rights 
and turn human beings into “illiterate, diseased, and pauperized” and/or dangerous 
terrorist aliens.  
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 The focus of this chapter is, then, on the border patrol, its current policies and its 
invasive border policing practices. What was and is the role of the border patrol? How 
has it survived, and how does it continue to survive in the present and into the future? 
What are BPAs doing within 100 miles of the northern border? In order to answer these 
questions I briefly examine the border patrol institution to understand its internal 
structure and to see how it has changed (if it has changed at all) in order to exist as an 
institution. This examination can help us to understand how the US Border Patrol Agency 
as an institution works to “secure” the “nation” and national interests and how BPAs 
recognize (detain and remove) citizen from dangerous non-citizens, “aliens,” “illegals,” 
“terrorists” and so on. Literature on the history of the US Border Patrol mainly focuses on 
the US-Mexico border (Sanchez 1993, Nevins 2010, and for more comprehensive 
coverage of the border patrol on the southern border please refer to Hernandez 2010). A 
few other scholars focus on the US-Canada border, but little attention has been paid to 
recent border patrol practices on the northern border. Thus, as a political geographer, my 
work here is to fill this gap with my research and contribute to the expansion of 
geographical thought. Before I examine the border patrol of today, it is important to 
explore the developments that led to the creation of the border patrol. 
 According to the CBP website, the official and institutional form of border 
policing and border patrol dates back to the early twentieth century. By 1904, the 
Mounted Watchmen or Mounted Guards, as part of the US immigration Service, policed 
the southern border to prevent illegal crossings (CBP, Border Patrol History).71 As I 
discussed in previous chapters, US immigration policy appeared more welcoming (with 
                                                
71 For more information about the US Border Patrol and agents see National Border 
Patrol Museum, http://www.borderpatrolmuseum.com/history/border-patrol-history.html. 
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some exceptions) prior to the 1840s (c.f. Nevins 2010:125-26). Hence, the territorial 
expansion was mainly achieved through the use of military powers instead of other 
apparatuses that openly practiced territoriality to protect US borders. However, after the 
1840s, these friendly policies started to change and started to display the internal 
contradictions that we see today. Some of the factors that changed these friendly 
immigration policies into less friendly ones included the composition of the newly 
arriving immigrants, increased association of immigrants with external threats and 
xenophobia, and finally, periodic economic crises. The crisis of 1854-55 and 1857-58 and 
other developments can attest to the above notions. During the crisis years, the nativist 
movement, “Know Nothing,” was successful in gaining representation in the US 
Congress. They worked to create xenophobic, anti-Irish and anti-German sentiment for 
the general public (Meyers 2004: 29-30).72 Following the 1860s and 1870s, the economic 
and geographical expansion of the US State and the labour needs of industrial capitalists 
required more immigrants in agriculture, mines, iron and steel and railroad construction 
(Meyers 2004, Nevins 2010). The interests of economic expansion (and thus capital and 
capitalists) found a way to advance under the name of “national interests.” It seems that 
although the economic benefits of new immigrants’ labour were essential for national 
interests, these immigrants also pose a danger to the unity and purity of the (white) 
nation. Xenophobia and anti-immigrant policy and practices slowly and gradually 
increased. Consequently, the need to secure the nation’s borders from these outside 
threats also gained further importance. 
                                                
72 Perhaps, “Know Nothing” lost its fame and representation in the Congress in 1856, but 
their ideology continues to live and reappear in the form of the “Tea Party” movement. 
	   112	  
 It appears that both the border patrol (Mounted Guards or Watchmen) and the 
language of securing the nation’s borders came to life at the same time that economic 
expansion and anti-immigration ideologies were at one of their peaks. These Mounted 
Guards practiced territoriality and assumed the role of protecting the space between US 
and Mexico, and Canada. Although the Mounted Guards mainly operated around some 
parts of the southern border, their main goal was to stop Chinese immigrants. According 
to the CBP their numbers were never more than seventy-five until 1915.  Congress 
established the Mounted Inspectors in 1915; these patrolmen were called Immigration 
Inspectors and were stationed at particular locations—thus they could not watch the 
border at all times, rather, it was the military troops’ mission to patrol borders (Border 
Patrol History). Although inspectors were equipped with extensive arrest authority, these 
inspectors were also essentially focused on Chinese immigrants. According to the CBP 
website, immigration was not always the main concern for the agency during the early 
years of the twentieth century. For the US State, interception of “enemy” 
communications and customs violations were more important than immigration (Ibid). 
Hence, the inspectors became aware that their efforts were unproductive since there were 
no border enforcement points between inspection stations along the Mexico border. In a 
written statement to the Commissioner-General of Immigration in 1918, Supervising 
Inspector Berkshire seems to have created a need for a new organization. He suggests: 
“if the services of men now being drafted cannot be separated for this work, it 
may be that the various departments vitally interested would give favorable 
consideration to the formation of an independent organization…properly 
equipped and trained, made up of men, would guard the border more effectively 
against all forms of lawlessness than a body of soldiers of several times the same 
number…” (Border Patrol History, emphasis added).  
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The goal is to establish the institution. Once established, one observes, like any other 
institution, the imperatives of institutional reproduction at work. In order to protect the 
institution and the border patrol jobs, the agency had to create different needs and/or 
attach itself to the needs of US State. 
 Inspector Berkshire made an effort to create needs; the passage of Prohibition and 
the new quotas on immigrants in 1921 and 1924 assisted his efforts and placed further 
attention on the border patrol. These simultaneous developments, the Quota and 
Prohibition, made the border patrol more useful and significant in the eyes of US 
government officials. Hence, through the Labor Appropriation Act, on May 28, 1924, the 
United States Border Patrol (USBP) was officially created to secure “our” borders (CSR 
2008) between points of entry—later its role expanded to the seacoast (Border Patrol 
History, emphasis added). Up until recently, the border patrol was part of Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS). The number of agents was around 450 during the 
beginning years, which included Mounted Guards and other policing agencies. While the 
immigration acts of 1921 and 1924 made USBP possible, this legislation also introduced 
racial purity and made a stronger connection between the idea of the “alien” and “race” 
(Nevins 2010:127).  
 From this point forward, the number of border patrol agents continued to expand 
and the border patrol worked to address the needs of various government policies and 
programs. Up until the end of Prohibition, Patrol Inspectors73 played an important role in 
apprehending bootleggers on both sides of the border, whereas during WW II, BPAs 
                                                
73 According to the Border Patrol Museum website, up until the 1970s, agents were 
referred to as Patrol Inspectors. The name was changed to Patrol Agents in 1970 by the 
Department of Justice who took over the Border Patrol in 1940. For more see: 
http://www.borderpatrolmuseum.com/about/did-you-know.html. 
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“provided tighter control of the border, manned alien detention camps, guarded 
diplomats, and assisted the US Coast Guard in searching for Axis saboteurs” (Border 
Patrol History). In other words, the role of the border patrol was re-defined and hence the 
agency has survived by trying to answer different needs of the US State. During WWII, 
the Chinese Exclusion Laws were repealed, and there was no reason, at least officially, to 
exclude our “ally” Chinese any longer (Nevins 2010). However, the Japanese were not an 
ally, they were enemy. Hence large numbers of Japanese Americans were put into 
internment camps. Consequently, border patrol agents were used to transport and guard 
some of these internment camps (Hernandez 2010: 103).  
 Once the threats that came with the War faded away, border crossings from the 
southern border became an important problem again. Mexican immigrants no longer 
crossed the border as easily as they had before the 1920s, because the link between 
Mexicans and “aliens” had become stronger. In 1952 legislation (during the “second red 
scare” years), border patrol agents were given the authority to “board and search” 
vehicles for illegal immigrants anywhere in the United States; however, the main focus 
was on the Mexico border (Border Patrol History). In fact, sixty-two Canadian border 
units relocated to the Mexico border to assist US government’s repatriation of Mexicans 
in the south (ibid). The trend of linking Mexicans and immigrants with “illegal” 
continued during the 1960s and 1970s. The Supreme Court case in 1976, United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte (United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 [1976]) solidified and, 
in effect, officially allowed racial stereotyping of Mexicans. The Supreme Court ruling 
allowed border patrol agents to detain motorists of Mexican descent and to search their 
vehicles at fixed checkpoints near the border (in addition to physical border checkpoints). 
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The dissenting opinion warned that this decision would open a precedent and these 
bordering practices “inescapably discriminate against citizens of Mexican ancestry and 
Mexican aliens lawfully in this country for no other reason than that they unavoidably 
possess the same ‘suspicious’ physical and grooming characteristics of illegal Mexican 
aliens” (Ibid). The prevailing decision argued that these (Mexican) motorists are close to 
the border, hence, these cars were more likely to transport illegal aliens. In other words, 
the line between citizen and non-citizen, or legal and illegal can be determined by 
recognizing Mexican appearance. While the decision made racial stereotyping legal, 
another and perhaps unintended consequence or interpretation of this decision may be 
that this legal precedent provided job security for border patrol agents. To be able to 
survive, the border patrol, like an invasive species, attached itself to the needs of the US 
government. The border patrol agents worked as immigration officers, enforced anti-
Chinese immigration laws, transported “enemies” and guarded Japanese internment 
camps. Over time, they learned to recognize “aliens.” And the job security that such 
recognition afforded.  
 After 2001, the “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism” Act, or for short the USA PATRIOT 
act once again provided the groundwork for new authoritative powers for the border 
patrol. This act facilitated a shift in focus for various government agencies, including the 
border patrol, to look for terrorists, terrorist weapons, drugs and illegal immigrants inside 
(and outside) US territory. The Border Patrol readjusted its overall focus and modified its 
priorities with a stronger emphasis on preventing the entry of terrorists and terrorist 
weapons (CSR 2008, 2010). This new focus enabled BPAs to receive different 
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authoritative powers, which make up the underlying causes of their current contradictory 
border policing practices. Once part of the INS, the USBP is currently connected to 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and CBP operates under the Department of 
Homeland Security (CSR 2004, 2008, 2010). As I mentioned above, the main objective 
of the border patrol has expanded from preventing unauthorized aliens and now includes 
preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the country (CSR 2008, 2010, 
NPS 2012-2016). There is a difference between CBP inspectors and USBP agents. CBP’s 
focus is on overall border enforcement.  Hence CBP inspectors work at points of entry 
and are responsible for “conducting immigrations, customs and agricultural inspections 
on entering aliens.” (CSR 2008: 1). The USBP agents, however, work between points of 
entry—they have no official role at points of entry.  Section 287 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) provides border enforcement powers to BPAs. The INA provides 
immigration officers the statutory “authority to, without a warrant, interrogate aliens, 
arrest, conduct searches, board vessels and administer oaths” (CRS 2004), along with 
“broader statutory authority to make arrests for any felony cognizable under the laws of 
the United States” (CSR 2004, 2008).  These Federal regulations provide legal authority 
for BPAs, but more importantly, they provide them with the capability to control spaces 
between entry points and to work to gain operational control of the border. As 
immigration officers, agents were permitted to “board and search all vessels ‘within a 
reasonable distance’ of the border and have access to private land, but not buildings, 
within 25 miles of the border.” Currently, federal regulations define reasonable distance 
as 100 air miles for BPAs (CSR 2008: 29).74  
                                                
74 CRS report suggests that Border Patrol district directors can petition the Commissioner 
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Figure 5: The Legal Extension of the Internal Border Policing (CSR 2004, 2008, ICE Secure 
Communities “Activated Jurisdictions” 2012). Cartography: Loris Gasparatto. 
 
 In other words, BPAs are able to board vessels, transportation hubs, parks, 
downtowns, churches, stores, laundry mats, conduct searches, and interrogate “aliens,” 
within 100 miles of the border. According to ACLU report in 2009, “nearly 2 out of 3 
Americans (197.4 million people) live” within 100 miles of a border, and hence are 
subjected to these contemporary practices. Yet, not everyone experiences these border 
policing practices the same way. In what follows, I provide a discussion of the ways that 
                                                                                                                                            
to extend the reasonable distance in special circumstances (CRS 2008: 29). 
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some people are largely exempt from these policies. These discussions help us better 
understand how BPAs were influenced and learned to recognize “aliens.”   
5.2. Readjusting Border Policing for the Snowbirds 
 
 Inside the US, within 100 miles of the northern border, BPAs appeared in unlikely 
places and search(ed) trains, buses, subways, highways, places of worships, cars, grocery 
stores, homes, and workplaces (Border Patrol Free; Jensen 2009). Despite the fact that the 
BPAs are involved in the everyday public and private life of the people along the 
northern border—Rochester and Syracuse, NY, for example—BPAs’ bordering practices 
have not attracted much attention in mass media, or thus far in academia up until 
recently. In the south, these contemporary border-policing practices come under scrutiny 
and have already faced resistance. In June of 2004, border patrol agents roamed the 
streets of Ontario, Corona, and Escondido, which is 120 miles from the Mexico border to 
search for “illegal aliens.” They picked up approximately 300 immigrants “outside 
homes, in parking lots and swap meets and near Latino supermarkets. All of the detainees 
were Mexican or Central American” (Vittuci 2004, CRS 2008). This event was 
questioned and then the legality of these searches was confirmed. As a result, the 
community gave an immediate reaction and resisted the practices: “[m]ore than 1,500 
people marched from Ontario to Pomona in protest” and Spanish-language radio stations 
informed immigrants of the location of Border Patrol agents (Vittuci 2004). In contrast, 
in the north, these practices have gained public attention rather slowly. 
 As a resident, student and active community member in Syracuse, NY between 
2003 and 2010, my initial observations suggested that these BPA practices had gone 
strangely unnoticed and unremarked by media and academia up until 2008, 
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notwithstanding the increased presence of border agents in unconventional places since 
2001. These unremarked bordering practices can be explained partially by the historically 
positive perception of the Northern border. Despite the fact that substantial numbers of 
people from both sides have crossed the border and sought temporary or permanent 
employment and residence in both countries since the 19th century (Stuart 2007), when 
compared to the US-Mexico border, the mingling of US Americans and Canadians 
(illegal or legal) has attracted little or no attention. Recent histories also attest to this 
positive relationship on the Northern border. For example, during the Clinton 
Administration in the 1990s, the number of Border Patrol agents on the border of US-
Mexico doubled to one agent every quarter mile by 1999, whereas the Canadian border 
had only one agent for every 13.25 miles (Eldridge at al. 2004).  
 Canadians can cross the border and stay up to six month in the US without a 
visa,75 thus, today many Canadians own property in the US and particularly in the State 
of Florida.  However, after 2001, when the US government was again trying desperately 
to “secure the nation’s borders” through a variety of security and surveillance strategies 
on both sides of the border, this positive relationship was put to the test. The 
misconception at work was that the 9/11 perpetrators had entered the US from Canada 
(Struck 2005).76 Thus, one of these initiatives granted CBP inspectors and border patrol 
agents the power to determine how long Canadians could remain in the US (Stuart 2007). 
The government of Canada and the Canadians who owned property in the US, especially 
                                                
75 http://canada.usembassy.gov/visas/information-for-canadians.html, accessed on April 
10, 2012. 
76 According to “9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States” all of the perpetrators had a valid US visa 
obtained from US consulates and entered into US (33 times, and 1 unsuccessful attempt) 
via various airports on the East Coast. 
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in Florida77 were not happy and both parties petitioned the US government to exempt 
Canadians. Homeland Secretary Tom Ridge personally guaranteed the Canadian Prime 
Minister that “Canadians would be exempt from proposed thirty day visa limit” (Stuart 
2007: 93). Similar exemptions were also proposed when the state of Florida tried to pass 
a highly controversial immigration bill that would have required all non-citizens to carry 
papers—inspired by Arizona SB-1070 (See Coskan-Johnson 2011), while providing 
provisions for those who are Canadians and Western Europeans. The architect of the bill, 
Rep. William Snyder, argued that this bill would not lead to racial profiling. All this bill 
does is to address the large population of Canadians who own property in Florida, and in 
Snyder’s words, “what we’re doing there is trying to be sensitive to Canadians” (Foley 
2010). However, the same sensitivity was not applied or even suggested for large 
populations of Latinos and non-Canadian and non-Western Europeans in Florida. Despite 
the fact that the US publicly celebrates racial diversity and official US discourse rejects 
the idea of “America” as a white nation, the US government again attempted to “secure 
the nation’s borders” by trying to answer to the needs of “whiteness”—while at the same 
time acknowledging the economic benefits obtained from immigrants. 
 Why do these events relate to the northern border, border patrol and the BPAs 
routine ID checks in unlikely places? Obviously, the first reason is that Canadians live 
beside and share a border with the US. Thus, BPAs bordering practices also reflect the 
above trends. Second and more important, these government policies, laws, and the 
media coverage of these events enter into people’s everyday lives. Thus, social relations 
are structured in particular ways that work to portray and accept who can be a citizen and 
                                                
77 They are called “Canadian Snowbirds.” For more information please see, 
http://www.snowbirds.org/index.php. 
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non-citizen. These decisions are made daily by the BPAs routine checks. The next section 
then will focus on where BPAs search for these “aliens” and how they practice border 
policing. 
5.3. Protecting the border and the nation? 
 
 The lack of attention to the Northern border described above continues despite, 
for example, the increasing number of border patrol agents and their presence in unlikely 
places in the State of NY. In spite of the implementation of increased security and 
surveillance measures and the disruption of daily life in unlikely places by BPAs, in 
comparison to the southern border, the northern border remains invisible. The main goal 
in this section then is to make these contemporary BPA practices on the northern border 
more visible. As mentioned in the literature review above, the traditional—linear—
surveillance strategies such as port of entry points, walls and other permanent security 
and surveillance locations are now complimented with fluid surveillance strategies. 
Unlike the BPAs at physical border checkpoints, these contemporary bordering practices 
use a dynamic geography of surveillance strategies, thus allowing border agents to roam 
over the US territory in quest for the aliens. The security apparatuses (dispositifs) 
facilitate the surveillance of “illegal aliens” and the illusion of “secure” national space. 
 Extending Marx’s analysis of the “house of terror” and Foucault’s analysis of the 
panopticon to contemporary bordering practices, one can observe that the threat of BPA 
surveillance in a bounded national space appears continuous even in the absence of the 
BPAs. As if one is watched continuously and must be on the look out for BPAs at all 
times. BPAs choose particular locations such bus and train terminals to practice physical 
surveillance by taking control of these spaces. They exert power and determine who is a 
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citizen and “alien.” Like Rep. Snyder above, BPAs have repeatedly stated that they do 
not use racial stereotyping when they confront people inside US territory. However, 
evidence based on my participant observations, various national and local newspapers, 
and other government and non-government sources suggests otherwise. Below I provide 
details of what BPAs are on the look out for during routine checks. How do they define, 
and where and when do BPAs look for potential “aliens”?  
 Although I traveled between Syracuse, NY and St. Catharines, ON for a semester 
by car, I did not experience BPAs. Since my aim was to be able to observe and 
participate in BPAs border policing, I refocused my attention to public transportation, 
such as Amtrak trains. I traveled with the Empire Service and Lake Shore Limited—
neither train crosses any international borders. The Amtrak Empire Service runs between 
Niagara Falls and New York and the Lake Shore Limited runs between Chicago and New 
York (amtrak.com).78 BPAs board these trains at various train stations along the way and 
confront people about their citizenship. I was not able to observe or participate in the 
BPAs border policing practices. However, I did encounter another component of the US 
security measure in Syracuse, NY on Tuesday, January 24th, 2012. The Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) agents set up a random screening checkpoint for Amtrak 
passengers. They were inspecting passenger’s bags next to the waiting area at the station. 
According to my observations, there were approximately five to seven, low-level, blue-
shirt TSA agents in various parts of the station. There were two TSA agents dressed in 
black (possibly supervisors) and several police officers with jackets that were visibly 
marked “Amtrak.” Some Amtrak workers at the station explained that these random 
                                                
78 The Maple Leaf service runs between Toronto and New York, thus crosses 
international borders (Ibid). 
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checks were part of a TSA’s “pilot program” with the possibility that it might become 
permanent in the future. Other individuals who worked at Dunkin’ Donuts or Subway did 
not have any idea what TSA agents were doing at the station. I was informed by one of 
the Amtrak workers that I got “lucky” because TSA has not been around for a long time.    
 Again, I was unlucky in my attempts to encounter and observe BPAs in trains, 
train stations, bus stations or on highways. Perhaps one of the reasons for this could be 
that in October, 2011, Border Patrol headquarters in Washington, D.C. decided that for 
all Border Sectors in the US, “checks of transportation hubs and systems located away 
from the southwest border of the United States will only be conducted if there is 
intelligence indicating a threat” (NBPC, Johnson 2011, Kephart 2011). Despite this 
memo, which partially eliminates transportation raids along the whiter and friendlier US-
Canada border, I continued to travel until the beginning of March 2012. During my 
spontaneous conversations with Amtrak workers on trains and in newspaper accounts of 
other people in various train and bus stations, I was provided with contradictory accounts.  
 Despite the message from headquarters that aims to constrain border policing, 
during my travel after the message from headquarters, some Amtrak workers repeatedly 
asserted, “they [BPAs] are everywhere, but if you want to see them [I should] try 
Cleveland station, you will see all sorts of security there, government and private.” 
However, there are other accounts that suggest these practices have in fact stopped. The 
bus terminal at Rochester, NY, as Rochester BPAs actively practiced these policies and 
detained large number of “illegals,” was one of them. The Trailways and Greyhound 
station manager at Rochester, NY explained that he had not seen them since September 
11, 2011, and one of the passengers, Michael Thompson, stated that “I felt like they 
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[BPAs] were doing their job in terms of keeping terrorists from coming in, [sic] 
foreigners. They were checking driver’s licenses. Which felt good to me. I missed them 
[the 24/7 presence of border patrol] that they are not here [at the Rochester station]” 
(Levato 2011). Thompson’s statement captures the discursive practices that have been 
created and repeated for the general public by the apparatuses mentioned above. Here, I 
am not suggesting that these practices are entirely new. On the contrary, as I argued in the 
previous chapter, similar exclusionary practices that focus on policing marginalized 
people in the US have been going on for centuries. In recent history for example, the 
border patrol has been actively policing trains and busses since the 1990s (Nevins 2010). 
What I am suggesting is that after 2001, in the name of defending the homeland and 
securing the nation’s borders, the US State Repressive and Ideological apparatuses went 
to work, making some people “aliens” again. With the assistance of various laws, acts 
and policies (and with the mass media) a) the policing of minority groups in the US has 
been further normalized, b) as a result, these communities have become more and more 
vulnerable as border policing practices’ main focus was on these groups and c) these 
practices have reified the link between immigrant and “illegal, terrorist and drugs.” As I 
mentioned before, the actual mission statement of the BPA summarizes passenger 
Thompson’s contention that after 2001, the BPA’s main concern was detecting, 
apprehending and/or deterring of terrorists and terrorist weapons, along with its 
“unchanged” role to “detect and prevent the illegal entry of aliens” into the US (CBP). 
The following are some examples of the detection and prevention of illegal immigrants, 
terrorists and terrorist weapons by the armed US Border Patrol Agents 100 miles inside 
the US territory and along the Northern border. These examples are important because 
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they call into question the validity of in whose interests is the “border and the nation” 
secured.  
 In the summer of 2010, a student from Potsdam University in New York State 
was questioned by the BPAs and asked to provide papers while she was conducting turtle 
research with her professor in a local swamp. Since the student did not have her papers 
with her she was detained until her professor convinced the BPAs to call and confirm her 
student status with the university (Woodard 2011). Another “lucky” example emerged 
when I started my research on invasive borders and BPAs border policing. One of my 
friends at Potsdam University learned about my research topic, and s/he shared one of 
his/her colleague’s firsthand experiences with border patrol agents. Nancy’s79 colleague 
was from East Asia. While they were a couple hours away from home, they were stopped 
on the highway and her colleague was questioned about his/her status in the US. Like the 
student in the swamp, Nancy’s colleague did not have her papers with him/her. The BPAs 
followed their car back to their home so that he/she could provide evidence that she was 
not an illegal alien. 
 Not everyone has the opportunity to provide papers. A twenty-year-old Chinese 
music student from Potsdam, NY was detained for four hours during BPAs routine bus 
search and was then released. Bethany Parker-Goeke, International Education and 
Programs Coordinator at the State University of New York, Potsdam, provided detailed 
information on National Public Radio. She stated that the student had applied to change 
his/her status and as a result did not have his/her papers at the time (npr.org). Despite the 
fact that Parker-Goeke possessed the student’s original, valid papers on her desk, a 
                                                
79 A pseudonym. 
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couple of days later BPAs came back and the student was handcuffed and taken to 
detention for approximately a month—at that time his status was still undetermined. 
During detention, he was put into two different county jails and the immigration 
detention center in Buffalo.80 The student lost the beginning of the semester and later 
dropped out. Parker-Geoke told NPR that after this incident “his parents would not let 
him to go back to the US.”  
 Border patrol agents are people and, like everyone else, they are capable of 
making mistakes. It is correct to note that these invasive bordering practices affect the 
image of Border Patrol Agents negatively. Thus, one would assume that the USBP would 
not miss the opportunity to publicly admit and perhaps offer an official explanation for 
this “misunderstanding.”81 However, the border patrol did not give an interview for this 
story, as NPR reports. In fact, an e-mail from the border patrol spokesperson concludes, 
“agents use the checks to prevent smugglers from using public transportation to access 
the interior of the country” (Ibid). The spokesperson’s e-mail appears to be an attempt to 
defend, justify and protect BPAs’ invasive border policing instead of acknowledging the 
injustice and the harm inflicted by BPAs on a twenty-year old Chinese student. 
  Similar to the case above, around 2007, a Pakistani student from University of 
Rochester was detained by BPAs, again on a domestic bus while traveling with his 
Student ID. In his declaration to the Immigration Courts in NY for an unnamed 
deportation case, Carry Jensen suggests that before this Pakistani student incident, 
                                                
80 He earned a nickname of “Smartboy” during his detention. 
81 One could also argue that it would have been a smart foreign policy. 
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student IDs had been sufficient for domestic travel (2009: 2).82 In fact, Jensen writes that 
neither he nor his staff nor colleagues in other close by institutions had heard anything 
about these routine ID checks previously in Rochester, NY—including staff members 
who have worked there for over twenty-five years. While the student attempted to explain 
to BPAs that his family had a pending asylum application which provided him a legal 
status to be in and attend school full time in the US, the BPA responded “Tell it to the 
Judge” (Jensen 2009:2). After two weeks in detention, his family was given the chance to 
“tell it to the judge” and prove his legality and right to be in the US. These examples 
suggest that not only are there problems of communication between different government 
apparatuses and various legal frames, but also problems with the use of power by BPAs. 
But, more importantly one can also see how the propensity for laws, policies and border 
policing practices can infiltrate into daily life and slowly normalize relations in particular 
ways. The border patrol agents’ practices give the impression that one has to watch over 
one’s shoulder at all times, because BPAs have no exact geographic location. They roam 
inside a 100-mile band along the international border. Thus, for those who are privileged 
to be recognized as “citizens,” like passenger Thompson above, or those who are given 
“sensitivity” like Canadians, BPAs are doing “good” and “securing” the nation. However, 
the same cannot be said for those marginalized groups who are recognized as “aliens,” 
those who are alien to whiteness (see previous chapter) regardless of their status inside 
the US. Many concerned individuals and civil rights organizations (e.g., the American 
                                                
82 A similar example occurred in Syracuse, NY, at the Amtrak/Greyhound station in 
2007. Syracuse University English Professor Silvio Torres-Saillant’s account appeared on 
a report about Rochester BPAs transportation raids. She was harassed and singled out by 
BPAs because of her Latino background. Torres-Saillant also points out that “since I was 
traveling on ground transportation within the same state, I did not see the need to carry 
documents that established my legal status in this country” (Añon et al., 2011).  
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Civil Liberties Union and Freedom for Families), argue that the Border Patrol employs 
racial profiling in its routine searches. However, from the beginning, BP has argued 
otherwise. Then, one has to ask: what are BPAs looking for? 
 According to the video “Caught in Transit” from 2008, Rochester BPAs detained 
more than 1200 people in 2007 on the northern border. They achieved these numbers 
through transportation raids. In the video, Adrian Cotsworth, the border patrol agent in 
charge of the Rochester Station, states, “the priority of the border patrol is the operational 
control of the borders. The main objective of that [sic] is preventing the entry of terrorist 
and terrorist weapons into the US in/between ports of entry” (Ibid, emphasis added). 
Below is the conversation between a border patrol agent and a passenger.  
BPA: Hi you doin sir, I am with the United States Border Patrol, can you please state 
your citizenship? 
Passenger: What do I look like? 
BPA: Well, you know what, what does an American [sic] look like? 
Passenger: That’s a shame. Do I look like I am from Zimbabwe? 
BPA: We are a true melting pot sir. We come in all shapes and colours. This is not about 
ethnicity or race. It is about nationality. 
Passenger replies: I am from Los Angeles. 
BPA: Thank you sir, that makes you United States Citizen.83 
 
The passenger becomes a US citizen and is free to continue on his journey. The USBP 
and the CBP seem to suggest that these practices do not violate civil rights since people 
are not forced to answer border patrol agents’ questions. Furthermore, they claim that 
these invasive bordering practices do not violate the 4th amendment of the US 
                                                
83 I transcribed this video interview. The conversation is in italics. The last access was on 
April 25, 2012, http://www.andrewburtonphoto.com/portfolios/video-caught-in-transit/. 
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Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable search without probable cause, because these 
routine ID checks are essential for “securing the nation’s borders.”  
 It is difficult, if not impossible, to make a plausible argument that detaining a 
twenty-year-old Chinese student for a month in two county jails and one immigration 
detention center, detaining a Pakistani student with a student ID during domestic travel, 
stopping people on the highways and following them two hours back to their home to see 
their papers, harassing a student and professor while conducting turtle research in a 
swamp somewhere in Potsdam can be justified as a matter of “securing the nation’s 
borders” or preventing the entry of terrorists and terrorist weapons. In other words, it is 
difficult to suggest that these practices secure borders. However, these bordering 
practices are capable of securing the existence of BP, BPAs’ jobs, and the interests of 
whiteness.  
 In addition to failing to provide supporting documentation for how and for whom 
the border is secured (for example see Civil Action No. 10 CV 2705 (SAS)), Border 
Patrol have consistently claimed they do not racially profile during these searches.84 
Agents are trained to recognize two different categories as if these categories exist 
independently of each other. Although citizen and non-citizen exist in a continuum, for 
BPAs, as an extension of the US State, these categories form two discrete (distinct and 
separate) points. For example, in an interview, BP agent Cotsworth (Martinez 2008) 
asserts “[w]e question people with blond hair and blue eyes as much as anyone else” 
(Ibid). Agent Cotsworth explains how these daily routines help BPAs recognize and 
                                                
84 The USBP follows the “Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law 
Enforcement agencies.” The “guidance” provides details of how agents can or cannot use 
race and ethnicity. The BPAs, simply by following these guidelines, are free from racial 
profiling.  
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identify aliens. He explains, “it is not what they’re [aliens, terrorists] saying, it’s what 
they’re not saying. It’s sweat, it’s shaking, it’s stuttering, it’s bad breath. It’s the things 
that people can’t control—and you [BPAs] learn to read it just by doing it so much” 
(Ibid).85 86 Conceivably Cotsworth tries to ease the claims against BPAs’ discriminatory 
practices, but ironically, his statement stands as evidence for the racial profiling claims, 
instead of challenging or opposing them. For Cotsworth (and perhaps BPAs under him), 
the “good” law abiding citizens are the people who have good hygiene, smell and who 
have blond hair and blue eyes. Furthermore, he suggests that these predetermined “good” 
citizens are also subjected to similar treatments “as much as anyone else.” However, one 
wonders how a month-long detention for a Chinese student who has a visa and has no 
proven connection to illegal activity is similar to those Canadians in Florida. The 
evidence above suggests that “aliens” experiences are nothing like those who are (still 
non-citizen but) recognized as “Americans”. 
 Social constructions such as gender, race, and class will inevitably influence how 
BPAs and people react when trained and armed border patrol agents confront citizens and 
                                                
85 If one follows agent Cotshworth’s logic, then, the “bad” guys can easily trick border 
patrol agents with a piece of gum or a tic-tac and anti-perspirant or deodorant that can get 
rid of faulty smell and bad breath. Hence security of the borders can be compromised 
easily. 
86 If “doing it so much” makes better BPAs, then I must quickly note how one can 
become BPA and learn the basics. To become a Border Patrol Agent, one has to possess 
certain qualities such as age and citizenship requirements. In addition, one has to pass a 
comprehensive background investigation, medical examination, and drug and fitness tests 
(CBP.gov). According to CBP, a candidate might be denied if in the past s/he was 
arrested, convicted, dismissed from other jobs, or have debt and financial issues—and 
may also be subjected to a polygraph test. After a successful pre-screening, candidates 
attend the CBP Border Patrol Academy in New Mexico for fifty-five days; they take 
courses in nationality and immigration laws, physical training, firearms instruction, and 
driving—along with report writing, finger printing, etc (ibid). These are the first steps for 
learning how to recognize citizen from an “alien.” 
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non-citizens. A Mexican woman describes her experiences to a New York Times reporter 
by saying “[y]ou’re sitting on the train asleep, and if you don’t look like a U.S. citizen, 
it’s ‘Wake up!’” (Bernstein 2010). Critical inquiry into these practices has to recognize 
the historical circumstances that have created the social and economic exclusionary 
policies of the US State. Like BPAs, people learn to recognize “aliens.” As a result, not 
looking like a US citizen not only makes people vulnerable and eliminates their basic 
rights, but also makes them suspect and names them “illegal alien.” How can a citizen 
who is suspected as an “alien” because she does not look “American” react when 
confronted by armed agents inquiring about her citizenship status from within a few 
inches of her face on a train? Perhaps she can become nervous, and sweaty87 because 
BPAs have already “recognized” her as a suspect or “illegal alien,” even before they have 
boarded trains, buses, or stopped her/his car on the highway.  
 In what follows, I examine recently released detention figures to better understand 
why one might become nervous during these interactions and what the outcome of these 
interactions can be. Recall agent Cotsworth’s crucial points about how on-the-job training 
helps BPAs recognize “aliens and terrorists.” One could stretch and apply similar logic to 
the BPAs as well:  it is not what they [BPAs] are saying; it’s what they [BPAs] are not 
saying. A recent report, “Justice Derailed” (Añon et al., 2011) gathers data in relation to 
the Rochester Border in NY. The report analyzes data between 2006 and 2009 and 
concludes “the arrests included individuals from 130 nations, but 73 percent of arrestees 
came from Latin America, 11 percent from Asia, and 9 percent from sub-Saharan Africa 
                                                
87 My white and male appearance can certainly be useful when I encounter border agents. 
But still, it does not give me the confidence to cross borders without feeling nervous at 
the entry points. I am still a Turkish person with US passport and accent. 
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and Oceania. Canadians represented only 0.4 percent of those arrested” while the rest of 
these groups make up 93 percent (Ibid). I am aware of the difficulty and the problems of 
making assumptions about what particular people look like. However, it is unlikely that 
93 percent of the arrestees fit the description of agent Cotshworth’s citizens. Below, a 
video conversation between a passenger and BPAs provides more concrete evidence and 
supports the points I make about who is identified as citizen and non-citizen. Passenger 1 
turns her camera on and starts recording BPA policing practices inside the train. A BPA 
politely inquires about passenger 1’s citizenship status.  
 
BPA1: what is your citizenship? 
Passenger1: I am not answering that question! 
BPA1: What!?  
 
Passenger 1 repeats her answer. The BPA put his hand on his gun, looks around, clears 
his throat, and replies: OK. He moves to the next passenger. Passenger 1 continues to 
record various conversations between other passengers and the BPAs. At some point, she 
approaches one of the other BPAs in the train car and asks: 
 
Passenger 1: Can I ask you a question? 
BPA2 leans over. 
Passenger1: When someone is asked about their immigration status do they have to 
answer? 
BPA2: No, you do not have to answer. 
Passenger1: OK. 
BPA2: Hmmm, it is…, if we have suspicions enough, we can keep pressing, or there is 
other suspicions. Beyond all the typical facts, but no, you don’t have to. 
Passenger1: what’s the suspic…what would be the suspicion for instance? 
BPA2: Accent. 
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Passenger1: OK. 
BPA2: Dress, you know, different customs…stuff like that. 
Passenger1: Okay, got it. 
BPA2: Suspicious shaking, nervous,…a lot of things. 
Passenger1: Right, so if you have that suspicion and you do not answer, what happens? 
BPA2: Then, I can probably...then I can keep asking. 
Passenger1: Okay, could you take someone off the train because of it? 
BPA2: YES. 
Passenger1: Really? 
BPA2: hmmmhm. 
Passenger1: Could you detain them because of it…just on suspicion like clothing, accent? 
BPA2: Nods his head, reasonable suspicion, yeap. 
Passenger1: Ok, got it, thank you. 
Then, BPA2 asks: your name? 
Passenger1: Ummm. I don’t want to answer that question. 
BPA2: You are suspicious now. 
Passenger1: Laughs. Am I? Oh no, am I going to be taken off the train. 88 
 
How is it possible for cultural diversity to be celebrated and simultaneously used as an 
exclusionary tool? It is difficult to support an argument that suggests these invasive 
bordering practices serve “national interests” and provide security for borders. If not 
borders or the nation, then what is secured? One possible answer would be that the USBP 
as an institution and BPA jobs are secured at the expense of those who talk, dress and act 
differently. But more importantly, these practices (secure and) reify the borderline 
between citizen and non-citizen—aliens and terrorists.  
                                                
88 I transcribed this video (some subtitles provided by the user who uploaded the video 
online). “Border Patrol on Amtrak Part 2” 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A9KS9mbT5u0&feature=related. The last accessed 
on April 25, 2012. 
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 The effects of border policing on the northeast section are similar to experiences 
in the northwest of the US-Canada border, and they are important to consider here, 
because they raise similar concerns in relation to who is or is not a citizen and if this 
border policing is in fact securing borders. Below I examine how BPAs exercise similar 
border policing in Washington State, and I focus on how communities and individuals are 
affected by these invasive bordering practices. I examine various newspapers and other 
secondary sources in order to establish some consistency in bordering practices along the 
full length of the US-Canada border. The Olympic Peninsula is located in Washington 
State in a “quiet and rural area” and “does not border any foreign country” (Border Patrol 
Free). Similar to the Rochester, NY station, the number and the presence of border patrol 
around the Olympic Peninsula increased rapidly from one agent to four, and then to 
twenty-five agents. As of 2011, the number of BPAs is around 40 (Oppmann 2011).89 
According to Border Patrol Free’s story, 90 while actual international border entry points 
lack both the resources and the manpower to “check for possible illegal goods being 
transported or to thwart terrorism,” which should be a national security matter; none of 
these new positions are used to help fix these problems.  Instead, community members 
                                                
89 The Olympic Peninsula is important for border patrol’s plea for increasing their 
numbers and for the rhetoric of national security. In 1999, Ahmed Ressam attempted to 
cross into the United States from Victoria, Canada with a fake passport. Despite the “mild 
suspicion,” the US immigration officers failed to see the bomb, even after checking his 
car’s trunk and his passport came clean on the computer check (Frontline, Ahmed 
Ressam’s Milenium Plot). There was only one border patrol agent at the station at that 
point (Keep the Border Patrol On the Border, 2008). Ressam, with his hidden bomb 
continued onto the ferry towards Olympic Peninsula. When he arrived, he showed 
unwillingness to answer questions and the agent asked for Ressam’s ID. While agents 
were searching his car, US Customs agents found the bomb, but they first assumed it was 
a drug, not a bomb. He was immediately arrested (Frontline, Ahmed Ressam’s Milenium 
Plot). 
90 For more see http://bpfree.org/thestory.html. 
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first started experiencing highway checkpoints. Later on, BPAs gradually invaded 
communities further away from the border by raiding immigrant stores, churches, bars, 
and entire communities (Border Patrol Free, Oppmann 2011). 
 Within this quiet rural community, there are many different voices that express 
their concerns about these practices. These examples range from violations of civil 
liberties and problems of racial profiling to how these bordering practices have also hurt 
local farmers and producers who rely heavily on immigrant labour. One of the local 
farmers expresses frustration by stating: “my payroll went off the charts, it went up 30% 
right across the board. We cannot function and continue to be a farm in that situation….” 
Another concerned community member, Pastor of St. Mary Catholic Church, Father 
Topel began to see his Spanish worshippers gradually disappear since border patrol 
agents started to park outside the church during Spanish masses. Father Topel asserts, 
“…none of these people [the peninsula’s Hispanic parishioners] are terrorists. It’s not just 
the Hispanics who are being affected here. Any one of us who watches another human 
being [sic] have his rights denied, has his own rights denied.”91  
 While traveling on a bus, Eyle, another member of the community, was stopped 
by border patrol agents. After questioning Asian men and Canadian women, a border 
patrol agent questioned her. Eyle, a former Peninsula newspaper employee and Native 
American woman describes her experience: “My family has been here since the dawn of 
time. The bus was full of people—there must have been 30 of us—and they only 
questioned three of us. We had dark hair and dark skin” (Ibid, emphasis added). The 
experiences described here bear little resemblance to agent Cotsworth’s blond haired and 
                                                
91 http://bpfree.org/thestory.html. 
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blue-eyed accounts. While these personal statements point to serious problems with racial 
profiling and raise questions about whether these bordering practices are actually done in 
the interest of the “nation,” one needs to also look at data representing BPA practices on 
the Olympic Peninsula as well (Añon et al., 2011). Thus, below I incorporate information 
from a documentary on the border patrol free website, which highlights the public forum 
that took place in Washington State. This forum aims to show what BPAs have done so 
far in the Olympic Peninsula, other than invading people’s lives, hurting businesses and 
restricting civil rights of residents.  
 On November 3, 2008, the City of Port Townsend, The Leader, the League of 
Women Voters, the AAUW, the ACLU Jefferson County, and the Port Townsend Peace 
Movement all sponsored the “Border Patrol Public Forum” in Washington State. 92 The 
attendees included border patrol agents, several local law enforcement agents, several 
civil right activists, members of other civil rights organization and around 400 people 
from the public. As the documentary begins, a publisher at the Port Townsend Leader, 
Scott Wilson, asks for the number of detentions related to immigration, drugs and 
terrorism during the border patrol checkpoints around Jefferson County’s highway. Chief 
Officer John Bates explains that BPAs apprehended twenty-two people, fifteen 
undocumented immigrants, seven US citizens (for various reasons), and zero terrorists. 
The documentary asserts that between February and November 2008, border patrol 
agents stopped 41, 912 passengers in 24, 524 vehicles at fifty-three roadblocks in 
Washington State. As a result of these massive operations, eighty-one unauthorized 
                                                
92 The AAUW stands for American Association of University Women and ACLU stands 
for American Civil Liberties Union. This forum also resulted into a documentary called 
“Keep the Border Patrol ON THE BORDER.” It is available for the public at bbfree.org. 
I transcribed some of the above information from this documentary. 
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immigrants were taken into custody, nineteen people were turned over to other agencies, 
and zero terrorists were found (Border Patrol Free). Thus, it should come as no surprise 
when border patrol agent Christian Sanchez puts his job security on the line by publicly 
stating that at Port Angeles, he and his co-workers are “paid to do nothing” and  “there 
are no gangs or cross border activity” (Oppmann 2011). In a panel discussion, while 
highlighting the bad economy and cuts in other services, agent Sanchez states, “the 
taxpayers are paying us all this extra money to do nothing on this Peninsula, where it’s a 
water-based border” (Ibid). One must ask the question again, in whose interest is the 
nation or the border secured? The anecdotal evidence cited above, the data from the 
border patrol free website and the statements from agent Sanchez all suggest the border is 
secured for the institutional reproduction of the USBP which also means job security for 
the BPAs. These goals are achieved at the expense of those who are alien to whiteness.93  
5.5 Conclusion  
 
 Based on an examination of these data and other accounts, these bordering 
practices do not make borders or the nation secure, and they do not serve national 
interests. The Government Accountability Office’s recent report which assesses the 
border patrol, suggests that since 2001 not much has changed on the northern border. In 
fact the report confirms, “only 32 miles of the nearly 4,000-mile U.S.-Canadian border 
have ‘an acceptable level of security’…The vast majority of northern border territory is 
                                                
93 Other BPA highway checkpoints have resulted in fatalities in other parts of the US. In 
fact, in 2004 near Elizabethtown, NY, during a US Border Patrol checkpoint on Interstate 
87, two separate accidents occurred when Canadian busses failed to see border patrol 
checkpoints. The result was significant enough to make it one of the “ten deadliest 
accidents in the Adirondack Mountain Region” which killed four people and injured 
more than sixty people—four were critically injured. “10 deadliest accidents in the 
Adirondack Mountain Region 2006.” Last accessed on April 27, 2012. 
http://www.adirondackalmanack.com/2006/08/10-deadliest-accidents-in-adirondack.html 
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‘vulnerable to exploitation’” (Zremski 2011, emphasis added). I argue that even though 
BPA’s official raison d'être is to protect the “national interest” and “secure borders,” its 
actual practices show otherwise. Specifically, my empirical analysis suggests that BPA 
practices serve two main purposes, which are not mutually exclusive: a) these practices 
are about both the reproduction of “whiteness” and its economic interests, and b) these 
practices are about the jobs and institutional reproduction of the US Border Patrol. On the 
one hand, for economic and transnational elites and global citizens (see chapter 3), along 
with goods and services, crossing borders and traveling within the US territory is almost 
hassle-free. For example, one can obtain pre-clearance, if one can produce $400 dollars, 
proof of immigration status, a driver’s license, insurance and vehicle registration at the 
US-Mexico border (Pallitto and Heyman 2008). Then, once his/her application is 
approved, “a driver can use a radio frequency identification (RFID) card to pass through 
border checkpoints without stopping for inspection” (Pallitto and Heyman 2008: 322). 
These programs are in effect on both sides of the border. The Pre-enrolled Access Lane 
program (PAL) is used on the US-Mexico border and NEXUS is at the US-Canada 
border (Ibid).  
 These bordering practices, on the other hand, create insecurity for people who 
cannot produce $400 dollars, or other forms of identification, for people who are 
perceived as “reasonably suspicious,” because of their accent, dress, and customs, and for 
people who are constructed as if they are on the wrong side of the thin borderline 
between so-called “citizen” (i.e. Rep. Sensenbrenner and Dobbs) and non-citizen (i.e. 
alien and terrorists). Despite the fact that immigrant labour is absolutely crucial for the 
national interest and the economy, the US State does not make provisions to protect the 
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interests of these vulnerable groups. The discourses of security create false images of 
urgency where “safety and perhaps even the survival of the society” depends on policing 
of borders and nation (Pallitto and Heyman 2008: 317). The outcome of these discursive 
practices then translates into a search for those who are alien to whiteness. These invasive 
bordering practices create insecurity and thus normalize the subjugation of minorities.94 
Simultaneously, these practices reflect the idea of a clash of “civilizations,” (Huntington 
1993); whereas, the clash is in fact within the “civilization;” within the US State, within 
the BPAs. These bordering practices provide security for the continuation and expansion 
of the border patrol agency and the number of border patrol agents.95 However, job 
security for the border patrol should not become life insecurity and elimination of basic 
human rights for others. 
                                                
94 Simultaneously, these practices reflect the idea of a clash of “civilizations,” 
(Huntington 1993); whereas, the clash is in fact within the “civilization;” within the US 
State, within the BPAs. 
95 Surely, this is the reason why the National Border Patrol Council is enraged with 
Washington’s decision to end these practices on the northern border. 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion: Future Research, Critical Pedagogy and Redefinition of 
BPAs: 
 
 In the concluding part of my thesis, I want to succinctly address four issues. First, 
I discuss possible answers to my thesis questions. Second, I move into future research 
and what remains to be done. In other words, I make suggestions for future research and I 
explain why future research needs to examine inconspicuous US immigration policy and 
bordering policing practices. When the Occupy Movement first began, my colleagues and 
I were reading and struggling to write our research, which, perhaps naïvely, forced us to 
think about this: wouldn’t it be better if we were out there “doing something”? Thus, for 
the third issue, I elucidate how my thesis and other similar texts can be used for critical 
pedagogy. And finally, I propose a solution that will focus on the importance of 
overcoming contemporary bordering practices by creatively rethinking how to put 
existing state apparatuses to better use. 
6.1 Future Research  
 
 In this research, I have examined the inconspicuous geographies of the border, US 
immigration policy, and border patrol practices. As I have pointed out, after 2001 legal 
provisions in the US extended the idea of the border into US territory. Once again, the US 
border and bordering practices have become mobile, but this time on the whiter and 
friendlier northern border. Along the US-Canadian border, BPAs confront people in 
different places and spaces to inquire about those who look like “aliens.” The questions 
that this thesis asked include: How do border agents exercise power(s) and control the 
movement of people within 100 miles of the border? What kinds of spaces have agents 
targeted? Most importantly, if we remember the discussion of chapter four, for whom and 
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in whose interest is the border, the “nation,” being secured? BPA practices shape (and are 
shaped by) both the “public” and national space (Soja 1980). Thus the spaces where this 
border policing takes place become sites where “good” and “bad,” “citizen” and “alien” 
are produced, reproduced and contested. Immigrants are not “aliens.”  Yet, economic 
interests and immigration policies work to construct some people as such.  
 Yet no one study can answer all questions related to US immigration policy 
and/or border patrol practices. It is my hope that similar research topics in the future will 
benefit from my political and geographical examination of the border policing practices 
along the northern border. Future research must closely examine the political economy of 
the US-Canada border in relation to these bordering practices. I believe that the neo-
liberalization of US immigration policy and the construction and the usage of detention 
facilities around the US must be more carefully scrutinized. Finally, there is also a need 
to examine border patrol practices in relation to other government apparatuses and 
policies that employ similar strategies both inside and outside the US. 
 For example, the US government is currently debating legislation that appears to 
provide significant power and authority for the DHS and other apparatuses under DHS. 
The “National Security and Federal Lands Protection Act” or HR 1505, was introduced in 
2011. This act also works to achieve and serve similar interests to the aforementioned. 
Section two, paragraph (b) of HR 1505 states,  
“Authorized Activities- The Secretary of Homeland Security shall have 
immediate access to any public land managed by the Federal Government 
(including land managed by the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of 
Agriculture) for purposes of conducting activities that assist in securing the 
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border (including access to maintain and construct roads, construct a fence, use 
vehicles to patrol, and set up monitoring equipment).  (The Library of Congress, 
emphasis added) 
The following sections of the bill employ 100 miles of the national border as the 
borderline where the DHS will operate. A more disturbing part of HR 1505 is the 
description of the laws that will be waived so that DHS, which includes many other 
government agencies including BPAs, can search and exercise its powers without being 
apprehensive about any other act or law that existed previously. Below is the list of acts 
and laws that will be waived for DHS if HR 1505 passes: 
The laws referred to in paragraph (1) are the National Environmental Policy Act 
of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. 
1531 et seq.), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.), 
the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470 et seq.), the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. 703 et seq.), the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.), the 
Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 (16 U.S.C. 470aa et seq.), the 
Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300f et seq.), the Noise Control Act of 1972 
(42 U.S.C. 4901 et seq.), the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.), 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.), Public Law 86-523 (16 U.S.C. 469 et seq.), the Act 
of June 8, 1906 (commonly known as the `Antiquities Act of 1906') (16 U.S.C. 
431 et seq.), the Act of August 21, 1935 (16 U.S.C. 461 et seq.), the Wild and 
Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1271 et seq.), the Farmland Protection Policy Act (7 
U.S.C. 4201 et seq.), the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. 1451 
et seq.), the Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C. 1131 et seq.), the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Wildlife Refuge 
System Administration Act of 1966 (16 U.S.C. 668dd et seq.), the Fish and 
Wildlife Act of 1956 (16 U.S.C. 742a et seq.), the Fish and Wildlife Coordination 
Act (16 U.S.C. 661 et seq.), subchapter II of chapter 5, and chapter 7, of title 5, 
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United States Code (commonly known as the `Administrative Procedure Act'), the 
Otay Mountain Wilderness Act of 1999 (Public Law 106-145, 113 Stat. 1711), 
sections 102(29) and 103 of California Desert Protection Act of 1994 (16 U.S.C. 
410aaa et seq.), the National Park Service Organic Act (16 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), 
Public Law 91-383 (16 U.S.C. 1a-1 et seq.), sections 401(7), 403, and 404 of the 
National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-625, 92 Stat. 3467), 
the Arizona Desert Wilderness Act of 1990 (16 U.S.C. 1132 note; Public Law 
101-628), section 10 of the Act of March 3, 1899 (33 U.S.C. 403), the Act of June 
8, 1940 (16 U.S.C. 668 et seq.), (25 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.), Public Law 95-341 (42 
U.S.C. 1996), Public Law 103-141 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.), the Forest and 
Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (16 U.S.C. 1600 et seq.), 
and the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 (16 U.S.C. 528 et seq.). (Ibid) 
Some might argue that this act will never pass. However, the point I am trying to make is 
not concerned with whether this bill can pass or not. My point is that HR 1505, like other 
policies and acts listed above, works to redefine and normalize social relations in a 
manner that serves particular interests. It serves the interest of whiteness and capital 
while severely damaging basic rights and the interests of people who have been and are 
excluded in social, political and economic life. This act will provide significant power 
and authority to the border patrol (and perhaps to others under the DHS) to roam national 
space freely in search of and at the expense of those who are made  “aliens”—those who 
talk, dress and look differently. Homeland Security Secretary, Janet Napolitano, recently 
stated that the US Federal government has started using drones, unmanned aerial 
aircrafts, for the surveillance of the northern border (Valdes 2012). The DHS is 
attempting to build the “nation’s largest fleet of domestic surveillance drones” that cost 
about $250 million (Bennet 2012, Constantini 2012). According to Bennet’s article 
(2012), these drones are difficult to maintain and too costly to operate ($3000 for an 
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hour). In addition, they cannot fly in inclement weather (thus they only flew half of the 
intended number of flight hours around the borders)96 and according to NBPA, they are 
not as effective as other traditional (cheaper) surveillance equipment.97 The US 
government insists drones that cost $250 million and are unable to fly serve “our 
interests.” These contemporary surveillance bordering practices work to control and give 
the appearance of constant surveillance of individuals in unlikely places and spaces, thus 
future research needs to focus on analyzing the socio-spatial and economic consequences 
of these and other legislations in the United States. 
6.2 Organized Resistance and Redefining the Border Patrol 
 
 These border policing practices give the impression that borders are secured in 
“our interests” and therefore they create the illusion of a “secure nation.” One of the 
important difficulties here is understanding what constitutes “our,” and what “our 
interests” are, because being inside the category of “our” provides the right to be present 
inside the US. The US State apparatuses solve this difficulty by making “aliens” and 
exercising various forms of power to search, detain and remove them from the US 
national space. In other words, current border policing practices transform the idea of the 
“imagined community” into material form. And the BPAs “hunt down” those who are not 
part of “our” nation and thus “protect our interests.” Such practices, however, are done at 
the expense of minorities and other vulnerable groups, as well as at the expense of 
democratic values, freedoms and rights enshrined in the US constitution. The interests of 
                                                
96 If these drones are crucial for security, then a hypothetical situation of bad weather 
along the borders puts national security at high risk. 
97 Here, one can observe the problematic relationship between national security (the 
military industrial complex) and the labour interest of the BPA. The military industrial 
complex seems to be working against the labour interest of the BPA. 
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these vulnerable groups are not reflected in the immigration policy and border policing, 
and therefore the very existence of some immigrants and their basic right to be in the US 
state is undermined. 
 Undocumented immigrants have been systematically made and recognized as 
“illegal” in the United States for some time now. As I argued above, from the beginning 
the US government has worked to secure its territory and borders against “aliens.” The 
concept of the alien is directly linked to other categories such as “race” and class (and 
gender). As I argued, the concept of alien changes with time and space so that Native 
American and/or African slave can be aliens. The “white” immigrants in 1790 were 
aliens that could be naturalized into citizens and by 1798 they were the possible enemies 
of the state. Alien can be a “white” Irish woman in Boston, MA in the 1980s. Latinos/as 
can be “aliens,” and braceros and wetbacks. Organized African American men and 
women in the 1960s were aliens. The common denominator among these different groups 
of people is that aliens were “alien” to whiteness. Whiteness is not only about skin 
colour, because as I argued on several instances, it is colour blind. Whiteness captures 
historical, social, political, economic and thus material relations, which are made in 
relation to the “nation,” “race,” gender and class. Thus, aliens transmit and present 
meanings that shape social relations so that when individuals or groups are identified as 
“aliens,” they become alien to the prevailing ideologies and discourses. In other words, 
some people are made into aliens and alienated not only from each other, but also from 
the historical, social, political, economic and the material benefits that are available to 
others. 
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 For example, a person with a different accent, clothing, or customs is recognized 
as an “illegal alien” when the US government, media and other apparatuses link criminal 
activity with border security and immigration. As a result of this connection, the BPAs 
can search for migrants who are “illegal” within 100 miles of the northern US border. As 
I have suggested, Rep. Sensenbrenner’s HR 4437 might have failed to become a law that 
made undocumented immigrants and those who helped them criminals, and thus, it 
arguably failed to secure the “nation” and serve “national interests.” However, one of the 
achievements of this failed bill has been that it exacerbated contemporary discourses of 
anti-immigration (and conservative rhetoric) in the United States. The bill worked to 
construct “aliens” as well as fear of “aliens.” But more significantly, it helped to justify 
and normalize future anti-immigrant legislation and border policing practices. A 
particular ideology was reflected onto the US legislation and created and normalized 
discourses of anti-immigration. The State of Arizona’s SB 1070, Florida’s Canadian 
sensitive bill, and Alabama’s HB 56 are some of the other anti-immigrant legislations that 
followed HR 4437. However, the process of making aliens and securing borders is never 
one-way. Making aliens and securing borders in the name of national (or in “our”) 
interests are always contested practices. 
 In other words, there is always resistance. Mitchell (2003) demonstrates that the 
process of securing the city in the United States has been a deceptive one. Mitchell 
suggests that the answer to the question, “in whose interest is the city being secured,” 
should be “in our interest” (2003: 230). One cannot lose sight of Mitchell’s question 
because urban policies and cities are designed in a way that serves the interest of capital 
and thus not everyone has access to these spaces. Similarly, if one can expand the scale 
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from city to “nation,” then one can also ask in whose interest is the “nation” and its 
borders being secured? Who determines “our (national) interests”? These are the points 
of debate and the points of struggle. If the process of creating “our interests” is the point 
of the struggle, then “our interests” have to be redefined and must be contested. And 
these anti-immigration discourses have been contested both on the ground and in 
academia. How can academic texts like this thesis help resist bordering practices (and one 
might also ask who can afford and will have access to this research or other similar 
research)? One possible answer is the following: this thesis and other similar texts are 
often shared with students in classrooms and seminars. Sharing such work with students 
will make these bordering practices accessible and visible, and they could apply these 
critical points and include them in their decision-making processes—or in some cases, 
explore these ideas when they are protesting in the streets. In other words, critical 
pedagogy will inform people about the inconspicuous geographies of borders and 
bordering policing practices. 
 In addition to academia, there is resistance on the ground that is slowly but 
steadily growing. In 2006, immigrants, documented and undocumented, took to the 
streets and made themselves visible. They protested (by the hundreds of thousands) 
against HR 4437 (Staeheli and Mitchell 2008), perhaps because this legislation was not in 
their interest. In 2008, a group of concerned individuals protested against transportation 
companies in front of Penn Station in New York City. They protested transportation 
companies for a) assisting the border patrol (and others) to conduct these intrusive 
searches and for b) not informing their passengers in advance about these raids (Lee 
2008). Civil rights organizations such the ACLU, FFF and others (scholars such as 
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Joseph Nevins and Nancy Morawetz)98 continue to make these unjust practices visible. 
Their work includes individuals and communities who are negatively affected by these 
(and other) bordering practices. “The Border Patrol Free” network in Olympic Peninsula, 
WA is also one example of organized resistance. In addition, there are others who also 
organize and resist the border patrol’s practices. While the nobility of the following type 
of “resistance” might be questionable, smugglers also become mobile. Like the BPAs, 
they roam, observe and track border patrol agents’ locations and provide live updates for 
those who are trying to cross the border (Lacey 2011).  In addition to these examples of 
resistance, and as I persistently argued, government reports continuously suggest that the 
rising number of border patrol agents and their detention numbers do not secure borders 
and do not serve “our interests.” Yet, as HR 1505 suggests, the rhetoric of national 
security and security of the borders is still pushed in the name of “our interests” by the 
US State. So, what else can be done?  
 Mitchell (2003: 236) asserts that “expanding the right to the city requires a clear 
focus on the utopic possibilities, and dangers, of always seeking to reopen, and thus 
reform, public space in the image of a more just urban order.” By expanding and linking 
his call for a more just city to a more just “nation” (or at least to anywhere within the 100 
mile of the international borders), I propose original and utopic changes for the US 
Border Patrol. 99 If the US State and its apparatuses and agents could reshape 
contemporary discourses surreptitiously by enforcing whiteness and capitalist ideology 
                                                
98 Professor Morawetz and some of her students helped to create the “Justice Derailed” 
report. Professor Nevins has been writing about injustices along the borders and 
borderlands for sometime now.  
99 During my conversation with Mitchell, he suggested that under capitalism, every good 
idea looks like a utopic idea.  
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through undemocratic and anti-immigrant legislations, then I would argue that a counter 
approach must also be applied to resist and reproduce social relations (and also power 
relations)—of course along with all other forms of organized resistance. I suggest that 
one way to serve “our” interest can be done by changing the image and the job definition 
for border patrol agents. The name, border patrol agent, must be changed to “Border 
Agents for Secure Immigrant Communities” (BASIC). BASIC agents must continue to 
roam 100 miles of the border but this time with the intention of assisting all authorized 
and unauthorized immigrants’ immediate and future needs—from providing food and 
water in the middle of the desert to providing assistance to immigrants against 
discrimination in the city and in the “nation.” BASIC agents must protect immigrants 
from other apparatuses, corporations and communities who treat them and their labour 
unjustly anywhere within the 100 miles of the international border. Based on my 
geographical analysis in this thesis, there will be enough work to both justify the 
reproduction of the USBP as an institution and to secure BASIC jobs.  
 The spatial control of vulnerable groups in unlikely places can be turned into 
spatial assistance for those vulnerable groups. As a result, not only is the job security of 
BASIC guaranteed, but also the “right to be” for minority citizens in the US is secured. 
Perhaps then, one can get a bit closer to a more just “nation.” 
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